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History provides many examples of seemingly ‘ordinary’ men who take 
part in acts of collective violence that support the economic, political or 
social goals of ‘their’ group, such as genocide, mass killings, insurgencies 
and terrorism. For long, social scientists have debated whether engaging 
in such violence is driven solely by circumstances or whether individual 
characteristics also are important (e.g. Browning, 1992; De Swaan, 2015; 
Littman & Paluck, 2014). This goes as well for collective violence that is 
resorted to by crowds, which is the subject matter of this thesis. This latter 
form of collective violence may occur around demonstrations, protests, 
football matches, recreational events and community disturbances, and 
distinguishes itself from for instance war and state-perpetrated acts 
(Adang, 2011; WHO, 2002). For the sake of readability, collective violence 
by crowds in this thesis is simply referred to as collective violence. For the 
purpose of this thesis, both confronting others physically and the destroying 
or damaging of objects, or attempts to do so, are listed as under violence.
The first explanations of collective violence date back till the end of the 
19th century. Le Bon (1895) assumed that within a group, individuals behave 
irrationally and may come to act violently because they shift from a conscious 
to an unconscious personality. This so-called ‘classical perspective’ on 
collective violence is linked to the later developed concept of deindividuation: 
a tempxorary state of reduced self-awareness due to an increased feeling of 
anonymity and a decreased feeling of individual responsibility (Diener, 1980; 
Zimbardo, 1969). Furthermore, within the classical perspective on collective 
violence some authors assume that violent crowd behavior reflects the 
criminal or deviant nature of the individuals who are a part of it. This latter 
notion is incorporated in so-called convergence explanations (Ball & Drury, 
2012; Reicher, 2001). 
The classical perspectives on collective violence have been misused to 
criminalize crowds and, in turn, as a justification to treat crowds as criminal 
(Reicher, 2001). Uproars by ethnic minorities in the 1960s and 1970s and 
the rise of hooliganism in the 1980s refueled scholarly interest in collective 
violence. Dissatisfied with the absence of context in classical perspectives 
(decontextualizing), alternative explanations were developed. Turner & 
Kilian (1987), for instance, argued that group norms are established through 
joint consultation between individuals within the crowd, witah some having 
more influence than others. Although this line of reasoning provided a link 
between individuals and their actions in crowds, their emergent norm theory 
failed to explain how such crowd unity can be quickly achieved in changing 
circumstances (Wright, 1978). Furthermore, the context in which collective 
violence emerged, including its intra- and intergroup dynamics, kept being 
disregarded (Reicher, 2001).
To address these shortcomings and to illustrate that – for those 
involved  – involvement in collective violence is meaningful behavior, in the 
1980s, the concept of social identity was introduced. By arguing that crowd 
behavior is guided by an individual’s self-understanding as a member of a group 
(social identity) instead of his own goals and desires (personal identity), the 
focus shifted to the relevance of perceived similarities with the in-group and 
differences with the out-group. Consequently, the social identity perspective 
on collective violence maintains that individual behavior in crowds is guided 
exclusively by social category-based processes (Reicher, 1984, 1987). Over
Background
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the past decades, the social identity perspective on collective violence 
has been further elaborated (Reicher, 2001). One of its main premises is 
that individual characteristics do not in any way guide individual behavior 
in crowds: ‘there has been precious little success in finding any individual 
attributes which reliably predict riot participation’ (Reicher, 2001, p. 191). 
This stance has remained virtually undisputed (Brown, 2000) but, at the 
same time, has also been insufficiently studied. This introductory chapter 
intends to explain why sticking to this premise is unsatisfactory and why 
individual characteristics should be a legitimate component of collective 
violence research. In addition, in this chapter the thesis’ aim, exploring 
the contribution of individual characteristics to collective violence, and its 
outline are described.
From the 1960s onwards, study results indicated that collective violence 
was not – as proposed by the “classical” theories – irrational, unfocused 
and uncontrolled (e.g. Reicher, 1984, 1987). Convergence explanations 
stressing that the crowd reinforces and intensifies the already existing 
criminal and deviant character of individuals who are a part of it, were also 
increasingly challenged. For instance, research showed that the majority of 
those involved in collective violence around protests and demonstrations 
had no substantial criminal history and did not routinely engage in violent 
behavior. Furthermore, no other links between individual characteristics 
and partaking in collective violence could be established (Reicher, 2001). 
Individual characteristics were argued not to predict or explain individual 
behavior in social situations at all or, if they did, their influence would quickly 
diminish in larger crowds (McPhail & Pickens, 1981; McPhail, 1991; Stott & 
Reicher, 1998a; Turner, 1964). 
To offer a counterpart to the classical perspectives on collective 
violence, scholars aimed to provide a link between individuals, their actions 
in crowds, and the context in which these actions arise (Reicher, 2001). To 
this end, Tajfel and Turner’s (1979) concept of social identity was adapted 
to explain collective violence. These scholars assumed that individuals 
have many social identities (e.g. family, nationality, neighborhood and 
work), which ensures that individual thoughts, emotions and behaviors are 
in accordance with the situation at hand (Tajfel & Turner’s, 1979; Turner 
& Kilian, 1987). This concept of social identity is at the core of the Social 
Identity Model (SIM), which currently is one of the dominant vantage 
points for explaining collective violence. The SIM maintains that in response 
to underlying causes and/or precipitating incidents (hereafter: trigger 
events) individuals in a crowd may shift from a personal to a social identity. 
Subsequently, situation-specific norms are assumed to guide group and 
individual behavior, suggesting that an ‘us-them’ perspective is a main 
catalyst of collective action (Postmes & Spears, 1998; Reicher, 1984, 1987). 
From a social identity perspective, partaking in collective violence entails 
neither irrational, unfocused and uncontrolled behavior nor an influence 
of pre-existing individual characteristics. Instead, it assumes a shift from 
individual to categorical bases of behavioral control (Reicher, 2001). 
The social identity perspective on collective violence has received 
extensive empirical support (see Reicher (2001) for an overview). The
A social identity perspective on collective violence 
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categorical level of perceived relationships is particularly well reflected in 
the dynamics between police action – treating the whole crowd as potentially 
disruptive – and its consequences for crowd behavior. In such cases previously 
‘neutral’ individuals in the crowd may come to act violently (e.g. Stott & 
Reicher, 1998b; Drury & Reicher, 1999; Stott & Drury, 2000), reflecting the 
notion that individuals tend to gravitate to a position minimizing intra-group 
differences compared to intergroup differences (Haslam & Turner, 1992, 
1995; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty & Hayes, 1992). The results of these 
and other studies also underscore that collective violence is aimed only at 
the out-group linked to the trigger event, and that behavioral norms are 
defined by looking at the behavior of others who are considered to share 
the same social identity (Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2005; Postmes & Spears, 
1998; Reicher, 1984, 1987, 1996). Unlike previously developed theories, the 
social identity perspective on collective violence explains the rapidity with 
which consensus within crowds can arise and why any person in a crowd 
may come to act violently (Reicher, 2001; Terry, Hogg & White, 1999). 
Even in the face of trigger events and intergroup dynamics gravitating 
towards collective violent action however, only a minority of the individuals 
present actually involve themselves in violent behavior (Adang, 2011). This 
observation may be explained by differences in the social categories that 
individuals identify, in the contents of these categories and in the persons 
prototypical thereof (Herrera & Reicher, 1998; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, b; 
Reicher & Sani, 1998; Sani & Reicher, 1998, 1999). Furthermore, experiencing 
anger or joy has been pointed to as a factor contributing to intergroup 
conflict and offensive action tendencies in crowds (Levy et al., 2017; Mackie 
et al., 2000; Spaaij, 2008; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Such findings suggest that 
cognitive processes and resultant emotions may play a key role in collective 
violence involvement. Consequently this also indicates that individual-level 
factors may have explanatory value with regard to this matter.
Anger is a strong negative emotional state that is explicitly linked to 
violent behavior (DeWall, Anderson & Bushman, 2011). Individuals vary in 
their propensity to experience anger due to the way social information is 
processed and the emotions this evokes (see Crick & Dodge, 1994). This, in 
turn, suggests that in a given context chances of behaving violently differ 
between individuals (Hazebroek, Howells & Day, 2001; Martinko & Zellars, 
1998; Owen, 2011). Heightened impulsivity and emotion regulation deficits 
(ED) are examples of behavioral and psychological characteristics that have 
been implicated in the etiology of violence, particularly violent behavior 
disproportionate to the actual situation (Coccaro, 2003; Fetich et al., 
2014; Kulper et al., 2015; Puhalla et al., 2016). This goes as well for a hostile 
attribution bias – the tendency of interpreting others’ intent as hostile also in 
ambiguous or benign situations – which is often present in people suffering 
from antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) (e.g. Bailey & Ostrov, 2008; 
Babcock, Green, & Webb, 2008; Douglas & Martinko, 2001).
Not only social information processing but also explicit and implicit 
attitudes towards violent behavior have been pointed to as a contributing 
factor to actual violence (Anderson & Huesmann, 2007). Explicit attitudes 
refer to deliberate behaviors that can be traced back to a positive view on 
Individual-level explanations for violent behavior
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the behavior in question (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Examples of 
positive attitudes towards violent behavior are reflected in the belief that 
this behavior is acceptable or that it contributes to self-esteem and social 
image (Huesmann & Guerra, 1997; Slaby & Guerra, 1988). Such attitudes 
have been found to be more prevalent among individuals suffering from ASPD 
(Gilbert et al., 2015), indicating again that psychological characteristics may 
contribute to behaving violently. 
Despite negative explicit attitudes towards violence, individuals may 
still come to act violently due to uncontrolled emotional reactions. The risk
of uncontrolled emotional reactions may increase due to a lack of cognitive 
resources, motivation and/or time to make the cognitive effort required to 
behave in accordance with explicit attitudes (Dodge, 1993). The extent to 
which this cognitive effort can be made appears to be linked to an individual’s 
ability to inhibit impulses and regulate emotions. This may explain why 
heightened impulsivity and ED – as well as ADHD – are associated with an 
increased risk of displaying violent behavior (Coccaro, Bergeman & McClearn, 
1993; Davidson, Putnam & Larson, 2000; Kim & Lee, 2010; Retz & Rösler, 2010). 
Due to the course of the scientific debate on collective violence so far, 
individual agency in crowds has been approached almost exclusively from 
a group-dynamic vantage point (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2017). 
However, the current empirical literature on violent behavior indicates that 
psychological characteristics a) influence how individuals interpret and 
evaluate their social environment, b) affect an individual’s attitude to violent 
behavior and c) are vital to the ability to inhibit spontaneous emotional-
driven responses. This suggests that individual agency in crowds may not 
exclusively be affected by trigger events and subsequent social processes 
as assumed in the social identity perspective. Potential relevant individual 
characteristics and contributing mechanisms as derived from prior empirical 
work discussed above on solo violence are displayed in table 1.1.
Based on observations of collective violence around football matches 
and protest events, Adang (2011) introduced the initiation-escalation model 
of public disorder (hereafter: initiation-escalation model). This model posits 
that context, intergroup interaction, intergroup relationships and individual 
differences together may more adequately explain who becomes involved in 
collective violence and why (Adang, 2011). 
To explain the initiation of collective violence, the initiation-escalation 
model distinguishes between violence that occurs in response to a trigger 
event (reactive violence) and violence merely requiring the presence of a 
rival group (proactive violence). The target of reactive violence is usually
linked to the trigger preceding the violence. On the other hand, individuals 
and groups who aim for a confrontation to occur seek violence proactively. 
Recent theoretical developments
Table 1.1 Individual characteristics that may contribute to collective violence involvement
14
These confrontations may even be preplanned (also see Adang, 2002; 
Spaaij, 2007). In the initiation-escalation model, two mechanisms explain 
why individuals decide to involve themselves in collective violence. The 
first mechanism, an ‘us versus them’ antagonism, parallels the principles 
of the social identity perspective as set out in a previous section of this 
chapter. The second escalation mechanism involves opportunity and 
(perceived) risk of retaliation. This escalation mechanism is substantiated 
by observations, which indicate that a) collective violence is more likely
when the police are absent, b) confrontations are being avoided or fled 
from when perceived as unable to win and c) only a minority of those 
present engages in risky behaviors such as physical fighting. This links to 
criminological principles central to rational choice and opportunity theory. 
Rational choice theory, in short, states that an individual will engage in an 
offense only when the risks associated with offending do not outweigh 
the perceived benefits. Opportunity theory builds on this assumption by 
specifically focusing on situational conditions that make committing an 
offense more or less ‘profitable’ (Cornish & Clarke, 1986; Clarke, 1995). 
Referring to the so-called young male syndrome – a high prevalence of 
risk-taking and criminal behaviors in young males, particularly in the presence 
of like-minded peers – sex (male) and age (young) are identified as individual 
characteristics, which may contribute to collective violence involvement 
(Adang, 2011). This line of thought fits with the notion that pronounced 
changes in personality occur in adolescence, with changes being partly 
attributable to social demands and experiences (Specht, Egloff & Schmukle, 
2011). As most young males do not display antisocial and criminal behavior, the 
demographic characteristics central to the young male syndrome, however, 
are rather unspecific. Given the key role of cognitive processes and resultant 
emotions in collective violence involvement, psychological characteristics 
associated with violent behavior may contribute to participating in collective 
violence. 
Although psychological characteristics are likely to affect an individual’s 
interpretation and evaluation of a given situation, his or her attitude to 
violence and the ability to inhibit spontaneous emotional-driven responses, 
scholars adhering to a social identity perspective on collective violence have 
put forward various arguments for not taking psychological characteristics 
into account. For instance, it has been argued that – if individual 
characteristics contribute – this contribution is insignificant in large groups. 
As violent behavior is not displayed continuously, it also has been stated 
that the violent behavior of individuals who participate in collective violence 
relates specifically to the situation at hand. Finally, it has been posited that 
in the empirical literature no indications can be found that substantiate a 
contribution of individual characteristics to engaging in collective violence 
(Reicher, 2001). There is something to be said of these arguments. First, 
some lack empirical evidence. To our knowledge, it has, for instance, not 
been examined whether the influence of individual characteristics on 
collective violence indeed diminishes when crowd size increases. Second,
some arguments contrast prior empirical work. For instance, risk factors 
for solo and collective violence offending have been found to largely overlap. 
A need for further research
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Furthermore, subgroups of violent offenders have been identified who 
frequently display violent behavior both alone and in groups (e.g. hooligans) 
(Piquero et al., 2015; Van de Valk & Linckens, 1988). These findings oppose, 
at least to some extent, the argument that underlying causes of solo and 
collective violence behavior differ significantly from one another. Third, 
several studies have indicated a link between psychological characteristics 
and an increased chance of participating in collective violence (Arms & Russell, 
1997; Mustonen et al., 1996; Russell, 1995). In addition, empirical studies 
that do not find evidence for a contribution of individual characteristics are 
in fact very limited with a focus on US ghetto riots and do not include the 
– from the point of view of this thesis – ‘right’ individual characteristics. This 
suggests that currently dominant explanations of collective violence may fail 
to adequately address the full scope of potentially relevant characteristics 
when it comes to understanding collective violence. 
All over consideration leads to the conclusion that the social identity 
perspective emphasizes that trigger events and subsequent social processes 
exclusively guide partaking in collective violence, whereas convergence 
explanations stress the contribution of individual characteristics. The 
empirical literature that has evolved over the past decades indeed suggests 
that the social processes central to social identity are at the core of explaining 
collective violence (Reicher, 2001). At the same time, however, it seems that 
individual characteristics play their part in the etiology of participating in 
collective violence. Research indicates that the individual characteristics 
at play may affect the perception of social relations (e.g. in-group and out-
group), the evaluation of events (e.g. it being experienced as a provocation) 
and the responses considered to be appropriate (e.g. considering violence as 
justified or being unable to suppress an aggressive response). This suggests 
that a common ground, between the social identity perspective and the 
convergence explanations it so eagerly dismisses, may be found in their 
interaction with one another.
As was argued above, the common ground between the social identity 
model and theories implicating individual characteristics in explanations 
of (collective) violence, relates to questions like a) whether trigger events 
or opportunities are perceived, b) how these events and opportunities are 
evaluated, and c) how these events and opportunities are subsequently 
responded to. Personal cognitions and emotions influence perceptions, 
evaluations and responses to social events and can therewith be expected to 
contribute to an individual becoming involved in collective action, including 
collective violence. 
From the premise that stable psychological characteristics contribute 
to collective violence involvement, it follows that those found to participate 
in collective violence can be expected to display violent behavior outside 
of collective settings as well. Likely, their cognitions and emotions will 
apply to their social interactions in general, so both within and outside 
crowd situations. The large majority of those involved in collective violence 
however has been found to rarely behave violently outside collective
settings and to do so in crowd settings only under very specific conditions 
(Reicher, 2001). A small subgroup of collective violence offenders may
Current study and research questions
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however be an important exception to these findings: members of hard-
core hooligan groups. Several studies indicate that these individuals are 
frequently and perpetually involved in both solo and collective violence, and 
to be so from early age on (Lösel & Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 2015). 
Moreover, prior research suggests that their psychological characteristics 
may indeed contribute to their violent behavior. Hard core hooligans, for 
instance, have been found to suffer disproportionally from psychological 
disorders such as ADHD and ASPD (Lösel & Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et 
al., 2015). In addition, they have been implicated to participate in mutually 
arranged confrontations, indicating that – for some of them – the mere 
presence of a rival group is sufficient to engage in collective violence (Adang, 
2011; Cleland & Cashmore, 2016; Giulianotti & Armstrong, 2002; Marsh & 
Harré, 1978).
In sum, the current empirical literature suggests that the majority of 
young men who are involved in collective violence only act violently on a 
one-off basis in a specific setting, without having repeated police contacts. 
Their violent behavior may be explained by antagonistic group relationships, 
which emerge due to a specific course of events (Reicher, 2001). On the 
other hand, a small subgroup of individuals can be identified whose violent 
behaviors – alone and as part of a collective – have an early onset and continue 
well into adulthood. Their (collective) violence may even be preplanned. 
Rather than contextual factors, their violent behavior seems to be driven by 
psychological characteristics associated with violent behavior (Piquero et 
al., 2015; Lösel & Bliesener, 2003), which may make them more susceptible 
to participating in collective violence (Russell, 2004).
Although there is a subtle difference between violent behavior and 
offending (not all offending entails violent behavior), the individual differences 
in frequency of and persistence in violent behavior may be interpreted and 
explained by means of Moffitt’s (1993, 1997) dual taxonomy. She identified 
two developmental offending pathways: the adolescence-limited trajectory 
and a life-course persistent pathway.1  Adolescence-limited offenders 
display risky behavior and minor offending particularly in groups. They 
generally have a regular childhood and mostly desist from offending shortly 
after initiating it. Their offending behavior may be attributed to feeling a 
need to belong and to the relevance adolescents assign to social status 
(Wilson & Daly, 1985; Weerman et al., 2015; Young & Weerman, 2013). Life-
course persistent offenders, however, suffer from inborn deficiencies in 
neurological functioning and display behavioral problems already from an 
early age on. Their behavioral and psychiatric characteristics and the inability 
of others (e.g. parents) to adequately cope with these during childhood, in 
turn, are linked to their early age of onset of and persistence in offending 
(Moffitt, 1993, 1997). The dual taxonomy thus offers different explanations 
for different groups who, during adolescence, are engaging in rather similar 
behaviors.
Thus far, studies taking a typological vantage point to interpret the 
contrasting offending patterns of individuals involved in collective violence 
suffer from various methodological shortcomings. These shortcomings for 
instance concern sample size (relatively small) and sample inclusion criteria,
which are biased towards individuals resembling Moffitt’s life-course 
persistence offenders (e.g. Farrington, 1994; Lösel & Bliesener, 2003; 
1 Although more recent studies identify more offending trajectories, the heart of this line of 
thought remains undisputed (Moffitt, 2007; Monahan et al., 2009; Piquero, 2007).
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Piquero et al., 2015). Consequently, these studies stress individual-level 
explanations without considering prior empirical work from the social 
identity perspective. The current study aims to provide empirical data to 
bridge differences between convergence and social identity explanations 
and seeks to find a common ground between opposing explanations for 
collective violence. To this end, the current studies aim at answering the 
following research questions:
By looking at collective violence around football matches and 
recreational events in the Netherlands, this thesis’ focus is upon collective 
violence that is, at least by outsiders, perceived as issue-irrelevant and 
hedonistic (Marx, 1970). Therefore, structural, political/ideological and 
cultural aspects of collective violence (see Waddington, 2010) are not 
explicitly considered. The social identity perspective has been utilized to 
explain collective violence irrespective of the situation in which it occurs. 
So, given this thesis’ aim, the specific situation in which collective violence is 
studied therefore does not seem theoretically relevant.
There are however several practical reasons for focusing on collective 
violence around football matches and recreational events. First, although 
the Netherlands have known times in which protests and demonstrations 
got out of hand repeatedly – for instance during the squatters’ riots in the 
1980s (Rosenthal &’ t Hart, 1990) – collective violence in the Netherlands 
occurs most frequently around football matches. Second, over the past 
years, with the aim of identifying those involved, the Dutch police have 
extensively investigated multiple cases of collective violence around football 
matches. This, in turn, increased the chance that a representative sample 
of collective violence offenders can be obtained (see Ball & Drury, 2012). 
Third, as individuals involved in collective violence around football matches 
and recreational events are central to this thesis, it is relevant to know that 
between 1997 and 2014 the Dutch government developed and implemented 
various policies aiming to increase security around football matches. 
Particularly relevant is that reducing football violence by targeting those 
repeatedly involved in football violence and facilitating ‘neutral’ supporters 
became standard policy during this period. This resulted in setting up 
a database in which known hooligans are registered by means of the 
‘Hooligans in Beeld’ approach (see Ferwerda & Adang, 2007). The presence 
of such policies, which pay attention to individuals and groups at high risk 
for partaking in collective violence, increases the availability of suitable data.
1 Do developmental pathways in delinquency and crime differ across individuals 
up to the moment they become involved in collective violence?
2 Are individual characteristics linked to persistence in collective violence 
offending and, if so, which ones?
3 Does the contribution of contextual and individual determinants differ 
between various types of collective violence (reactive vs. proactive) and, if 
so, in what way? 
Methods
Study Focus
(   )
(   )
(    )
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Pursuing these policies has resulted in a gradual decline in serious 
violent incidents and a decrease of police deployment around football 
matches in the Netherlands (Ferwerda et al., 2014). At the same time, 
violent confrontations between hooligan sides still occur from time to 
time. Over the past five years, several incidents of collective violence 
around football matches have taken place, with some being investigated 
by an external commission due to their vehemence (Auditteam Voetbal & 
Veiligheid, 2012a, 2012b). Furthermore, arranged confrontations between 
sides outside match days and away from the stadium surroundings 
are an upcoming phenomenon (Ferwerda et al., 2014). This indicates 
that collective violence around football matches is still a current topic, 
assuring not only this thesis’ scientific merit but also its societal relevance.
A multimethod study consisting of quantitative and qualitative research 
methods was conducted to answer the research questions prominent to 
this thesis. For quantitative research purposes, various samples were used.
In absolute numbers collective violence is a rarely occurring event, and 
when it does occur, usually only a minority of individuals who partake in the 
violent behavior is identified and arrested (Ball & Drury, 2012). In order to 
determine developmental pathways in delinquency and crime of individuals 
involved in collective violence, a representative sample of collective violence 
offenders (n=438) was identified and criminal career data were gathered.
Collective violence offenders were identified based on two sources. The 
first source was a hooligan database managed by the Dutch National Football 
Intelligence Point (Dutch: Centraal Informatiepunt Voetbalvandalisme, 
CIV). A side note regarding the CIV-database is that registered individuals 
are well known due to their prominence in hooliganism, increasing the risk 
of bias towards individuals more frequently and perpetually involved in 
collective violence. Therefore, in addition, individuals apprehended due to 
their involvement in a recent collective violence incident were included in 
the study. Only incidents where the police had made a great deal of effort 
to arrest those involved – including extensive analysis of available camera 
footage as well as sharing footage with the public to facilitate identification 
of involved individuals – were selected. This way it was ensured that 
arrested individuals did not merely consist of individuals already known to 
the police due to their prior offending (see Ball & Drury, 2012). Between 
2011 and 2017, this applied to three collective violence incidents: two 
cases of collective violence erupting around a football match (Auditteam 
2012a, 2012b) and one case of collective violence around a spontaneous 
recreational event (Cohen Commission, 2013). The latter incident was not 
football-related. However, as this disturbance was ‘non-political’ and, just 
like football-related incidents, could be characterized as issue-irrelevant, 
it was included in the current thesis.
Criminal career data included arrests up to the moment of involvement 
in collective violence as well as data from the national police registration 
system BVH (Dutch: Basisvoorziening Handhaving). Records in the BVH 
include all incidents that police officers have been concerned with during
Research methods and data sets
1 Crime and delinquency sample (n=438)(   )
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their shifts over the past five years and also cover non-arrested persons. 
This offered the possibility to gain insight into incidents in which individuals 
were involved, also when their involvement was not followed by an arrest.
To be able to determine whether and, if so, which individual 
characteristics are linked to persistence in collective violence additional 
criminal career data (up to 2016) were gathered for the crime and 
delinquency sample. In addition, behavioral and psychiatric characteristics 
data were obtained. Because Dutch legislation does not allow researchers 
to independently approach former arrestees with the request to complete 
psychological tests or cooperate with an interview, existing data needed to 
be relied on. Three sources of information were consulted. First, forensic 
reports written by the Netherlands Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and 
Psychology (Dutch: Nederlands Instituut voor Forensische Psychiatrie en 
Psychologie, NIFP) on request of the magistrate or the Public Prosecution 
Service (PPS). Such forensic reports are, however, prepared only in cases 
of very serious offending and were often not present for individuals who 
participated in collective violence. Second, police data were utilized for 
gathering information on psychological characteristics. The police may 
make references to psychological characteristics in the registration system 
BVH, which entails verbatim elaborations of interrogations and suspect and 
witness statements. BVH records of collective violence offenders therefore 
were consulted. Third, we consulted Dutch Probation Service data recorded 
in a recidivism risk assessment instrument (the RISc) – which has been used 
for suspects who are fifteen years and older since 2004 (Hildebrand & Bosker, 
2011). To increase the validity of the data gathered, a coding list aimed to 
identify references to psychological characteristics was used. The presence 
of psychological characteristics was recorded only when, in the sources 
consulted, either the individuals included in the study themselves, their 
educators or professionals aware of the individual’s personal circumstances 
a) mentioned that disorders had been diagnosed or there had been 
pronounced suspicions thereof without psychological examination, b) made 
references to the required use of specific medication or c) described a 
behavioral pattern indicative of the psychological characteristics this study 
focuses upon. 
Data on a subgroup of the crime and delinquency sample (n=108) were 
utilized for case study purposes. In addition to police registration data on 
their prior offending up to becoming involved in collective violence, BVH data 
up to that moment were utilized to record the presence of psychological 
characteristics. 
Despite the regular occurrence of arranged confrontations, obtaining 
case files proved to be difficult due to an absence of criminal investigations. 
In the end, only two recent case files (2012 and 2015) concerning instances 
of collective violence that could be classified as mutually arranged
2 Persistence sample (n=438)
3 Reactive violence sample (n=108)
4 Mutually arranged confrontation sample (n=40) and reactive football-
related collective violence sample (n=76)
(   )
(   )
(   )
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confrontations could be studied. A dataset consisting of individuals (n=40) 
who, as established by these two recent case files, had been involved in a 
mutually arranged confrontation were included in this sample. Available 
data concern involvement in delinquency and crime as apparent from police 
registration data about offending up to 2016. In addition, psychological 
characteristics data were obtained from police and Dutch Probation Service 
data. Suspects in the studied case files were compared to individuals who had 
been involved in collective violence in a non-arranged football-related setting 
with regard to their criminal career and psychological characteristics. Data 
were recorded in a way similar to the two former samples.
Next to these quantitative datasets, qualitative information was 
gathered. For the case study of a reactive collective violence incident 105 
interviews with authorities, police officers and municipal workers (of which 
94 face-to-face) were conducted, and written documentation and audio-
visual materials of a collective violence incident in a recreational setting 
were analyzed. Findings were, where appropriate, complemented with the 
results of other studies conducted in response to this incident (Van Dijk et 
al., 2013; Van den Brink et al., 2013). To gain insight into mutually arranged 
confrontations, two recent case files were studied and additional face-to-
face interviews with police representatives involved in both investigations 
were held. In addition, a questionnaire was sent out to international 
and Dutch police professionals (the latter working covertly and non-
covertly) involved in football and safety. With several international and 
Dutch police professionals who responded, subsequent semi-structured 
interviews were held. 
This introductory chapter described developments in the field of 
collective violence research and the theoretical stance to which this has 
led are described. By bringing together prior empirical work from a variety 
of disciplines, a potential common ground between the social identity 
perspective and the convergence explanations that scholars adhering to 
the first point of view so vividly dismiss was identified. This thesis’ aim is to 
empirically substantiate this common ground by examining whether, and if 
so how and for whom, individual determinants of collective violence can be 
identified.
In chapter 2 of this thesis, the criminal career trajectories of 438 
individuals who have been involved in collective violence are examined 
by using group-based models. The main aim of the study reported in this 
chapter is to provide a detailed description of the criminal careers of those 
involved in collective violence (onset, frequency, and diversity of offending), 
their developmental pathways in delinquency and crime, and the extent to 
which other violent offenses are committed.
In chapter 3, persistence in collective violence offending and 
behavioral and psychiatric characteristics of those involved are described 
and analyzed. This chapter, therefore, is centered on the question whether 
individual determinants of collective violence can be identified and, if so, 
which psychological characteristics are associated with collective violence 
offending. 
Aim and outline of the thesis
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A case study of the so-called ‘Haren Facebook riot’ in September 2012 
is provided in chapter 4. This riot is analyzed by means of the initiation-
escalation model. The questions this chapter aims to answer is how events 
escalated, what contextual and individual factors played a role and why the 
police were eventually attacked. 
The notions of contextual and individual contributing factors are further 
elaborated in chapter 5, which focuses on mutually arranged confrontations 
between hooligan groups. To date, no empirical studies into this matter have 
been conducted. Chapter 5 aims to provide a detailed description about 
the significance of arranged confrontations to those who participate and to 
explore determinants of becoming involved in such fights. 
The sixth and final chapter provides a summary of all findings and a 
discussion of their theoretical and practical implications. 
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Since the 1970s theoretical and empirical work on collective violence 
has mainly focused on the context in which collective violence takes place, 
assuming that collective violence offenders are ordinary people acting 
in extraordinary circumstances. Recent studies however indicate that 
‘hooligans’ share many characteristics with other violent offenders, which 
has (re)fueled the notion that individual propensity is important in explaining 
collective violence, and that collective violence offenders generally fit the 
small group of serious and persistent offenders identified by Moffitt. Based 
on Dutch police data on 438 individuals involved in collective violence, we 
examined the criminal careers of collective violence offenders leading up to 
the date of registration as a collective violence offender. Using group-based 
models, we distinguished three criminal career trajectories in our sample. 
Although we found many collective violence offenders had no criminal 
records whatsoever, we also found a small group of collective violence 
offenders who exhibited a high frequency of offending, displayed both solo 
and group violence, and acted violently across different settings. Our results 
leave us to take a middle ground in the context-propensity debate, because 
we argue that different categories of collective violence offenders may exist 
whose behaviour is triggered by different processes. Incorporating the 
notion of different types of collective violence offenders helps explain the 
seemingly contradictory findings of prior studies, and suggests new avenues 
for future research into the intra- and intergroup dynamics of collective 
violence.
Keywords: Criminal careers, hooliganism, collective violence, violent crime
Large-scale collective violence incidents have been common throughout 
modern history. For example, think of the US riots in the 1960s (for example, 
Caplan and Paige, 1968), the mass demonstrations, strikes and riots in the 
UK at the end of the 1980s (Burns, 1992; Reicher, 1996; Walton and Ragin, 
1990), confrontations between protesters and the police at international 
summits such as G8 and G20 meetings (Della Porta and Reiter, 2006; Ericson 
and Doyle, 1999; Herbert, 2007) and reoccurring disturbances between 
supporters of different football teams (Spaaij, 2006, 2008; Williams et al., 
1986). Urban violence and escalated protest events may find grounds in 
felt injustices at, for instance, the economic, political or social level (Body-
Gendrot, 2012; Reicher, 1996; Waddington and King, 2009). Consequently, 
these types of collective violence can be characterized as issue relevant. 
Crowd violence surrounding (sport) events on the other hand is considered, 
at least by outsiders, as issue irrelevant (Marx, 1970; Wann et al., 2001). 
Despite differences in the nature of collective violence, there are roughly 
two types of explanation for it (Reicher 1996; Waddington and King, 2005). 
First, there are theories that focus on the context in which collective violence 
occurs. Trigger events, group dynamics and (the emergence of) temporary 
deviant norms in crowds in particular have received scholarly attention 
(Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997, 2004; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Second, 
there are theories that focus on individual characteristics of collective 
violence offenders (hereafter propensity theories). Central to propensity 
theories is the notion that collective violence reflects the character of 
Abstract
Introduction
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those belonging to the crowd (LeBon, 1895; Taylor, 1984; Waddington, 
2003). Taking the argument to the extreme, contextual theories hold that 
everyone is at equal risk of getting caught up on the spur of the moment and 
engaging in collective violence. In this sense, collective violence offenders 
resemble the famous Dr Jekyll, an ordinary person turning to crime and 
deviance only under very specific conditions (Lösel and Bliesener, 2003). In 
contrast, propensity theories view collective violence offenders much more 
as a Mr Hyde. According to these theories, collective violence offenders are 
not different from other (violent) offenders whose personal and background 
characteristics constantly put them at risk of frequent offending, both 
alone and in groups, and not only during adolescence – when delinquency 
is most common – but also in adulthood. Prevalence, incidence and duration 
of offending are key elements by which criminal career studies characterize 
persistent offenders (for example, Blumstein et al., 1986). Propensity 
theories therefore seem to suggest that collective violence offenders are at 
risk of developing persistent criminal careers.
Prior research mainly concerns the contextual perspective on 
collective violence (for example, Reicher et al., 2004, 2007; Waddington, 
2007). However, groups of football supporters are known to prearrange 
confrontations with rival groups. Therefore, not every incident of collective 
violence seems to be the result of previous trigger events (Adang, 1988, 2011; 
Armstrong and Harris, 1991; Kerr and De Kock, 2002; Williams et al., 1986; 
Spaaij, 2008). Furthermore, many people abstain from collective violence 
even in the face of such trigger events despite evolving group dynamics and 
the emergence of temporary deviant norms (Adang and Van Ham, 2015). 
Consequently, the question of who becomes involved in collective violence 
and why remains in part unanswered when taking a contextual vantage 
point. Some studies however indicate that collective violence involvement 
and individual violent offending are explained by similar risk factors and show 
considerable overlap in their development over the life-course (for example, 
Farrington, 2006). Therefore, insights from a propensity perspective may fill 
the void left by contextual theories in explaining collective violence offending 
(also see Spaaij, 2014). Empirical research into the personal characteristics 
and criminal careers of collective violence offenders however is scarce, and 
as yet provides too narrow a foundation to support any general conclusions. 
The current study therefore aims to broaden knowledge about collective 
violence offending by examining the criminal careers of a sample of collective 
violence offenders using Dutch police data. Trajectory modelling is used to 
distinguish developmental pathways leading up to collective violence, and 
detailed incident data taken from police records are used to scrutinize the 
nature of and contexts in which (public) violence takes place.
Propensity theories hold that collective violence is the outcome of 
the convergence of individuals who are predisposed towards creating 
‘disorder’. The ‘riff raff’ explanation of collective violence – which states that 
collective violence reflects the deviant or criminal minded character of those 
involved – is an illustrative example of this approach (for example, LeBon, 
1895; Allport, 1924). From the 1960s onwards this point of view suffered 
heavy criticism. Critics have argued that propensity theories in general 
Why do people engage in collective violence?
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and the ‘riff raff’ explanation in particular are reductionist approaches 
that ignore the social context in which people enter into collective conflict. 
Therefore, propensity theories are considered ill equipped to explain or 
predict individual behaviour (violent and non-violent) in social situations 
(McPhail, 1985, 1991; Smith, 1983; Turner, 1964; Reicher et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, reasoning that personality characteristics are a constant, 
it has been pointed out that propensity theories cannot explain why some 
events do not result in collective violence despite the presence of groups (for 
example, hooligans2) known for their frequent engagement in such behaviour 
(Waddington and King, 2005). Finally, in an influential review of empirical 
studies on the personal and background characteristics of collective 
violence offenders, Reicher (2001) concluded that no specific individual 
attributes (for example, being a migrant, educational level, social status) 
that reliably predict collective violence involvement can be identified. Thus, 
on both theoretical and empirical grounds, the view that collective violence 
offenders have normal social backgrounds has been dominant since the early 
1980s. This in turn has resulted in a lack of further elaboration of propensity 
theory in the context of collective violence (also see Spaaij, 2014).
Yet the relationship between objective, structural conditions (for 
example, economic circumstances) and collective action is weak (Green 
et al., 1998; Tilly et al., 1975). Therefore, contextual theories have mainly 
focused on three subjective sociopsychological determinants of collective 
violence: perceived injustice, perceived efficacy and social identity. Perceived 
injustice relates to economically, politically or socially felt injustices, such 
as discrimination in education or job opportunities. Perceived efficacy 
considers collective violence to be the result of rational actions by groups 
that try to advance their goals and interests (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). 
Social identity relates to the emergence of a ‘shared social definition’ within 
a crowd and is at the heart of explaining collective violence (Van Zomeren et 
al., 2008). The emergence of a shared social definition within a crowd results 
in an us–them perspective. This us–them perspective serves as a catalyst 
for collective action in which situation-specific norms guide the behaviour 
of groups and individuals (Drury and Reicher, 1999, 2000, 2005; Postmes 
and Spears, 1998; Reicher, 1984, 1987, 1996, 2001). People – including 
individuals who ordinarily do not resort to violence – thus may participate 
in collective violence when they feel that they are being treated unjustly, 
certain events confirm this belief and bring people together in a sense of 
shared outrage, and this leads to feelings of empowerment to strike back 
(for example, Hornsey et al., 2006; Reicher and Stott, 2011; Van Zomeren 
et al., 2004). These findings connect with the notion that crowd events are 
typically intergroup encounters and consequently the position of any one 
party must be understood in relation to the ongoing intergroup dynamic 
(Drury and Reicher, 1999).
Contextual approaches, however, lack the inclusion of consistent data 
on the age (young) and gender (male) of collective violence offenders (for 
example, Adang and Van Ham, 2015; Caplan and Paige, 1968; Feagin, 1968; 
Roversi, 1991; Trivizas, 1980; Zani and Kirchler, 1991) and other individual 
attributes that have been found to correlate with violent offending and 
collective violence involvement (Farrington, 1994, 2006; Lösel and Bliesener, 
2003). In particular, contextual approaches have difficulty explaining why, 
2 There are different definitions of the term ‘hooliganism’ (see Piquero et al., 2015). In this 
article, we will not dwell further on this discussion.
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even in the face of specific circumstances conducive to collective violence, 
the majority of people abstain from collective violence. Adang and Van 
Ham (2015), for instance, note that, during a Project X event3,  a process 
of self-selection occurred amongst the youngsters present: those who felt 
uncomfortable with the changing atmosphere left, while others stayed out 
of curiosity. Only a minority (less than 10 percent) actually got involved 
in collective violence. Furthermore, relative to all individuals present in a 
football stadium or during a demonstration, it is always less than 1 percent 
acting violently (Adang, 2011).
The foregoing suggests that a more interactive understanding of 
the relationship between collective violence offenders’ attributes and the 
contextual determinants of collective violence is needed, as has also been 
argued by Spaaij (2014). Although differences in riot behaviour have been 
addressed (for example, Adang, 1988, 2011; Morrell et al., 2011), differences 
between collective violence offenders generally have not (Newburn, 2015; 
Spaaij, 2014). A notable exception is the aforementioned case study of 
a Project X event by Adang and Van Ham (2015), in which these authors 
identify two types of collective violence offenders: incidental public order 
offenders and notorious troublemakers. Both types of collective violence 
offenders are argued to differ not only in the frequency with which they 
engage in collective violence but also in the extent to which contextual 
determinants and individual attributes influence their collective violence 
involvement. Thereby a position is taken between contextual theories 
stressing the specific conditions under which people get involved in 
collective violence, and propensity theories that emphasize the influence of 
individual characteristics.
Differentiating between different types of collective violence offenders 
connects with research that has studied collective violence offenders from 
a developmental life-course perspective in general and Moffitt’s taxonomy 
(Moffitt, 1993, 1997) in particular (Farrington, 1994, 2006; Lösel and 
Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 2015). Within this taxonomy two distinct 
groups of (violent) offenders are identified: (1) offenders whose criminal 
career remains limited to adolescence (adolescence-limited offenders), and 
(2) offenders who persist in delinquency well into adulthood (life-course-
persistent offenders). The delinquency of adolescence-limited offenders 
is mainly attributed to contextual circumstances. The continuing of 
delinquency into adulthood however is explained amongst other things, by 
individual determinants (for example, (neuro)psychological deficits).
Only a limited number of prior studies provide empirically based 
information on the criminal career of collective violence offenders, 
more specifically hooligans.4 Based on self-report information, Lösel and
3 On 21 September 2012, thousands of young people responded to an invitation to a sweet 
16 party erroneously posted publicly on Facebook. The term refers to the movie ‘Project 
X’, which had been released earlier that year, which deals with a birthday party getting 
out of hand. The movie inspired other events that resulted in public violence, for example 
in the US, France and Germany (Adang and Van Ham, 2015). 
4 Marsh et al. (1978) also discuss the ‘careers’ of hooligans. However, these careers relate 
to the fan group within the overall fan base of a football club with which supporters (were) 
identified (for example, novices, hooligans). This classification of careers is based on an 
ethnographic approach that does not explicitly include criminal career characteristics 
(for example, age of onset, frequency of offending).
Prior empirical work
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Bliesener (2003) compiled 33 detailed case reports of male football 
hooligans from different German cities that were part of the local hard-
core hooligan scene. These males were contacted via social workers, 
special police units and others in close contact with the hooligan scene. The 
profile resulting from these interviews is very similar to that of Moffitt’s 
persistent offender. First, 75 percent of the hard core hooligans interviewed 
reported behavioral problems already at an early age. Over 70 percent of 
those interviewed reported having engaged in multiple property offences, 
and 57 percent admitted to having committed multiple robberies. For 
over two-thirds, these crimes resulted in their having a criminal record for 
crimes unrelated to hooliganism. Many reported other forms of deviance 
as well, including alcohol and substance abuse, and one in four reported 
having lost their driver’s license because of that. Apart from their criminal 
careers, these hard-core hooligans fitted the image of life-course persistent 
offenders in terms of personal and childhood risk factors. Over half came 
from a broken home, and nearly one in four had experienced domestic 
violence. The majority had been subjected to poor parenting, and one-third 
reported having an alcoholic father. Many could be categorized as aggressive 
and highly impulsive, and 72 percent showed a tendency towards antisocial 
personality disorder; 27 percent showed signs of psychopathy. The fact that 
at an average age of 29.4 years they were still active in the hard-core hooligan 
scene by itself signifies that, unlike the bulk of adolescent offenders, these 
individuals persisted in their deviant behaviour well into their adult years.
A second series of studies (Farrington, 1994, 2006; Piquero et al., 
2015) used data from the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development. 
Football hooligans in the Cambridge study were identified at age 18 based 
on (1) self-reported attendance at professional football matches and (2) 
involvement in at least one fight inside or outside football grounds in the 
three preceding years. Of the 238 males attending matches, 39 reported 
having been involved in fights, and 17 of them were apprehended by the 
police (226 persons of whom 34 reported having been involved in fights for 
the Piquero et al., 2015 study). The profile of hooligans resulting from these 
studies is also very similar to that of Moffitt’s persistent offender. Farrington 
(1994) showed that hooligans were raised in large families with poor 
parental supervision and left school at an early age. They were also more 
likely to display impulsive and sexually promiscuous behaviour, to use drugs 
and to drink heavily. In 2006, Farrington provided evidence that hooligans 
were similar to violent offenders in terms of childhood, adolescence and 
adulthood risk factors. In their 2015 study, Piquero et al. found that males 
involved in hooliganism incurred more convictions up to age 56 compared 
with non-fighting counterparts, and were more likely to be found in chronic 
offending trajectories.
Furthermore, their findings supported the view that hooliganism and 
criminal offending over the life-course are well explained by the same early 
risk and other correlates. Results from the aforementioned studies connect 
with other – albeit scarce (see Newburn, 2015; Spaaij, 2014) – research 
on collective violence offenders’ characteristics. Although studies do not 
address these issues for urban violence or escalated protest events, findings 
regarding hooliganism and events getting out of hand, for instance, imply 
that being impulsive or sensation-seeking or having ADHD contributes to
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being involved in collective violence (Adang and Van Ham, 2015; Arms and 
Russell, 1997; Mustonen et al., 1996; Russell, 1995; Russell and Arms, 1995, 
1998). Furthermore, some studies show that those involved in hooliganism 
repeatedly display aggressive and violent behaviour in other circumstances 
as well (Van den Brug, 1986; Van de Valk and Linckens, 1988; Ferwerda et 
al., 2010). Of notable relevance, however, is that most persons involved in 
collective violence have normal social backgrounds (Reicher, 2001) and 
only a minority of those involved have a criminal record or suffer from 
psychopathology (Adang and Van Ham, 2015).5 Furthermore, studies show 
that collective violence offenders are generally male minors and adolescents 
(Adang and Van Ham, 2015; Caplan and Paige, 1968; Feagin, 1968; Roversi, 
1991; Zani and Kirchler, 1991), rather than individuals who have continued 
with (violent) crime well into adulthood. All in all, prior empirical work thus 
not only supports contextual theory (i.e. that collective violence offenders 
have normal social backgrounds) but also supports propensity theory by 
suggesting a resemblance between collective violence offenders and life-
course-persistent offenders. From a developmental life-course perspective 
then, the current empirical evidence seems to suggest that criminal career 
trajectories of collective violence offenders – and therewith the root causes 
of collective violence involvement – might diverge. Thus far, however, this 
perspective has not been put forward in the theoretical debate on the 
initiation and escalation of collective violence, and it is unclear whether and 
to what extent this may be of relevance.
Hooligans in the Cambridge study were identified by reportedly being 
involved in a fight surrounding a football match between 15 and 18 years of age 
(15–17 years in the Piquero et al., 2015, study). No longitudinal information 
on hooliganism is available in these data. Therefore it remains unclear how 
hooliganism develops over the life-course in conjunction with other types 
of (violent) crime. Furthermore, although these studies gathered detailed 
data, owing to their limited sample size the extent to which their findings 
can be generalized remains unclear. Also, the Cambridge data pertain to 
those involved in hooliganism in the 1970s. To ascertain whether the nature 
of hooliganism and with it those involved in collective violence did or did not 
change, research on present-day samples is warranted. Finally, restricted by 
the available data, prior studies did not address the way collective violence 
develops with age and over the course of the individual’s criminal career. The 
current study addresses these shortcomings by using longitudinal data on a 
large and contemporary sample of registered collective violence offenders. 
Extending previous studies, the current study has three aims: (1) to provide 
a detailed description of the criminal careers of those involved in collective 
violence in terms of the onset, frequency and diversity of their offending; (2) 
to explore their developmental pathways in delinquency and crime, and (3) 
to examine the extent to which other violent offences are committed.
5 Please note that these findings are based on a limited number of case studies. Without 
being clear whether these cases are representative, it is uncertain to what extent 
findings can be generalized. 
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Over the past few years, the Netherlands has faced several incidents 
of large-scale collective violence. Collective violence incidents that have 
attracted much attention and have been investigated by independent bodies 
concern two football matches in 20116 and a Project X event in September 
2012. Given their excessive nature, these incidents were thoroughly 
investigated by the Dutch police and camera footage was made public 
to facilitate arrests. For these three incidents a total of 214 persons 
were arrested (hereafter, incident sample). In all three cases, police were 
confident the persons arrested formed an adequate representation of those 
responsible and/or involved in the violence. Case studies conducted by 
independent bodies concluded these incidents were not specifically related 
to salient social issues in Dutch society (Auditteam Voetbal and Veiligheid, 
2012a, 2012b; Cohen Commission, 2013).
Furthermore, the Dutch National Football Intelligence Unit (CIV in 
Dutch) maintains a database of those frequently involved in hooliganism. 
To assess whether individuals are to be recorded in this database, the 
‘Focus on Hooligans’ (Dutch: Hooligans in Beeld) approach is used. In short, 
this method aims to monitor and control football fans whose behaviour is 
considered problematic by means of targeted intelligence. Information on 
problematic fan groups and individual football fans associated with these 
groups is obtained from various data systems and concerns behaviour on 
match days as well as offences and disorderly behaviour at other times and 
locations (Spaaij, 2013). The information held by the police on problematic 
fan groups and the individuals associated with these groups is ‘quite good’ 
(Auditteam Voetbal and Veiligheid, 2013). In August 2012, the names of all 
228 persons registered in the CIV database at that time were recorded 
(hereafter, CIV sample). Four people from the CIV sample had already been 
included in the incident sample as a result of their arrest during one of these 
incidents. Therefore, the sample for the current study consists of a total of 
438 unique individuals.
For this study, we used information about our sample population 
recorded in two separate police registration systems: HKS and BVH. The 
HKS system contains information on every suspect detained by the Dutch 
police and the indictable offences involved. Indictable offences that at a 
later stage result in an acquittal or discharge from further prosecution are, 
in principle, removed from the HKS, as are prosecutorial dismissals owing to 
illegally obtained evidence, unlawful use of force or being wrongly accused. 
Individuals who accept an out-of-court settlement remain in the HKS, as do 
prosecutorial waivers for policy reasons or technical reasons other than those 
already mentioned. Note that we use the term ‘in principle’ here, because 
the removal of acquittals and discharges from prosecution from the HKS 
has not always been carried out accurately. Though in use since 1986, the 
HKS is suitable for scientific research only since 1996 (Bijleveld, 2007). For 
the individuals in our sample we thus have retrospective HKS data on their 
criminal careers from the year they were included in the sample (either 2011 
or 2012) back to 1996. Given that the minimum age of legal responsibility 
in the Netherlands is 12, for those aged 27–28 or under this age period
6 Feyenoord v. De Graafschap (17 September 2011) and FC Utrecht v. FC Twente 
(4 December 2011).
Data and methods
Data
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pertains to their entire officially registered criminal career. For those aged 
over 27–28 in 2011–12, however, registered information on the onset of 
offending may be lacking. For the purpose of this study, all offences recorded 
in the HKS were categorized as either group violence or non-group violence. 
Offences were categorized as group violence when they could be committed 
only in association. With only a few exceptions, all offences categorized as 
group violence concerned ‘collective violence in association’ (section 141 of 
the Dutch Penal Code).
The BVH system is the operational system of the Dutch police which 
contains information on all incidents that police officers were concerned 
with during their shift, including civilians involved either as suspects, 
victims or bystanders as identified by witnesses and police officers. Unlike 
the HKS system, which contains information only on the sections of the 
legal code under which suspected offenders were indicted, the BVH allows 
police officers to add a more detailed dvescription of the situation and the 
behaviours of those involved. For privacy reasons, however, the BVH records 
are accessible for a five-year period only. Therefore, BVH records for the CIV 
sample and those arrested for their involvement in the Project X disorder 
cover the period 2008–12. BVH records obtained from the other people in 
the incident sample concern the period 2007–11.7
Table 1 displays the number of collective violence offenders per age 
category. Most people in the incident sample were young adults aged 18-24, 
as were those included in the CIV sample. However, compared with people 
from the incident sample, the proportion of minors in the CIV sample was 
smaller (2 percent versus 24 percent) and the proportion of adults was 
bigger (57 percent versus 21 percent).
The persons included in the incident sample accounted for 262 records 
in the HKS. The persons included in the CIV sample had a total of 1568 
HKS records. Figure 1 displays the distribution of the criminal records of 
collective violence offenders. For both the incident sample and the CIV 
sample this distribution is heavily skewed, with a relatively small group being 
responsible for a disproportionate share of all registered offences. The
distribution is less skewed – yet far from negligible – for those included in the 
Results
Collective violence offenders’ main characteristics
Table 1. Number of collective violence offenders per public order incident, by age category
7 Individuals registered in the HKS (indicted offenders) and the BVH (suspects) differ in 
legal status. However, for reasons of readability and to adhere to the criminal career 
terminology, we refer to individuals registered in the HKS or the BVH as ‘offenders’
Collective violence offenders’ offending frequency
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CIV database. This may reflect the fact that those included in the CIV sample 
are considered ‘problematic’ fans to begin with.
In order to assess whether the age of onset of offending influences 
offending frequency, the mean number of registered offences per life year 
was calculated.8 Individuals offending before reaching the age of 18 on 
average had a higher offending rate than individuals whose first offence 
was registered at age 18 or over (p < .01).9 This finding was replicated when 
the analysis was limited to individuals who had at least one registration for 
group violence either before or after reaching the age of 18 (see Table 2). 
These differences may to some extent be confounded by the age at time 
of selection, for which early- and late-onset offenders in our sample differ 
(p < .01). Additional analysis, however, indicates that this difference in mean 
age did not influence our results: for both young adults (18–24, n = 137) 
and adults (25+ older, n = 144) at the time of selection, overall offending 
frequency was higher for individuals who were under-age at the time of their 
first HKS-registered offence (p < .01).10
Figure 1. Skewness in the general offending of collective violence offenders
8 Because a person can be registered in the HKS only from the age of 12, the previous 11 
years were not used in calculating mean scores.
9 The HKS is suitable for scientific research only since 1996 (Bijleveld, 2007). Results, 
however, were significant as well when those born before 1984 were left out of the 
analyses (available upon request).
10 For minors ages between 12 and 17 (n = 5) at the time of selection, this analysis is not 
possible.  
Table 2. The relationship between age of onset, type of registered offense and overall 
offending frequency
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To explore whether distinct criminal career patterns leading up to 
collective violence could be distinguished in our data, we used Nagin’s 
(2005) semi-parametric group-based model, with the number of registered 
offences in HKS in a given year as the dependent variable.11 Unlike growth-
curve models, group-based models do not model individual development as 
diversions from the overall group mean. Rather, both the level and the shape 
of the developmental curve are allowed to vary across a preset number of 
groups. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (higher values indicating 
better model fit), average posterior group probabilities (values above .7 
indicating good model fit) and the odds of correct classification (values 
above 5 indicating good model fit) can be used to determine the optimal 
number of groups (Nagin, 2005: 75). To account for the fact that, even for 
frequent offenders, registered offences are relatively rare events, we fitted 
zero-inflated Poisson models so as to allow subjects to have short periods of 
non-offending without this resulting in disjunct changes in the modelled rate 
of offending (Bushway et al., 2003). 
A total of 152 individuals were not registered in the HKS at the time 
of selection (also see Figure 1). They were excluded from trajectory 
modelling and were categorized as trajectory ‘0’ Consequently, trajectory 
modelling was applied for the 286 remaining individuals. This resulted in the 
identification of two additional criminal career trajectories.12 The mean age 
of onset and the frequency of offending characteristics for both trajectories 
are displayed in Table 3. From this table it can be derived that a minority of 
57 people have been categorized in a separate criminal career trajectory 
(trajectory ‘2’). They differed significantly (p < .01) in mean age of onset of 
offending (earlier) and in frequency of offending (higher) compared with the 
229 individuals categorized in trajectory ‘1’. 
As noted in the method section of the article, the BVH system 
allows police officers to add more detailed descriptions of incidents and 
those involved as either a suspect, victim or bystander. We will further 
detail differences between the trajectories identified on the basis 
of these BVH records.
In the five-year period prior to the sampling year, the 438 offenders 
in our sample generated 6878 BVH records. These records were screened 
to verify whether the record pertained to a particular offence. Screening 
resulted in the exclusion of 4715 records that were general in nature and/
Criminal career trajectories of collective violence offenders
11 The BVH records are accessible for a five-year period only. Therefore, BVH records are of 
no use for trajectory modelling.
12 BIC = −3201.71 (n = 4387), average fit = .967, OCC = 51.91. 
Table 3. Main characteristics of distinct criminal careers of collective violence offenders
a. Multiple modes exist – the smallest value is shown; the higher value is 12. 
The extent of violent behaviour over the previous five years
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or did not relate to any particular offence (for example, reports about the 
course of football matches, monitoring and surveillance, reports of nuisance). 
The remaining 2163 records were screened for violent offences for which the 
sampled individual was considered a ‘suspect’ in the broad sense of the term. 
This resulted in selecting 1174 violent incidents for further analysis. Table 4 
presents the number of violent offenders and number of violent offences per 
criminal career trajectory. With respectively 82 and 98 percent, individuals 
categorized in criminal career trajectories ‘1’ and ‘2’ were registered 
relatively more often in the BVH for a violent incident over the previous five 
years than those in trajectory ‘0’. Furthermore, the mean, mode and median 
of violent offences generally supported the conclusions drawn on the basis 
of HKS data, more specifically a heavily skewed distribution of (in this case 
violent) offending.
The 1174 violent incidents registered in the BVH concerned 298 cases of 
violence against objects and 876 aimed at persons. Analysis indicated that, 
of the individuals belonging to trajectory ‘0’, about one-third (30 percent) 
had been involved in person-oriented aggression.13 With a prevalence of 
respectively 75 percent and 95 percent, person-oriented aggression was 
more common for individuals belonging to criminal career trajectories ‘1’ 
and ‘2’. For person-oriented aggression it was determined whether the 
violent act was verbal (for example, insulting, threatening) or physical (for 
example, hitting, kicking, assaulting) in nature.  
Per criminal career trajectory, Table 5 displays the total and mean 
number of violent offences against objects and persons, distinguishing 
between verbal and physical violence for the latter. The distribution of 
violent offences is skewed for collective violence offenders belonging to 
trajectory ‘2’, who comprise 18 percent (56/316) of the sample registered in 
BVH but are responsible for about one-third of object-oriented aggression 
(31 percent), about half of verbal person-oriented aggression (46 percent) 
and about one-third of physical person-oriented aggression (32 percent).14  
Table 4. Main characteristics of distinct criminal careers of collective violence offenders
13 Because these incidents did not result in the individual being arrested (and consequently 
having a record in the HKS), the seriousness of these offences may be debatable.
14 Mean scores based on individuals who have been registered in the BVH for a violent 
incident. Including individuals who have not been registered in the BVH for a violent 
incident results in even more pronounced differences. The same is true for the results 
displayed in Table 6.
Table 5. Number of violent offenses in the BVH against objects and persons, by criminal 
career trajectory (mean per registered offender in parentheses)
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Table 6. Number of violent offenses in the BVH against objects and persons, by criminal 
career trajectory (mean per registered offender in parentheses)
Subsequent analysis indicates that collective violence offenders categorized 
in trajectory ‘2’ on average commit significantly more (p < .01) violent 
offences, whether object or person oriented, than do other collective 
violence offenders. 
Incidents that, as became evident from the incident description 
in the BVH data, involved more than one perpetrator and/or whose 
development was influenced by the perpetrators’ peer group (for example, 
encouraging or spurring on) were categorized as group violence. Incidents 
that involved one perpetrator and lacked peer or group influences were 
categorized as individual violence. In total, the BVH contained 372 cases 
of individual violence. 
Table 6 displays the number of individually committed violent offences 
per criminal career trajectory. As before, the distribution of individual 
violence offences is skewed: collective violence offenders belonging to 
trajectory ‘2’, who comprise 18 percent of the sample, are responsible for 43 
percent of all individual violence incidents. Furthermore, collective violence 
offenders categorized in trajectory ‘2’ more often (70 percent) have 
committed at least one act of individual violence compared with collective 
violence offenders in trajectories ‘0’ (18 percent) and ‘1’ (36 percent). 
Additional analyses showed that individuals belonging to criminal career 
trajectory ‘2’ were significantly (p < .01) more often involved in individual 
violent offending than were other collective violence offenders.
The settings in which violent offending occurred were also categorized, 
either as (semi)public or private. Private violence pertained almost exclusively 
to domestic violence against a (former) spouse, but also to some incidents of 
violent offending at work. Violence that was committed on the streets, while
going out, during events or around football matches was categorized as 
violence in a (semi)public setting.15 In total, the BVH contained 148 cases of 
private violence. The distribution of private violence is skewed for collective 
violence offenders belonging to trajectory ‘2’, who comprise 18 percent 
of the sample but are responsible for 40 percent of all private violence 
incidents. Furthermore, the prevalence of private violence was higher for 
collective violence offenders categorized in trajectory ‘2’ (44 percent) 
compared with collective violence offenders in trajectories ‘0’ (10 percent) 
and ‘1’ (15 percent). Additional analyses showed that individuals belonging to 
criminal career trajectory ‘2’ were significantly (p < .01) more often involved 
in private violent offending than were other collective violence offenders.
15 However, when the victim was the (former) spouse of the assailant, the incident was 
categorized as private violence. 
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The purpose of this study is to contribute to the debate on the 
initiation and escalation of collective violence, which concerns the relative 
contribution of individual and contextual determinants. Given that there are 
almost no current points of reference that include individual determinants, 
despite compelling arguments to do so (see Spaaij, 2014), we have done this 
by building on recent research conducted from a developmental life course 
perspective. The results of these prior studies indicate amongst other things 
that those involved in hooliganism, a specific form of collective violence, 
resemble Moffitt’s life-course-persistent offender, and that specific 
individual attributes of those involved can be identified (Piquero et al., 2015). 
This, however, contradicts findings of studies indicating that many of those 
involved in collective violence come from unproblematic social backgrounds 
and that only a few show signs of psychopathology (Adang and Van Ham, 
2015; Reicher, 2001).
Our analyses show that the age of onset of overall and group violence 
offending predicts overall offending frequency. Together with the age–
collective violence offending distribution in our sample, this addresses a 
potential bias that was introduced in other studies either by including only 
those who reported being involved in collective violence between the ages 
of 15 and 17 (Piquero et al., 2015) or by including only individuals who have 
persisted in deviant behaviour well into their adult years (Lösel and Bliesener, 
2003). Indeed, different criminal career trajectories of collective violence 
offenders can be identified, with only a minority of all collective violence 
offenders offending frequently from an early age – individually and in 
groups – in a variety of situations (including domestic violence).
However, it is important to keep in mind the limitations of our data. 
Individuals are registered in the HKS when they have been detained by the 
Dutch police. Although self-reported and registered crimes often show a fairly 
similar pattern (Farrington et al., 2003), the chances of being apprehended 
are low. First, victims and witnesses may not recognize crimes as such and 
thus leave them unreported to the police. Furthermore, registration of 
a particular (type of) crime and subsequent arrest are dependent on the 
investigation policy of the police and the prosecution policy of the Public 
Prosecution Service. In other words, before the police record a crime and 
an arrest is made a number of filters have already been passed through 
(Wittebrood and Junger, 2002). Reliance on official data therefore is likely 
to underestimate the actual criminal behaviour of those in the sample. More
problematic is that we have no way of knowing whether this bias is similar 
across groups. For instance, it could be argued that individuals who are 
already known to the police are more likely to be identified (that is, arrested), 
thus reducing the gap between actual and registered offending, but only 
for those with already extensive criminal careers (Ball and Drury, 2012). 
On the other hand, it can be argued that ‘experienced’ collective violence 
offenders are better at evading arrest (for example, by concealing their 
face or taking into account the position of CCTV). To (partly) address these 
issues, collective violence incidents where the police arrested every suspect 
they wanted to detain on the basis of camera footage (which is not selective) 
were included in the study. Furthermore, we used not only HKS data but also 
data from incidents registered in the BVH. Using BVH data diminishes the 
chance of bias because all incidents that police officers are concerned with
Results
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during their shifts are registered, and non-arrested persons who have been 
involved in the incident are also recorded.
Thus far, two opposing theoretical perspectives have been used to 
explain collective violence. These theoretical perspectives differ in the 
explanatory power assigned to contextual and predispositional influences. 
Research has mainly been conducted from a contextual perspective, 
leaving the subject of predispositions largely untouched. Consequently, an 
interactive approach to explain collective violence is missing. 
Our results suggest that there is a minority group of collective violence 
offenders who, from an early age, frequently offend well into adulthood. 
Their violent behaviour is not limited to football matches, but extends to 
other (semi-)public and private settings and is committed both in groups 
and alone. Their criminal career characteristics and the frequency and 
seriousness of their violent offending are in sharp contrast with those of 
other collective violence offenders, many of whom have no or only marginal 
prior criminal records up to their involvement in collective violence. The 
findings of this study therefore are supportive of a Moffitt-like typology of 
collective violence offenders, connecting with the notion that a one size 
fits all approach does not suffice to explain and tackle criminal behaviour 
(Lambie and Seymour, 2006).
Although differences in criminal career characteristics and violent 
offending between collective violence offenders in themselves are 
insufficient to explain collective violence, our findings suggests that 
a developmental life-course perspective could be fruitfully employed 
to contribute to our understanding. The developmental life-course 
perspective in general and Moffitt’s taxonomy in particular suggest that 
individual risk factors mainly predict those fitting a life-course-persistent 
criminal trajectory, whereas contextual aspects are of specific relevance 
for adolescence-limited offenders. From such a perspective, the historical 
idea of the ‘riff raff’ approach may be broadened by assessing the predictive 
value of attributes that are associated with general violent behaviour (for 
example, impulsivity, hyperactivity) to explain collective violence as well – at 
least for a certain group of offenders. This connects with the recent notion 
that underscores the relevance of context, intergroup interaction and 
intergroup relationships in the initiation of public disorder but also stresses
variations in the willingness of individuals to become involved in violence 
(Adang, 1988, 2011; Adang and Van Ham, 2015).
Our findings offer additional empirical data for the point of view that 
the contextual and predispositional perspectives are not mutually exclusive 
(also see Spaaij, 2014). Future research needs to address the feasibility of 
an offender typology to further empirically support the notion of such an 
interactive approach. To what extent are theoretically relevant individual 
characteristics associated with distinct collective violence offenders’ 
criminal trajectories? Although determining these trajectories in hindsight 
is informative, a true test of any offender typology would also need to 
involve prediction. A recidivism study within the current sample group of 
known offenders could be employed to test the predictive value of collective 
violence offenders’ predispositions for various criminal career features
Conclusion
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to shed further light on the influence of individual attributes on repeat 
collective violence offending. Such studies not only have the potential to 
further shape collective violence theory, but may also provide input for 
future crowd management policies and situational preventive measures as 
well as a person-oriented approach targeting persistent collective violence 
offenders.
39
Jekyll or Hyde?02.

41
Determinants 
of persistence 
in collective 
violence 
offending
Criminal career 
characteristics and 
individual traits
Originally published as 
T. Van Ham, A.A.J. Blokland, H.B. Ferwerda, T.A.H. Doreleijers & O.M.J. 
Adang (2019). Determinants of persistence in collective violence offending. 
Criminal career characteristics and individual traits. Deviant Behavior, 
online publication ahead of print. DOI: 10.1080/01639625.2019.1649954.
03.
42
This study explores individual characteristics linked to an increased risk 
of persistence in collective violence. A sample of collective violence offenders 
(n=438) was identified based on individuals’ involvement in a collective 
violence incident in 2011/2012 or due to them being recorded in a police 
database of ‘known’ football hooligans. For the current analyses, persistence 
was defined as recidivism to collective violence assessed over a 4 to 5 year 
time span. Criminal career data were obtained from the police (register 
data). Individual characteristics concerned criminal career measures, 
behavioral indicators of personality traits and childhood problematic 
behavior. Due to a lack of other available data sources, behavioral indicator 
data were largely obtained from police and probation service information. 
The results of this study indicate that offender characteristics can be linked 
to persistence in collective violence. Results contrast currently dominant 
theoretical perspectives on the etiology of collective violence. Theoretical 
and practical implications are discussed. 
Keywords: collective violence, persistence, offender typology, personality 
traits
Mass public disturbances are characterized by the involvement of large 
numbers of people acting violently against other individuals and/or destroying 
or damaging property. Recent instances of mass public disturbances include 
confrontations between authorities and protesters in Ferguson (USA, 2014) 
and Hamburg (Germany, 2017), between left- and right-wing activists 
in Charlottesville (USA, 2017), and numerous confrontations between 
authorities and football supporters around the EURO2016 tournament 
(France, 2016). Group violence around demonstrations, protests, football 
matches and other recreational events generally is referred to as collective 
violence (Adang, 2011). The provided phenomena suggest that collective 
violence may be defined as a violent form of collective action, to which large 
numbers of people may resort in response to a common stimulus (also see 
Reicher, 2001). However, around the EURO2016 tournament hooligan sides16 
were also engaged in mutually arranged confrontations, which involved 
mutual consultation between the parties involved. In this article we use the 
term collective violence to denote participation in hooliganism, riots and/or 
(arranged) group fights. 
In the aftermath of incidents of collective violence, the question 
how and why ‘things went wrong’ is often posed. In efforts to provide an 
answer to this question, some scholars point towards the context in which 
the collective violence emerged, whereas others emphasize the personal 
characteristics of those involved. These contrasting views reflect an on-
going theoretical debate on the causes of collective violence. Already in 
the early 1900’s, it was assumed that either people lose themselves entirely 
in a crowd, their behavior then becoming uncontrolled, unfocused and 
irrational, or that the violent behavior of crowds reflects the pre-existing 
tendencies of those belonging to it. This is a line of reasoning known as 
convergence theory. Both points of view were used as justifications to 
treat crowds as criminal (Reicher, 2001). From the 1960’s onwards these 
‘classic’ perspectives were increasingly challenged. Studies suggested that 
Introduction
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16 There are various definitions of the term ‘hooliganism’ (see Piquero, Jennings and 
Farrington, 2015). In this article, we will not dwell further on this discussion. 
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Theories of collective violence
collective violence largely is the outcome of rational behavior within a 
certain context, with crowd violence usually aimed at and being limited to 
the party held responsible for a certain course of events (Caplan and Paige, 
1968; Reicher, 1984, 1987). Furthermore, studies challenged the notion that 
crowds in itself are deviant or criminal-minded (for an overview see Reicher, 
2001). Consequently, a group-dynamic approach to collective violence was 
developed to explain how crowd unity can be quickly achieved in changing 
circumstances and to explain why large numbers of people, despite the 
absence of an affiliation to violent groups or any prior criminal history, may 
come to participate in collective violence (Reicher, 1984, 1987; Turner and 
Kilian, 1987).
This group-dynamic approach eventually resulted in the development 
of the social identity model (SIM) of crowd behavior (Reicher, 1996). Social 
identity refers to an individual’s self-understanding as a member of a 
group and ensures that in an associated context an individual thinks, feels 
and behaves in accordance with the group he/she identifies with (salient 
identity). The SIM pertains that in crowds individual behavior is guided by the 
activated social identity, therewith presuming a shift from an individual to a 
categorical basis of behavioral control. Convergence theories emphasizing 
personal characteristics are, as a matter of principle, rejected by the SIM 
(Reicher, 2001). Still, research finds that individuals differ in the social 
categories they identify, over the content of these categorical stereotypes 
and in their perception of who is prototypical of the groups identified 
(Herrera and Reicher, 1998; Reicher and Hopkins, 1996a,b; Reicher and 
Sani, 1998; Sani and Reicher, 1998, 1999). Furthermore, offensive action 
tendencies in crowds have been linked to the experiencing of anger i.e. an 
individual’s evaluation of the context (Mackie, Devos, and Smith, 2000; 
Yzerbyt et al., 2003). This suggests that, despite renunciation by the SIM, 
individual characteristics linked to social information processing may 
render some individuals more susceptible than others for participating 
in collective violence. 
Linking individual action in crowds to both social and individual-level 
processes may offer a possibility to bridge the theoretical gap between the 
SIM and convergence explanations for collective violence, and provide a 
more detailed account of who are most likely to engage in future collective 
violence. Until now, given the intellectual dominance of the SIM, whether 
and to what extent individual characteristics predict participation in 
collective violence has not been adequately addressed (Spaaij, 2014; Van 
Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2017). Therefore, in this study we examine 
the personal characteristics of known collective violence offenders up to the 
moment of involvement in collective violence and the extent to which these 
characteristics predict persistence in collective violence offending. For this 
purpose we gathered longitudinal data on a sample of 438 Dutch collective 
violence offenders. offenders. 
As research provided more and more evidence that collective violence 
was not uncontrolled, unfocused and irrational, classic theories of crowd 
behavior stressing these issues gradually lost their credibility. Currently 
dominant theories on collective violence instead emphasize the context in 
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which collective violence occurs - with social identity being central to this 
point of view (Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears, 2008). From a social 
identity perspective, trigger events and intergroup dynamics are assumed 
to facilitate (spontaneous) group forming and the emerging of antagonistic 
relationships between groups. Individuals involved in collective violence 
indeed often describe their relationships with others on a categorical, 
ingroup-outgroup level (Reicher, 2001). Furthermore, individual behavior 
in crowds tends to remain within the boundaries defined as appropriate by 
the social identity of the group with which individuals identify, and only the 
behavior of those who are seen as belonging to the same group is followed 
(Drury and Reicher, 1999, 2000; Reicher, 1996). By implying a causal relation 
between shifting from a personal identity to a social identity and violent 
behavior, the social identity perspective suggests that any person, regardless 
of individual characteristics, may get involved in collective violence given the 
‘right’ circumstances (Reicher, 2001). 
Convergence theory however, still has its supporters (Ball and Drury, 
2012). This in particular seems a consequence of the so-called specificity 
problem: The SIM does not account for the observation that, even in the face 
of trigger events and intergroup dynamics gravitating towards collective 
violence, a large majority (>90%) of individuals tends to leave the scene at 
the moment or just prior to the moment of violence occurring, or merely 
observes how the course of violent events unfolds, without themselves 
actively participating in any violent behavior (Adang, 2011). Individual 
differences in behavior within groups during collective violence incidents 
suggest that, in addition to group level triggers and processes, personal 
characteristics may have explanatory value with regard to individuals’ 
participation in collective violence. 
Violent behavior, both in groups and alone, has been linked to social 
information processing and the experiencing of anger (Crick and Dodge, 
1994; Mackie et al., 2000; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). Prior studies indicated 
that antisocial features, especially a tendency to interpret others’ intent as 
hostile, heightened impulsivity, emotion-regulation deficits and attention/
hyperactivity features are linked to aggressive responses disproportionate 
to the actual situation (Bailey and Ostrov, 2008; Schönenberg et al., 2013; 
Coccaro, Bergeman, and McClearn, 1993; Fetich et al., 2014; Owen, 2011; 
Retz and Rösler, 2010). In addition, sensation-seeking behavior was found 
to increase the likelihood of participating in collective violence (Mustonen, 
Arms and Russell, 1996). Convergence theory is further supported by 
studies which find that perpetual engagement in collective violence is linked 
to personal characteristics like ADHD and ASPD, and a history of prior 
offending and violent behavior (Farrington, 1994; Lösel and Bliesener, 2003; 
Piquero et al., 2015). At the same time however, many collective violence 
offenders have no criminal history up to their involvement in collective 
violence (Reicher, 2001). 
Rather than the general approach that characterizes both SIM and 
convergence theory stressing personal characteristics, an approach seems 
needed to accommodate both theoretical contradictions and contrasting 
empirical results. The problem behavior theory offers an approach capable 
of doing so. This theory explains problem behavior – behavior that may 
result in sanctions or other formal social responses, such as participating 
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in collective violence – as an outcome of person-environment interaction 
( Jessor and Jessor, 1977). More specifically, this theory suggests that 
personality characteristics, social environmental factors, and involvement 
with conventional values or institutions all contribute to the likelihood of 
engaging in problem behavior ( Jessor, 1991). This perspective suggests, 
then, that on the individual level values, expectations, beliefs and attitudes 
may contribute to participating in collective violence, while at the same time 
social environmental factors – such as high peer approval, the presence of 
peer models and high peer influence – may contribute. This fits observations 
of Adang (2011) who stresses variations in individual willingness to 
participate in collective violence while also underlining the relevance of 
group-dynamics. 
In addition, the divergent criminal histories of individuals involved 
in collective violence as apparent from prior empirical work (Farrington, 
1994; Lösel and Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 2015; Reicher, 2001) suggest 
that a typological approach may accommodate theoretical contradictions 
and contrasting empirical results. Moffitt’s (1993, 1997) dual taxonomy 
provides the archetypical example of such a typological approach.17 Central 
to the dual taxonomy is a distinction in the root causes of offending between 
offender types. Individual neurobiologically based determinants are deemed 
particularly relevant for those frequently and persistently involved in crime 
from a young age onward (life course persistent offenders), whereas 
the criminal behavior of those who engage in crime only temporarily 
(adolescence-limited offenders) is thought to be governed predominantly 
by contextual clues (Moffitt, 1993, 1997). Similarly distinguishing collective 
violence offenders that only sporadically get involved in collective violence 
from those repeatedly getting involved in collective violence, may help to 
reconcile theoretical and empirical inconsistencies in extant collective 
violence research.
The exact merit of a typological approach to collective violence 
offenders thus far remains unclear. The few available studies into the criminal 
careers of collective violence offenders however, seem supportive of a 
Moffitt-like typology. For instance, Van Ham et al. (2016) found that while 
most collective violence offenders had no or only marginal criminal records, 
a small group of collective violence offenders displayed a high frequency 
of both solo and collective violence offending from an early age onward. 
Studies utilizing data from the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development 
additionally suggested that individuals involved in football-related fights 
are more likely to be found in chronic offending trajectories (Piquero et al., 
2015), to display impulsive behavior, to use alcohol and drugs heavily, to drop 
out of school at an early age and to be raised in families with poor parental 
supervision (Farrington, 2006). These results are consistent with those of 
a study of 33 adult male hooligans from Germany who reported problem 
behavior as a child, problems with anger management and impulse control, 
and to be suffering from psychopathology associated with violent behavior 
(Lösel and Bliesener, 2003). Prior cross-sectional studies linking personal 
characteristics to the self-reported likeliness of participating in collective 
violence largely confirm these results (Arms and Russell, 1997; Russell, 1995; 
Offender typologies and prior empirical findings
17 Although studies have identified more offending trajectories, the heart of this line 
of thought remains undisputed (see Moffitt, 2007). 
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Russell and Arms, 1995, 1998). Finally, these findings connect to systematic 
observations which show important between-individual variation in the 
willingness to participate in collective violence (Adang, 2011). 
Taken together the violent behavior of different types of collective 
violence offenders may be triggered by different constellations of contextual 
and individual determinants. Thus far, a typological approach has been 
sparsely considered in the scientific debate about the contributing factors 
of collective violence involvement. The current study aims to contribute to 
knowledge on this matter.
Prior longitudinal studies on collective violence offenders have several 
shortcomings. First, samples have been relatively small – i.e. less than forty 
(Farrington, 1994, 2006; Lösel and Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 2015) – 
precluding any meaningful distinction between offender types. Second, 
prior samples seem to be biased towards persistent offenders. Lösel and 
Bliesener (2003) for instance studied individuals who at age 30 were still 
considered hard-core hooligans. Others only included individuals who self-
reportedly had been in a group fight already as a minor (Farrington, 1994, 
2006; Piquero et al., 2015). Both persistence in offending in adulthood and 
early onset of offending are characteristics of the life course persistent 
pathway (Moffitt, 1993, 1997). Third, prior cross-sectional research (Russel, 
1995; Russell and Arms, 1995) focused upon hypothetical involvement in 
collective violence by administering questionnaires around sport matches. 
As these studies also did not apply a vignette design, contextual influences 
were not taken into consideration. Finally, results of the before mentioned 
Van Ham et al. (2016) study, using a sample of collective violence offenders 
that compared to previous studies was less biased towards persistent 
offenders, indicated that various types of collective violence offenders can 
be distinguished based on the level and shape of their criminal trajectories. 
However, their study did not provide further information on the possible 
etiology of these offender typologies. 
The current study aims to address the aforementioned shortcomings 
and to extend the findings of earlier research by studying personality traits, 
criminal career history and recidivism over a 4- to 5-year period (as a measure 
of persistence) of a current, representative, and, compared to prior studies, 
large sample of 438 known collective violence offenders. The questions 
around which this article is centered are whether individual characteristics 
associated with collective violence involvement can be identified and, if so, to 
what extent these characteristics can be linked to persistence in collective 
violence.
The 438 individuals included in the current sample were either (a) 
arrested for their involvement in at least one of two specific football-
related collective violence incidents in 2011, (b) arrested during riots 
around a recreational event in 2012, or, (c) were registered in 2012 in a 
database maintained by the Dutch Police due to their frequent involvement 
in football hooliganism in general. Individuals’ criminal history from age 12
Current study
Methods
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up to 2017 was assessed by means of retrieving data from the HKS (Dutch: 
Herkenningsdienstsysteem) police system. The HKS contains information 
on every suspect arrested by the Dutch police and the indictable offences 
involved. Acquittals or discharges from further prosecution are removed, as 
are prosecutorial dismissals due to illegally obtained evidence, unlawful use 
of force or being wrongly accused. Since January 1st 2016 the HKS police 
system has been replaced by the BVI/BOSZ-system. Information registered 
in the HKS from 1 January 2010 was migrated to the BVI/BOSZ-system, which 
therefore also was consulted. The minimum age of legal responsibility in the 
Netherlands is 12. The HKS is only suitable for research since 1996 (Bijleveld, 
2007). Consequently, although data about their juvenile criminal career 
were retrieved, these data might be incomplete for individuals aged 33 or 
over in 2017 (n=101 in our sample).
The moment of being involved in a collective violence incident or being 
registered due to frequent involvement in hooliganism (in respectively 2011 
or 2012) was labeled as the index date. For all individuals in our sample the 
age at the index date was recorded. In order to be able to assess the extent 
and type of recidivism (general, special, specific), all indictable offenses 
were categorized as non-violence (e.g. theft, burglary), violence offending 
(e.g. assault, aggravated assault) or collective violence offending. General 
recidivism was defined as being registered for any indictable offense after 
the index date, while special recidivism was defined as being registered for a 
violence offense after the index date. Finally, reregistration for participation 
in collective violence was regarded as specific recidivism.
For each type of crime identified in the current study, the following 
variables were created: 1) the total number of crime registrations before the 
index date, 2) age of officially registered onset of offending, 3) type of crime 
at age of onset, 4) time span between index date and first instance of re-
offending, and 5) the total number of criminal registrations since the index 
date. Furthermore, when the individual had a history of violent offenses, a 
dichotomous variable was created indicating the number of settings (i.e. 
private – in a home; semi-public – in a bar or club; public – on the street) 
in which violence was resorted to (one setting versus multiple settings). 
To this end, the Dutch National Police registration system BVH (Dutch: 
Basisvoorziening Handhaving), in which police officers can provide a detailed 
description of events, was consulted. Due to data retention and privacy 
limitations however, the latter data only concerned a time span of five years 
up to the index date, thus starting from 2007/2008.
Privacy legislation prevented us from approaching sampled individuals 
in person with a request to participate in scientific research. In the absence 
of self-report, alternatives for gathering psychological data in the present 
setting had been limited. Institutions offering psychological care for 
instance are bound by privacy legislation concerning the nondisclosure of 
privacy-sensitive information. Furthermore, data available from Statistics 
Netherlands are limited due to the specific time frames to which these data 
relate and the aggregate level on which data could be disclosed. Confronted
Recidivism
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with these limitations, we resorted to the available police, Probation Service 
and forensic psychological data.
Only for 15 individuals in our sample forensic psychological reports 
prepared by the Netherlands Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology 
(NIFP) were available. In addition, for 113 individuals we obtained data 
from the Probation Service. The latter concerned information taken 
from a recidivism risk assessment instrument called the RISc (n=66), or a 
shortened version thereof (n=47) (see Hildebrand and Bosker, 2011). For the 
entire sample we also consulted the police registration system BVH. The BVH 
system allows police officers to add detailed descriptions of the behaviors 
and characteristics of those involved in the incident reported upon, and 
includes verbatim elaborations of interrogations and individual statements. 
An implication of the various sources consulted is that data gathered on 
psychological traits either reflect diagnoses by validated instruments 
(NIFP), information about diagnoses based on conducted anamneses (NIFP 
and Probation Service) or information indicative of psychological and 
behavioral characteristics that, as far as can be derived, are not ascertained 
by psychological tests but rely on the disclosing of information by individuals 
themselves, by their family or by professionals well aware of the individual’s 
personal situation (BVH). As the available data do not allow for a reliable 
assessment of psychiatric disorders, the current study is concerned with 
behavioral indicators reflecting individuals’ psychological traits.
Particularly traits associated with violent behavior – such as attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), emotion regulation deficits, heightened 
impulsivity, sensation-seeking behavior and antisocial tendencies – have 
been implicated in participating in collective violence (Lösel and Bliesener, 
2003; Piquero et al., 2015; Russel, 2004). Therefore, the psychological 
traits we focused upon are: 1) antisocial features, 2) attention/hyperactivity 
features, 3) heightened impulsivity, 4) emotion-regulation deficits and 5) 
sensation seeking features. For each of these five behavioral indicators, a 
dichotomous variable was constructed indicating whether that behavioral 
indicator was present in the individuals’ documentation or not. Presence of 
attention/hyperactivity features was scored when in the consulted sources 
specific references were made to Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD) because of earlier diagnosis or pronounced suspicions without 
psychological examination, or when references were made to the non-
recreational, required use of prescription drugs (methylphenidate). The 
presence of antisocial features was scored when specific references were 
found to Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) because of earlier diagnosis. 
Aggression regulation deficits were scored when sampled individuals were 
reported to have followed an aggression control training, when they were 
reported to suffer from frequent tantrums, or when they were said to have 
an explosive or angered character. References to often acting impulsively, 
needing to learn to ‘count to ten’, or to act before thinking (especially in 
stressful situations) were considered indicative of heightened impulsivity. 
The presence of sensation-seeking behavior was scored when sampled 
individuals were described in the sources consulted as showing an increased 
need for excitement, looking for exciting situations, or getting a kick out of 
or loving exciting situations. 
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Analysis
Because the behavioral indicators assessed may have manifested themselves 
already in childhood (Moffitt, 1993, 1997), problematic childhood behaviors 
at home and at school were also assessed by a number of dichotomous 
variables. Indicative of problematic childhood behavior at home were 
aggressive behavior against family members and having been placed out of 
the family home. Likewise, problematic childhood behavior at school was 
considered present in case of aggressive behavior against peers or teachers, 
when attending special education – which consists of specialized or intensive 
supervision due to disability, chronic illnesses or psychological disorders – or 
in case of frequent truancy.
In order to prevent coding bias, behavioral indicators and problematic 
childhood behaviors were scored prior to analysis, thus without detailed 
knowledge of either the individuals’ criminal histories or the nature and 
extent of their recidivism after the index date.
The current study used survival models to analyze the time in days until 
the first subsequent general, violence or collective violence offense following 
the index offense. Unlike linear regression models, survival models can handle 
censored data, that is cases in which the exact time to the first subsequent 
offense is unknown due to limitation of the follow-up period (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow, 2008). Survival models control for censoring by decomposing 
the dependent variable into two parts: The time to event, and the event 
status – whether the event of interest occurred or not. Two time-dependent 
functions were estimated: The survival function representing the likelihood 
of survival – that is not experiencing the event of interest – and the hazard 
function representing the likelihood of the event occurring conditional on 
having survived up to that time. Here we estimated non-parametric Kaplan 
Meier models (Kaplan & Meier, 1958) in order to graph overall survival in our 
data and univariately compare subgroups in our data. In order to conduct 
the multivariate analyses, Cox proportional hazard models (Cox, 1972) were 
applied. For the Cox proportional hazard models we present only the results 
of the final model, which used the forward stepwise procedure to trim the 
model of non-significant variables.
Table 1 displays the presence of each of the behavioral indicators and 
measures of childhood problematic behavior in our sample of collective 
violence offenders. The figures displayed in Table 1 indicate that attention-
deficit/hyperactivity features (13%), heightened impulsivity (13%), 
aggression regulation deficits (18%) and increased need for excitement 
(10%) were present in a significant part of our sample. Furthermore, a 
significant part (16%) scored positively on at least two of the behavioral 
indicators assessed in this study. Childhood problematic behavior was 
present in a significant part of our sample as well. About one in ten had 
displayed aggression against family members (9%), was placed out of home 
(7%), behaved aggressively at school (11%), attended special education 
(10%) or was reported to regularly miss classes (7%). Furthermore, a 
significant part (13%) scored positively on childhood problematic behaviors 
at home and at school.
Distribution of behavioral indicators and childhood problematic behavior
Results
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In order to assess the association between behavioral indicators, 
childhood problematic behavior and collective violence offending, we 
utilized a variable that was constructed for the same sample in a prior study 
by Van Ham et al. (2016). In this study three criminal career trajectories 
up to becoming involved in collective violence were identified. These 
trajectories may be characterized as ‘non-offending up to collective violence 
involvement (n=152)’, ‘prior offending up to collective violence involvement 
(n=229)’ and ‘early onset and high frequency prior offending up to collective 
violence involvement (n=57)’. To the extent that group dynamics instead of 
selection or convergence are relevant for participating in collective violence, 
an even distribution of the behavioral indicators of personality traits and 
childhood problematic behaviors among these three distinguished groups is 
expected. In contrast, an uneven distribution of these behavioral indicators 
would be supportive of a typological approach to collective violence 
offending incorporating both the SIM and convergence explanations, with 
psychological traits and childhood behavior problems expected to be 
particularly present among collective violence offenders with an early age of 
onset and high frequency of prior violent offending. 
Table 1 provides the presence of behavioral indicators and childhood 
problematic behavior for each group. Chi-square analysis indicated 
that attention-deficit/hyperactivity features (x2(2)=52.795, p<.01), 
antisocial features (x2(2)=48.4908, p<.01), aggression-regulation deficits 
(x2(2)=39.9014, p<.01), heightened impulsivity (x2(2)=78.0585, p<.01) and 
an increased need for excitement (x2(2)=62.711, p<.01) were more prevalent 
among early onset and high frequency prior offenders. This pattern also 
emerged for childhood problematic behavior. Significant differences 
between groups were found for aggression against family members 
(x2(2)=36.110, p<.01), having been placed out of home (x2(2)=26.4081, 
p<.01), aggressive behavior at school (x2(2)=72.070, p<.01), having attended 
special education (x2(2)=31.069, p<.01) and frequent truancy (x2(2)=53.49 , 
p<.01). Additional analysis taking into account the total number of behavioral 
indicators reflect the multi-problem character of early onset and high 
frequency prior offenders. Chi-square analyses indicated that this subgroup 
more often had two (x2(2)=22.6051, p<.01) or more (x2(2)=85.3341, p<.01) 
behavioral indicators. Similar results were found for the prevalence of two 
(x2(2)=39.616, p<.01) or more (x2(2)=35.608, p<.01) problematic childhood 
behaviors. In addition, a cumulative risk factor index was calculated for the 
75 individuals who scored positive on at least 1 behavioral indicator and at 
least 1 childhood problematic behavior. Chi-square analysis indicated that at 
least one of both (x2(2)= 97.877, p<.01), at least two of both (x2(2)= 86.161, 
p<.01) and at least 3 of both (x2(2)= 44.617, p<.01) were more prevalent 
among early onset and high frequency prior offenders.
Our analyses thus suggest an uneven distribution of behavioral 
indicators and childhood problematic behavior in our sample of collective 
violence offenders. These findings appear to contrast a core principle of 
the SIM, which propagates that offender characteristics do not contribute 
to explanations of collective violence. Specifically, the uneven distribution 
of behavioral indicators and childhood problematic behaviors, their higher 
presence among the early onset and high frequency prior offending group,
and the multi-problem character of this subgroup indicate that root causes
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for these offenders’ participating in collective violence may diverge. We 
therefore interpret this finding as a first sign that a typological approach 
incorporating insights from both social identity and convergence theories 
may have merit in the explanation of collective violence.
When involvement in collective violence is the mere result of 
coincidentally being in the wrong place at the wrong time, chances are low 
that an individual becomes involved in collective violence more frequently. 
Recidivism therefore may be regarded as reflecting persistence. Insofar 
as convergence and selection are involved in collective violence offending, 
expectations were that individuals‘ criminal career history, behavioral 
indicators, and childhood problematic behaviors assessed in this study
Table 1. Prevalence of Behavioral Characteristics and Childhood Problematic Behaviors 
for a Sample of Collective Violence Offenders (n=438) per subtype as identified by 
Van Ham et al. (2016)
*p<.01 
Survival analysis
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would predict collective violence reoffending. On the other hand, when 
instead of convergence mainly social processes affect becoming involved in 
collective violence, no differences are expected between individuals who re-
offended and those who didn’t. 
In order to establish general, special and specific recidivism in our 
sample (n=438) after the index date, we conducted survival analysis. 
From Figure 1 it can be derived that for about the first six months the 
survival rate follows a similar trend for general, violence and collective 
violence offending. Thereafter survival rates dropped sizably faster for 
general crime compared to violent crime and collective violence, while the 
survival rate for violent crime dropped faster for violent crime compared 
to collective violence. Survival rates at the end of the follow up period were 
about 50% for general recidivism, 64% for special (violent) recidivism 
and 80% for specific (collective violence) recidivism. Consequently, 
results indicate that about a third of our sample reoffends violently (36%) 
and a fifth does so in a group (20%). 
Subsequently, a series of bivariate analyses was conducted to examine 
whether collective violence recidivists (n=89) and non-recidivists (n=349) 
differed on criminal career measures, behavioral indicators of psychological 
traits and childhood problematic behavior (see Table 2). From Table 2 can be 
derived that recidivating collective violence offenders more often displayed 
violent behavior in multiple settings (21%) compared to collective violence 
offenders who did not re-offend (12%) (x2(1)=5.132, p=.023). ANOVAs 
further indicate that recidivating collective violence offenders were younger 
at the moment of their first police contact for general (F(1, 436=7.605, 
Figure 1. Survival Analysis within a Sample (n=438) of Collective Violence Offenders for 
General, Special and Specific Recidivism in Number of Days.
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p<.01), violent (F(1, 436=6.385, p=.012) and collective violence offending 
(F(1, 436=6.231, p=.013). Furthermore, the mean number of prior general 
(F(1, 436=7.467, p<.01), violent (F(1, 436=11.763, p<.01) and collective 
violence offenses (F(1, 436=19.317, p<.01) was higher among those 
persisting in collective violence. With regard to behavioral indicators, 
significant results were found for the prevalence of attention-deficit and/
or hyperactivity features (x2(1)=3.996, p=.046), heightened impulsivity 
(x2(1)= 6.389, p=.011) and an increased need for excitement (x2(1)=6.247, 
p=.012). No significant differences were found with regard to antisocial 
features and aggression-regulation deficits or with regard to childhood 
problematic behavior. Finally, analyses indicated that recidivating collective 
violence offenders more often (12%) had at least three behavioral indicators 
compared to those who did not re-offend (6%)(x2(1)=4.212, p=.004), and 
that recidivating collective violence offenders more often (12%) displayed 
two childhood problematic behaviors than non-recidivists (5%) (x2(1)=5.316, 
p=.021). One significant difference between collective violence recidivists 
and non-recidivists was found within the cumulative factor index; collective 
violence recidivist more often had at least two or more risk factors with 
regard to both behavioral indicators and childhood problematic behaviors 
(x2(1)=6.294, p=.012).
Again, these findings suggest that convergence or selection processes 
may contribute to collective violence offending. This in particular concerns 
criminal career measures with regard to age of onset and frequency of 
offending as measured by police arrest, and behavioral indicators associated 
with violent behavior, particularly when multiple behavioral indicators are 
present. Additional analyses not displayed here furthermore indicated that 
offender characteristics associated with collective violence recidivism 
overlap with those of solo violence re-offending. Together these findings
indicated that individuals who re-offended violently, whether alone or in a 
group, differ significantly from individuals who did not on similar criminal 
career measures and behavioral indicators. This suggests that risk factors 
for solo and collective violence offending are partly the same and that 
more frequent involvement in collective violence appears to not only be 
determined by social processes as stated by the SIM.
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Table 2. Differences between Collective Violence Offending Recidivists and Non-recidivists 
(n=438)
*p<.05 **p<.01
Finally, a multivariable Cox-regression analysis was conducted, of 
which the results are depicted in Table 3. From Table 3 can be derived that 
behavioral indicators contribute to collective violence re-offending. Of 
the three behavioral indicators (attention-deficit/hyperactivity features, 
heightened impulsivity and increased need for excitement) that, given the 
results of prior research might be of relevance in explaining persistence 
in collective violence, only attention-deficit/hyperactivity features were 
found to contribute independently. This behavioral characteristic was found 
to more than double the likelihood of persistence in collective violence 
(Exp(B)=2.135, p=.006). In addition, criminal career measures – age at 
Cox-regression analysis
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onset of offending (Exp(B)=.937, p=.047) and the number of prior collective 
violence offenses (Exp(B)=1.17, p=.001) – were found to influence survival. 
Because the current sample of collective violence offenders was identified 
from different sources – a database of known hooligans, two football-related 
collective violence incidents and a riot around a recreational event – we 
controlled for the diverging nature of the ‘index event’ by distinguishing 
between football-related and non-football related samples (Exp(B)=2.303, 
p=.018). We found recidivism as measured by police registrations was higher 
in the non-football related sample. In the Netherlands, a comprehensive 
preventive and individual-oriented repressive approach is applied to 
persons who partake in football-related violence. Although data are lacking 
to substantiate this claim, for the football-related subsamples this approach 
may have influenced persistence.
In sum, findings of the Cox-regression analysis indicated that a number 
of offender characteristics are associated with persistence in collective 
violence. This again suggests that individual characteristics are not to be 
totally disregarded when explaining collective violence, as has been argued 
by the SIM.
Over the past decades collective violence has been predominantly 
explained from a group-dynamic perspective stressing the role of social 
processes. Central to this group-dynamic perspective is the SIM. The SIM 
explains how trigger events and group dynamics may result in antagonistic 
intergroup relationships, which subsequently may affect an individual’s 
decision to participate in collective violence (Reicher, 2001). Doing so, 
the SIM disregards that personal characteristics of those participating in 
collective violence may also have explanatory value– the position taken by 
convergence theories (Ball and Drury, 2012).
While there is little doubt that group dynamics influence crowd 
behavior, individual evaluations of crowd situations do vary (Reicher and 
Sani, 1998; Sani and Reicher, 1998, 1999). Furthermore, the emotions these 
evaluations invoke, particularly anger, have been implicated in aggressive 
action tendencies in crowds (Mackie et al., 2000; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). 
Various psychological traits have been implicated in aggressive behavior 
in both non-provocative and provocative situations, a number of which 
have been previously linked to behaving violently in a group (Farrington, 
1994; Piquero et al., 2015; Lösel and Bliesener, 2003). Supporting the core 
principle of convergence theory, this suggests that offender characteristics 
may be linked to violent behavior in collective settings after all.
* p<.05 ** p<.01
Table 3. Determinants of Persistence in Collective Violence in a Sample of  
Collective Violence Offenders (n=438)
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In Western societies such as the Netherlands, collective violence 
generally occurs around demonstrations, protests, football matches, and 
other recreational events (Adang, 2011). The current article is concerned 
with individuals who have been involved in collective violence around 
football matches and recreational events, which may – at least by outsiders – 
be perceived as issue-irrelevant and hedonistic (Marx, 1970). The social 
identity perspective aims to explain how and why collective violence occurs, 
regardless of the setting in which it takes place. Consequently, though 
limited in its scope, the sample used in this study offers a possibility to assess 
whether individual characteristics contribute to participating in collective 
violence. 
The results of our study showed that our sample of collective violence 
offenders is characterized by a problematic background with regard to 
behavioral indicators and childhood problematic behavior. This finding fits 
with behavior theory, which suggests that involvement in any one problem 
behavior increases the likelihood of an individual displaying other problem 
behaviors as well ( Jessor, 1991). Differentiating between three groups 
– ‘non-offending up to involvement’, ‘prior offending up to involvement’ and 
‘early onset and high frequency prior offending up to involvement’ – our 
analysis indicated behavioral indicators and childhood problematic behavior 
were particularly present among collective violence offenders with an early 
age of onset and high offending frequency. Furthermore, co-occurrence of 
these characteristics in particular was prevalent among this subgroup of 
collective violence offenders, indicating their multi-problem character. As 
such, this subgroup is reminiscent of Moffitt’s life course persistent offender, 
suggesting that the premise of convergence theory might be limited to a 
subgroup of collective violence offenders, namely those who more frequently 
and persistently offend. About one in five offenders showed persistence in 
collective violence offending, in the sense that they had been apprehended 
for this offense at least once more by the police within four to five years 
after the index date. Substantiating our findings, behavioral indicators of 
psychological traits linked to violent offending predicted collective violence 
recidivism. Also, multi-problem backgrounds as reflected in the presence of 
multiple behavioral indicators and childhood problematic behaviors were 
more prevalent among individuals persisting in collective violence. Finally, 
Cox regression analyses indicated that various individual characteristics 
independently contribute to persistence in collective violence offending. 
Taken together, contrasting currently dominant theoretical views on 
collective violence, our findings showed that persistence in collective violence 
is associated with the presence of distinguishing offender characteristics. 
Our findings have implications for collective violence research. Many 
collective violence studies have emphasized the social processes leading 
up to collective violence and disregarded personal and psychological 
characteristics of those actually involved (for an overview see Reicher, 
2001). These studies to a large extent rely on participant observations and 
interviews (Adang, 2018). It, however, has been argued that these research 
methods are unable to construct trustworthy accounts of events i.e. may be 
biased or even speculative ( Johnson and Sackett, 1998; Waddington, 2012). 
Our findings suggest that in a given collective violence incident different 
subgroups may be distinguished for which the root causes of participating
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in the violence diverge. For some, the reasons for participating appear to 
not, or at least to not only be related to antagonistic group dynamics, but 
may also concern motives more directly linked to individuals themselves. 
First of all then, our results suggest that future collective violence studies 
should account for, and incorporate both group-dynamic and convergence 
explanations. This connects to the recently proposed initiation-escalation 
model of public disorder, which – by referring to the so-called young male 
syndrome – also argues for an approach to collective violence that includes a 
contribution to collective violence of contextual and individual determinants 
(Adang, 2011). Particularly with regard to the latter, possibilities of gathering 
data on individual characteristics data need to be explored. As, in the present 
absence of large scaled (survey) studies particularly aimed at collective 
violence offenders, validated measures or clinical interview data are likely 
to be unavailable, researchers may have to rely on alternative measures, as 
we did here. Another aspect deserving research attention, given the likely 
different underlying causes of participating in collective violence, is to what 
extent the presence and ratio of these specific subgroups may influence 
the total crowd’s group dynamics. This question in particular concerns the 
presence of groups of individuals who are repeatedly involved in collective 
violence. A qualitative case study in the Netherlands concluded that such 
groups may actively instigate a large-scale riot (Muller et al., 2010).
Our study may also offer input for discussing the conceptualization 
of collective violence. Its current conceptualization, around which social 
identity explanations are centered, assumes collective violence is reactive 
and largely centered around the motive of retribution. This conceptualization 
appears limited compared to current typological distinctions of violence. 
The quadripartite violence typology (QVT), for instance, states that 
differentiating between the affect underlying violence (negative/positive) 
and its nature (impulsive/controlled), allows for a richer representation of 
motivations for violence (Howard, 2015). The main motivations distinguished 
in the QVT are 1) excitement-seeking (positive affect, impulsive), 2) greed 
for social dominance or goods (positive affect, controlled), 3) revenge 
(negative affect, controlled) and 4) self-defense (negative affect, impulsive). 
The results of our study indicate that underlying causes for participating in 
collective violence may diverge between individuals. Consequently, future 
research may conceptualize collective violence around the motivations 
for violence identified in the QVT and/or the recently proposed initiation-
escalation model of public disorder, which argues that collective violence 
may also arise by the mere presence of a rival group (Adang, 2011). The fact 
that groups known for their frequent participating in collective violence 
are also involved in arranging confrontations with like-minded groups 
(e.g. Cleland and Cashmore, 2016), further substantiates this reasoning.
In sum, our findings indicate that some individuals are more likely than 
others to persist in collective violence. This specifically appears to concern a 
relatively small subgroup of collective violence offenders whose personal and 
criminal profiles resemble that of Moffitt’s life course persistent offender. 
Participating in collective violence for these individuals appears to reflect a 
general violent lifestyle that can be linked to the presence of multiple problem 
traits and behavioral characteristics. A first implication for intervention 
and prevention strategies may be to consider the relevant characteristics
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for determining the individual’s risk of recidivism. Subsequently, such 
information may be utilized in order to assess which collective violence 
offenders qualify for a person-oriented approach – a kind of approach 
that, at least in the Netherlands, is already customary for individuals who 
regularly participate in football-related collective violence and might be 
broadened to individuals repeatedly engaging in other types of collective 
violence as well. During the course of the current research however, it has 
proven to be extremely difficult to find reliable information on the personal 
characteristics of collective violence offenders. At the same time, this study 
suggests that such information is relevant both theoretically and in practice. 
The consistent gathering and recording of such information in the aftermath 
of future collective violence incidents is therefore recommended.
When drawing conclusions based on the current findings, it is however 
important to keep in mind the limitations of our data. First, official police 
data in all likelihood underestimate actual offending. Although those having 
extensive criminal careers may be more likely to be apprehended (Ball and 
Drury, 2012), chances of apprehension in general are low. Furthermore, as 
applies to all criminological studies making use of register data, registration 
of a particular (type of) crime and subsequent arrest are dependent on the 
investigation policy of the police and the prosecution policy of the Public 
Prosecution Service. The extent that collective violence is either high or 
low on the political agenda may therefore have influenced our measure of 
persistence (recidivism). Second, police data regarding collective violence 
incidents do not address its context or its scale beyond the legal minimum 
of three individuals involved (i.e. a full-blown riot or a bar room brawl). As 
the social identity model has been utilized to explain both large scale rioting 
as well as the escalation of night-time economy aggression (Levine, Lowe, 
Best, and Heim, 2012), this seems less problematic for making a contribution 
to the theoretical debate on explanations for collective violence. Third, the 
behavioral indicators and childhood problematic behavior data gathered
in this study did not reflect psychiatric disorders and personality traits 
as assessed by clinical diagnoses. Two aspects play a role here. First of all 
that – precisely due to adhering to the currently dominant theoretical 
insights – in practice no systematic attention is paid to the psychological 
characteristics of those engaging in collective violence. In Dutch practice, 
forensic psychological reports are usually only drawn up in case of serious 
offenses such as murder, manslaughter and sexual offenses. Consequently, 
to assess the presence of psychological traits and childhood problematic 
behavior there are few alternative data sources for the current sample 
outside of law enforcement parties such as the police and the Dutch 
Probation Service. Limited availability of suitable data is thus to some extent 
intrinsic to exploring new research directions. In order to address this issue, 
the presence of behavioral indicators of psychological traits and childhood 
problems were operationalized by means of standardized criteria applied 
to the sources consulted. Our results show that behavioral indicators are 
linked to persistence in collective violence offending. Although the currently 
applied method has its limitations, this suggests it does not result in findings 
that contrast earlier studies on violent offending.of standardized criteria 
applied to the sources consulted. Our results show that behavioral indicators 
are linked to persistence in collective violence offending. Although the
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currently applied method has its limitations, this suggests it does not result 
in findings that contrast earlier studies on violent offending.
Over the past decades scholars have predominantly taken a group-
dynamic approach to explain why individuals partake in collective violence 
despite the absence of an extensive criminal record or an affiliation 
with violent groups. This point of view disregards that even in the ‘right’ 
circumstances most people do not act violently, leaving unexplained why 
some individuals involve themselves in collective violence while others don’t. 
Individuals have been found to differ in their evaluation of social situations. 
As social information processing is influenced by psychological traits that 
are linked to violent offending, in this article we argue that, next to group-
dynamic processes, psychological traits may influence collective violence 
involvement.
Combining criminal career measures, behavioral indicators and 
information on childhood problematic behaviors suggests that particularly 
those persistently involved in collective violence offending show 
psychological traits that may predispose them towards violence. Therewith 
our findings are in line with the typological approach common in life course 
criminology, suggesting that different types of collective violence offenders 
may be identified for whom the root causes of collective violence involvement 
diverge. Given the association between behavioral indicators and specific 
recidivism, crowd composition may influence the extent to which individual 
and contextual determinants contribute to collective violence per given 
collective violence incident.
In the continuing debate concerning the relative contribution of 
individual and contextual determinants on collective violence, so far 
offender typologies have not been considered. The current study, which 
included a relatively large sample of collective violence offenders, suggests
that a typological approach may be employed to address and reconcile 
contrasting empirical findings and theoretical vantage points. Our results 
may be utilized to further develop a theoretical approach that addresses a 
contextualized group-dynamic understanding of collective violence as well 
as variations in individuals’ willingness to become involved.
Conclusion
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Two dominant perspectives explaining collective violence differ in the 
extent to which they ascribe influence to individual and contextual factors. 
Our analysis of a project X disorder in the Netherlands shows organized 
groups were not involved. Instead spontaneous group formation and 
identification were observed, confirming socio-contextual theory. Arrested 
suspects, however, were no cross section of youths, with a minority mirroring 
the personality profile of individuals disproportionally involved in collective 
violence. This suggests predispositions are of relevance as well in explaining 
public disorder. This case study shows the recently developed initiation/
escalation model provides a useful framework that incorporates both 
perspectives, i.e. both theoretical perspectives are not mutually exclusive. 
Research suggestions are discussed.
Keywords: public disorder, collective violence, predispositions, socio-
contextual theory
Nothing ever happens in the sleepy, 16,000 inhabitants villa town of 
Haren, designated twice as the ‘best municipality in the Netherlands’. Yet, 
on 21 September 2012, thousands of youngsters descended on the small 
town after a Facebook invitation for a sweet 16 party was turned into an open 
invitation for a project X party, referring to a film released earlier that year. 
The film ‘Project X’ depicts three high school seniors who have the idea of 
throwing a birthday party that no one will ever forget. They advertise it via 
their school, a website and a local radio station. Hundreds of youngsters show 
up at the home were the party is given. Things get out of hand, authorities 
intervene, a ravaged residential area is left behind.18 In several countries, 
parties inspired by the film had earlier led to public order problems, e.g. 
United States (Houston, 14 March 201219), France (Roques sur Argens, 17 
May 201220) and Germany (Backnang, 30 June 201221).
In Haren too, things got out of hand. In the course of the evening, a 
violent confrontation between youngsters and police lasting several hours 
erupted (called excessive and without precedent by authorities) and some 
shops were looted. Thirtyfour people were arrested during the riot (after 
subsequent investigations in the following weeks, the number of arrested 
individuals totaled 108). Events drew a lot of national and international media 
attention including from the BBC (Facebook party invite sparks riot in Haren, 
Netherlands22) and CNN (Facebook birthday invite leads to mayhem in Dutch 
town, authorities say23). The so-called Haren Facebook riot led to a lot of 
copycat behaviour: in the weeks following the riot, more than 40 invitations 
for new project X parties all over the Netherlands were announced via 
social media. Most never materialized, others were actively prevented from
Abstract
Introduction
18 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Rl1TJG17Wk (accessed 22 March 2015)
19 http://abcnews.go.com/US/project-movie-inspires-teen-parties/story?id=15922034 
(accessed 22 March 2015). 
20 http://www.rczeitung.com/index.php/provence-cote-dazur-artikel/items/villa-in-les-
issambres-nach-massen-party-verwuestet.html (accessed 22 March 2015). 
21 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQZgtq0SF2s (accessed 22 March 2015). 
22 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19684708 (accessed 22 March 2015). 
23 http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/22/world/europe/netherlands-facebook-riot/index.
html (accessed 22 March 2015). 
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happening by authorities. Nevertheless, similar to the England riots of 2011, 
the role social media played in the run up to and during these events became 
a hot topic and was seen as a distinguishing feature of the riot. Newburn 
(2015) puts the England riots (‘the most significant civil disorder on the 
British mainland in at least a generation’) in recent historical perspective 
and notes four ways in which these riots deviate significantly from other 
riots in the post-war period, through (1) their speed and malleability as the 
consequence of the information flows made possible through social media, 
(2) the amount of looting as a possible expression of violent consumerism, (3) 
the criticism levelled at police by politicians and (4) the most distinctive, the 
nature and extent of the response by the penal state: special court settings, 
utilizing massive resources to analyze CCTV data to bring unprecedented 
numbers of people before the courts that are subsequently remanded in or 
sentenced to custody.
Although the scale of the violence in Haren cannot be compared to what 
happened during the 2011 England riots and the looting was limited, it is not 
difficult to apply Newburn’s four ‘points of distinction’ to the project X riot 
in Haren. Authorities in Haren were surprised by the mobilization power of 
social media (1), several commentators blamed the hedonistic behaviour of 
the youths involved (2), and the response of the criminal justice system was 
extraordinary (4): a dedicated police investigative team of the type usually 
reserved for capital crimes was set up, police analyzed a total of 120 hours 
of video material (filmed by police cameras, obtained from the public and 
downloaded from YouTube. There were no CCTV cameras in Haren), fast-
track court proceedings were used and, as an innovation, perpetrators were 
convicted to contribute to a specifically established fund to cover damages 
(in other respects, punishments did not deviate from what was normal). 
Because of all the criticism levelled at them, police and authorities chose 
to commission an independent investigation into the riots and the way they 
were handled. Following the publication of the critical report, the mayor, as 
the one responsible for public order in the Dutch system, resigned (3). There 
is another similarity: the day after the project X riot, police and authorities 
blamed ‘scum’ (specifically, outside organized groups of ‘hooligans’) for the 
chaos and violence. The same happened after the 2011 England riots where 
some (especially politicians) blamed career criminals and gang members for 
the riots (prime minister David Cameron in a statement to Parliament: ‘it is 
criminality, pure and simple’). Others, however, pointed to the importance 
of a social context of deprivation and discriminating police tactics in London 
and other English cities that caused normally non-criminal individuals to 
participate (e.g. Guardian/LSE 2011; Reicher and Stott 2011). Haren is in no 
way a disadvantaged place, with an average household income that is the 
highest in the north of the Netherlands, a virtual absence of inhabitants of 
migrant origin and less than 1 per cent of inhabitants dependent on welfare/
social security (well below the national average). Other than with the 
England riots, there was no suggestion that the violence and looting in Haren 
was some kind of political protest, but the question did arise what role social 
context and group dynamics played in the project X riot.
This question links neatly to the theoretical debate that is going on 
between different explanations for collective violence (Reicher 1996; Stott 
and Reicher 1998). One perspective suggests that collective violence is an
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outcome of the convergence of individuals who are predisposed toward 
creating ‘disorder’ (e.g. ‘hooligans’ or ‘career criminals’). This approach does 
not explain how and why collective violence erupts in specific circumstances 
but not in others. The other side of the theoretical debate argues the need 
for a contextualized, group-dynamic understanding of collective violence. 
This paper wants to contribute to that debate. In analyzing the riot, we will 
make use of the initiation/escalation model for collective violence (Adang 
2011). The model was developed on the basis of systematic observations of 
225 so-called ‘high-risk’ football and protest events as a first step toward 
combining both theoretical approaches. The model made clear the relevance 
of context, intergroup interaction and intergroup relationships while at the 
same time indicating variations in the willingness of individuals to become 
involved in violence, with some actively seeking opportunities to be violent, 
without the need for external triggers (other than the presence of a rival 
group). The model, as outlined in Adang (2011), posits that as far as the 
initiation of collective violence is concerned, a distinction should be made 
between two types of violence:
The distinction between the two types of violence is not absolute and 
an obvious overlap is created by the fact that the young male syndrome may 
also be expressed in response to triggers that may seem trivial to outsiders. 
However, the model posits that different mechanisms are responsible 
for the escalation of violence (in the sense that more individuals decide 
to involve themselves):
1 Violence that is linked to a clearly identifiable trigger. This type of violence is 
reactive – it is a response to specific elements or frictions in a given situation, 
be it provocations by other groups or third parties, events on the pitch (in the 
case of football), measures taken by police or some other identifiable trigger. 
Theoretically, this type of violence is easily linked to familiar aggression theories 
(e.g. aggression out of frustration), competition for limited resources or as a 
response to threats. As with other forms of aggression, males are more likely 
to react aggressively than females, and adolescents/young adults are more 
likely to react aggressively than individuals from other age groups. The targets 
of the violence are usually linked with the trigger preceding the behaviour. 
2 Violence that is not linked to a clearly identifiable trigger. This type of 
violence is not reactive, and thus seems to arise more spontaneously in the 
situation (although it might be preplanned). It is performed by groups of 
male adolescents/young adult males and is directed specifically at similar, 
rival groups of young males. The individuals and groups concerned seem to 
actively seek out opportunities to confront rival groups. Theoretically, this 
type of violence can be seen as another expression of the so-called ‘young 
male syndrome’ (Wilson and Daly 1985), the tendency of young males to take 
risks and be violent because they discount the future in favour of short-term 
gains, which is socially facilitated by the presence of peers in pursuit of the 
same goals.
(   )
(   )
04. Contextual and individual factors 
determining escalation of collective violence
65
In this model, alcohol and drugs may indirectly contribute to the 
initiation and escalation of violence through one of the factors in the model, 
e.g. by increasing the likelihood that a trigger is reacted to or by altering 
perceptions of opportunity. The effects of alcohol consumption may 
make violence more likely under specific circumstances because of self-
overestimation, less impulse control, less accurate assessment of social 
and risky situations, less fear of sanctions and contributing to a feeling of 
‘everything goes’ (van Hasselt 2013: 210). We want to explore if the escalation 
in Haren can be explained using this model, which was developed in the quite 
different context of football and protest events. In terms of the six levels of 
the widely used ‘flashpoints’ analytical model (e.g. Waddington 2010), we 
focus on the role contextual, situational and interactional aspects play in the
1 On the one hand, there is the opportunity and (perceived) risk of retaliation. 
Only a small minority of a group engages in the most risky types of behaviour, 
whereas the majority of participants opt for less risky alternatives (shouting, 
gesturing, running) or do not become involved at all. Even for those being 
violent, there is a lot more missile throwing than physical fighting, and 
redirected aggression at inanimate objects (fences, buses, trains) rather 
than at individuals who can fight back. The fact that the young males, when 
violent, operate in groups is a form of risk reduction in itself, as is the fact 
that they avoid or flee from confrontations that they seem unable to win. 
In several respects, the data show that violence became more likely when 
there was no police present at risk locations. Violent fans and protestors 
regularly took measures to hide their faces to make recognition more 
difficult and avoid identification and arrest. These risk-reducing attempts 
to maintain ‘anonymity’ (to authorities, not to their fellows!) are to be 
distinguished from the so-called deindividuation effect of ‘anonymity’, for 
which there is no support (Postmes and Spears 1998).24 The evidence for 
bounded rationality in combination with the relevance of opportunities to 
be violent with limited risk for escalation provide a link between collective 
violence and principles of situational crime prevention (Clarke 1995). 
2 The second important escalation mechanism is the existence of an ‘us versus 
them’ antagonism. The more antagonistic the relationships between different 
groups, the higher the frequency of observed violence. This was clearly the 
case for the relations between rival fan groups and for the relationship 
between certain groups of protestors (‘autonomen/black block’) and police. 
Theoretically, the elaborated social identity model (ESIM), which states 
that collective ‘disorder’ is made possible through the shared psychological 
salience of a common social identity among crowd participants is relevant 
here (Reicher 1984; 1996). The defining dimensions of this identity serve 
to explain the normative limits of collective action (what people do) and 
the extent of participation (who does and does not join in) during a crowd 
event. This ‘social identity’ analysis argues that the dynamics of intergroup 
interaction are integral to the psychology of widespread ‘disorder’. Stott and 
Reicher (e.g. 1998) indicate that when an initially heterogeneous crowd has 
come to be treated as a homogeneous whole by the police, this has led crowd 
members to reconceptualize themselves as members of a common category, 
thus setting up a cycle of tension and escalating conflict.
(   )
(   )
24 According to deindividuation theories, anonymity causes antinormative and disinhibited 
behaviour. 
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initiation and escalation of collective violence (rather than on the structural, 
political/ ideological or cultural aspects that usually receive more attention). 
The questions this paper seeks to address is how events escalated, what 
individual, situational and contextual factors played a role and why police 
were attacked. Our analysis will focus on events at the day itself. After a 
description of the methodology used, we present a reconstruction of events, 
analyze contextual factors and present an analysis of individual factors, 
based in large part on a detailed analysis of apprehended suspects. In the 
end, we discuss the theoretical implications of our findings. 
This study was performed as part of the official independent 
investigation into events in Haren (Commission Project X Haren 2013) and 
made use of written documents, audio and video material and interviews. 
A factual reconstruction was made based on interviews and an analysis of 
written documentation and audio-visual material. The researchers had 
access to all relevant material from authorities. Audio was available of police 
communication. Video material was available that was made by a police officer 
wearing a bodycam (containing recordings made mainly in the lead up to the 
riot) and from two cameras fixed to two different riot police vehicles. Also 
video material from open sources was analyzed, both from media reports and 
YouTube. Police and authorities provided documentation of preparations, 
evaluations and official meetings held in relation with the event. In addition, 
94 face-to-face and 11 phone interviews were held with authorities, police 
officers and municipal workers that played a role in preparation, on the day 
itself or in the aftermath. An information and interview protocol guaranteed 
anonymity of respondents and complete independence of the researchers 
from authorities. Because of the wealth of the information available, it was 
possible to make a highly accurate reconstruction of events (Adang 2013). 
Where appropriate, the findings in this paper are complemented with the 
results of other studies done for the Commission: a study on the mobilization 
for Haren (Van Dijk et al. 2013) and a study on societal aspects of project X 
Haren (van den Brink et al. 2013). For this last study, 16 youngsters who were 
present in Haren during the riots were interviewed. After the riot, a total 
of 74 suspects were arrested after an extensive large-scale investigation to 
identify, arrest and prosecute as many suspects as possible (in addition to 
the 34 who had already been arrested during the riot itself). For our analysis 
of all 108 arrested suspects and in conformity with Dutch Law, permission 
was sought and obtained from the Minister of Safety and Justice to obtain 
and use the relevant individual data from police files. This includes data 
contained in police systems and reports of police interrogations of these 
suspects. Also, interviews were held with two officers who conducted many 
of the interviews with suspects. 
The 108 arrested suspects in all likelihood form a good representation 
of those that were violent on the night of 21st September in Haren. According 
to police officers on the scene that night at most 300 individuals (highest 
estimate) were violent that night. Arresting over one third of them is a 
relatively high percentage. Because of the outrage following the riot, the 
police got a lot of cooperation from the public as evidenced by 722 tip-offs 
and many hours of video material made by citizens. Almost all of the suspects
Methodology
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police sought to identify and arrest following their analysis of the 120 hours 
of available video material were in fact arrested. For the study, this meant 
that the potential bias of mainly those already known to police being arrested 
was avoided (cf. Ball and Drury 2012). All but three were convicted.
In our analysis of suspects, we specifically looked for data that could 
provide information on suspects’ previous police contacts and previous 
offences and convictions, and for indications of any form of psychosocial 
problems. The following police systems were consulted: 
 
To assess whether arrested suspects can be considered to belong to so-
called ‘hooligan’ groups, a query on arrested suspects was conducted in the 
Dutch police national Football Tracking System (Voetbalvolgsysteem). Since 
1997, all misconduct and misbehavior of persons around football matches 
is registered in this system to monitor the prevalence of football-related 
delinquency for management and policy goals.
The extent to which arrested suspects had been brought to justice for 
felonies prior to the project X disorder was investigated by consulting a 
police registration system called HKS. This system has been in use by the 
Dutch national police since 1986 and registers all persons that have been 
prosecuted due to committing a felony and the felony concerned.
The police registration system BVH is used among other things to register 
persons who are involved in or suspects of felonies and misdemeanor. Due 
to legal rules records that had been registered five years or more ago could 
not be consulted. Therefore, only records between 2008 and 2012 were 
included. All available records in BVH were also analyzed for information on 
problem behaviour during education and at home, personality aspects and 
alcohol and drug habits.
To put these data in perspective, we will compare them where possible 
with the analysis of arrested suspects following the so-called Hoek van 
Holland beach-riot of August 2009. This riot took place at a freely accessible 
dance party attended by between 30,000 and 50,000 visitors.
Late in the evening of this event, police officers were attacked by a 
group of 200-300 persons and persecuted into the dunes. Police officers 
fired a total of 75 (mostly warning) shots in self-defense; one person was 
killed by a police bullet. Statements of police officers and witnesses depicted 
violence of – by Dutch standards – almost unprecedented severity and 
intensity. Independent investigators Muller et al. (2010) showed that this 
riot was unequivocally caused by an organized group of ‘hooligans’ that 
is frequently involved in public disorder, calling themselves Rotterdam 
Jongeren Kern (RJK, Rotterdam Youth Core, fans of football club Feyenoord 
Rotterdam). The comparison with project X Haren is interesting because it 
also involves an escalation in a party atmosphere.
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On Thursday, 6th September, a 15-year-old girl from Haren opens an 
event on Facebook to celebrate her 16th birthday. The party is to take place 
on the 21st.25 The next day she notices the invitation is being spread widely 
and as much as 3,500 people on the first day announce they will attend. 
When the number keeps increasing and a link is being made with the film 
project X, she contacts her father. They decide to remove the invitation from 
Facebook. That doesn’t help much because several new Facebook events 
are started that highjack her original event. Eventually, one event remains 
active and the number of registrations keeps growing day by day (eventually, 
some 250,000 invitations were sent out with some 30,000 people 
indicating they would attend).
On 18th September, three days before the event is supposed to take 
place, several national media pick up on the news and (falsely) mention that 
the municipality has taken emergency measures. From this moment onwards, 
national attention is growing, activity on social media keeps growing 
exponentially (van Dijk et al. 2013: 72). Although they do not know what to 
expect, authorities start preparations. No measures are taken to prevent 
people from travelling to Haren. It is decided that the police should adopt 
a low-profile approach26, using regular patrol officers without deployment 
of riot police.27 In case a large number of people show up, an abandoned 
field is designated as a place for them to meet and be transported to nearby 
Groningen by bus. A special ordinance is issued, prohibiting the use (but not 
the possession) of alcohol in the evening of the 21st.
In line with the low key approach, police deployment this day is mainly 
focused on monitoring the number of people travelling to Haren and 
patrolling the road where the non-existing party is supposed to take place 
and surrounding streets. In the course of the afternoon and early evening, 
several hundreds of people enter Haren by various means (e.g. train, walking, 
car). The ordinance that it is forbidden to drink alcohol in the street is not 
communicated or enforced: police feel unable to do so, given the number 
of people arriving, many of whom carry alcoholic drinks. The atmosphere is 
happy, festive, jovial and upbeat. By the time it starts to get dark, after a 
quarter to eight, the total numbers of visitors is already well over a 1,000, 
with probably around 700 of them converging at the crossroads where most 
of the media representatives have taken up position. The first signs of trouble 
are beginning to show. Occasionally fireworks are thrown. Individuals climb 
in traffic signs and lantern poles, and offensive chants are at times directed 
to the police. At some point, all police officers present at the crossroads take 
up position behind a barrier that had been placed in the afternoon to close 
off the street. The crowd advances to the barriers and leans on them. At no 
Results: A Reconstruction of Events
Anticipation: 6–20th September
Project X Haren: 21st September
25 She deliberately makes the event ‘public’ to give her friends the opportunity to invite a 
few others who are not Facebook friends of hers. 
26 This is a common approach in the Netherlands, specifically intended to avoid being seen 
as provocative and allowing for easier communication with citizens. 
27 Riot police units in the Netherlands are composed of regular patrol officers who received 
a four-week basic riot police training and are equipped with protective padding, a shield, 
a helmet and a long baton (‘full riot gear’). One group of riot police consists of six officers 
with a group commander and a driver. Three groups form a section, three sections form a 
platoon. They are mobilized as needed, there are no full-time riot units. 
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point do they try to break through it, but occasionally, empty bottles and 
beer cans are thrown around, at first randomly, then in the direction of 
police officers. Several of the officers feel increasingly uncomfortable and 
threatened. By 20.00 hours, reinforcements are called up, both in the form 
of additional patrol officers in daily uniform (the idea is to have them enter 
the crowd and engage them) as well as in the form of riot police as a form of 
back up. The first group consisting of seven riot police officers arrives on the 
scene at 20.49 hours. These seven riot officers descend from their vehicle 
and, carrying helmets and shields (i.e. full riot gear), take up position as a 
human barrier. They do not charge at the crowd, which had already backed 
away at their approach. Nevertheless, immediately a barrage of objects is 
thrown at the officers. They have difficulty maintaining their position and 
at times have to retreat. The riot has started in earnest and it the police 
clearly are not in control of the situation. It takes time for additional riot 
police officers to arrive on the scene. Lack of manpower, lack of a properly 
functioning command and communication structure and the severity of 
the violence in combination with local infrastructure (wide alleyways, big 
gardens, many side streets) result in the violence continuing and displacing 
itself. On two occasions, a car is turned over and set on fire. Shopping 
windows are being smashed in and goods are stolen. A fire is started on the 
market square. The disorder finally ends almost four hours later, after it has 
started raining and mounted police officers in riot gear charge the remaining 
rioters. The damage to properties of citizens and authorities is somewhat in 
excess of 200,000 euro.
The reconstruction of events makes clear that there are two different 
phases: before and after the arrival of the first unit of riot police. Below, 
events are analyzed for factors that might help explain why this escalation 
occurred. First, by looking at the mobilization for the event, the background 
of arrested suspects and their actions and motives. Following that, attention 
will be paid to contextual factors in the phase leading up to the attack on 
police and the escalation.
Why did people come to Haren and where did they come from? van Dijk 
et al. (2013) report on a web survey of youngsters/young adults between 15 
and 25 that was conducted two months after events in Haren.28 The most 
important motivators to go, according to the youngsters themselves, were 
curiosity, excitement, the fact that something was happening at last and the 
fact that others would be going too. Most of the respondents knew about 
the film project X (many because they had seen the trailer rather than the 
film itself). Although it may have served as an inspiration for some, for many, 
knowledge of the film was an incentive NOT to go. The initial mobilization to 
Haren was facilitated by a combination of social media and traditional media 
activities, easy availability of transport and inconsistent communication 
by authorities. Mobilization for Haren was not mobilization for a riot. Most 
Analysis of Events
Visitors and perpetrators of violence
28 All 3,115 young people between the ages of 15 and 25 from the three northern provinces 
that formed part a representative national online panel were approached, 990 or 31 per 
cent started answering the survey, 855 or 27 per cent fully completed it – to obtain a 
representative sample, a weighting was done for sex and educational level. Eight per cent 
of respondents actually went to Haren. 
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youngsters came to Haren to have a party, either because they genuinely 
believed some kind of party was going to take place or because they were 
curious, wanted to take part in something special or defy authorities in 
showing up to party anyway. As one female participant noted with regard 
to the fact that they had come to the party that authorities did not want to 
happen: ‘in the beginning it was all beautiful. Youths against older people. 
Haha. We prevailed’, but ‘Later, only scum remained’ (van den Brink et al. 
2013: 10529). Another participant: ‘You arrive and it is real! You see a large 
crowd. That is cool. It’s like: this is really big, a lot of people have come. There 
was a good atmosphere…’ (van den Brink et al. 2013: 105). It is not possible to 
know exactly how many people attended the project X event in Haren, there 
was a coming and going of people. Authorities estimated that this number 
over the day totaled to between 3,000 and 5,000 people.
At the moment of escalation at 20.49 hours, police estimated that 
there were less than 1,000 people at the crossroads, with a gradual build-
up taking place in the hours before that time. Interviewed police officers 
indicate that the groups from which they were confronted numbered a few 
hundred people. The highest police estimate of the total number of people 
that actually were violent in the course of the evening is 300. After the 
first violent eruption, groups of from five up to several tens of youngsters 
committed acts of violence while the rest looked on or were merely present. 
Officers at the scene agreed that the violence directed at them was not 
really organized. This seems to confirm the fact that in the lead up to 21st 
September, police, using their regular intelligence sources, did not have 
information that any particular groups of youngsters or ‘hooligans’ were 
organizing to go to Haren to create public order disturbances.
When, in the afternoon of the 21st, rumors surfaced that hard core 
‘hooligans’ from next door Groningen might be interested to go to Haren, 
police deployed two plainclothes officers with specific knowledge of this 
group to see whether they were present. According to their observation, this 
group (or individuals from this group) were not present at the crossroads at 
all. At a later stage, they did spot a group of several tens of these hard core 
supporters at another location in Haren; however, these supporters did not 
participate in the violence against the police. The hard core fans themselves 
stated in the press that they did not participate in the disturbances (they 
refused to be interviewed by researchers). In the week following the riot, 
police football coordinators from other Dutch police forces reported there 
were no indications that any hooligans known to them had been present 
in Haren. Video images also provide no such evidence.30 There was also no 
evidence that individuals were coordinating violence by means of mobile 
phones or social media. An analysis of tweets sent on 21st September 
provides no indications that this medium played a role in a mobilization for 
violence. No weapons of any kind were brought along by those who acted 
violently, except for fireworks, objects used in the violence were those at 
hand. It is good to note that the violence, although severe, was not without 
bounds. It was mainly aimed at riot police and inanimate objects (cars, street
29 All quotes are translated from the original Dutch by the authors. 
30 Images show only one individual with a flag from a football club (FC Utrecht) being 
present (but not being violent). It is well known that ‘hooligans’ do not display club 
colours. Within a few seconds after showing himself, he is being attacked by known hard 
core FC Groningen fans, so in this sense, they were involved in some violence, but not in 
the violence directed at the police or objects. 
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furniture, shop windows), but not at inhabitants of Haren.31 The few people 
within the crowd that actively attempted to stop the violence (videos show 
at least three individuals from within the crowd who tried, unsuccessfully) 
did not meet with repercussions. Some of the perpetrators even abided by 
requests of home owners to stop damaging their goods (van den Brink et al. 
2013: 119). 
More than half of 108 arrested suspects are between 18 and 25 years 
old and more than a quarter has not yet reached adult age. The most common 
age (mode) as well as the median age is 19 years and the mean age of those 
arrested is 19.6 years. With only two arrested suspects being female, the 
arrestees are almost exclusively male. Arrested suspects mainly (87 per cent) 
live in the three northern provinces of the Netherlands. The vast majority of 
the arrested suspects therefore had to cover only a relatively short distance 
(but only four of them were inhabitants of Haren itself). This fits with the 
finding of van den Brink et al. (2013: 108) that very few youngsters of Haren 
were involved in the violence and that the general feeling or norm among 
them was not to damage the place where they themselves lived.
Two of the 108 arrestees are registered in the Dutch police national 
Football Tracking System once following misconduct in a train transporting 
football fans. For this behaviour they received a fine, but no stadium ban. 
From other police documentation, it can be derived that two more arrested 
suspects have been involved in football-related delinquency. Although 
five other arrestees are thought to belong to groups of (young) fanatical 
supporters of three professional football teams in the north part of the 
country, none of them is considered to be actively involved in hooliganism. 
This means that none of the arrestees are known as hooligans by police at the 
moment project X Haren took place.
On the basis of official police reports and analysis of interrogation 
transcriptions, it has been assessed whether some kind of previous 
relationship existed between arrested suspects. Five small groups consisting 
of three or four persons each were identified. These findings stand in stark 
contrast with the profile of arrested suspects (n = 34) in the Hoek van 
Holland beach riot, where 23 members of the self-identified Rotterdam 
Youth Core RJK were seen to be present (with 12 of them being arrested). 
Seven of those were suspected of partaking in a criminal organization (aimed 
at creating disturbances) and five of them had received a stadium ban 
(Muller et al. 2010).
Looking at the ‘prosecuted felonies’ HKS system, 84 of the arrested 
suspects had no registrations and 24 (22 per cent) were registered for a 
total of 99 times, an average of four times. Fifteen of those had committed 
a violent crime at some point prior to the project X disorder. Seven of the 
arrested suspects were responsible for most of the registrations, having 
well over four each. Felonies registered mainly involve property crime (46 
per cent) and violent crime (31 per cent). Again, data from the Hoek van 
Holland beach riot provide a stark contrast, with 76 per cent of 34 arrested
Background of arrested suspects
Criminal career
31 An assault on an 84-year-old man at his own home just outside the area where the riot 
took place falls outside this pattern. Despite a dedicated extensive police investigation, 
a suspect could not be identified. 
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suspects already having a HKS registration, and the average number of 
records in HKS amounting to seven for all involved in the disorder, and 12 
(especially in relation to violence) for the 12 arrestees identified as belonging 
to the RJK (Muller et al. 2010). As a further comparison, Adang and Van der 
Torre (2008: 70) note that 56 per cent of 250 individuals arrested during 
New Year’s eve disorder in the Netherlands were already registered in HKS 
an average of six times (especially in relation to violence) and Bruinsma et 
al. (2010: 41) report that 59 per cent of arrestees made during a riot in 
Utrecht were already registered in HKS an average of seven times (especially 
in relation to violence). Nationally, in 2012, 62 per cent of arrested suspects 
in the Netherlands was already registered in HKS, mostly for property crime 
(Kalidien and de Heer-Lange 2013). Nationally, 10 per cent of all felonies 
involve violent crime.
In all, 94 out of the 108 Haren suspects were found in the more 
encompassing BVH system, for a total of 626 records. Registrations found 
are mainly (26 per cent) concerned with groups of youth being checked 
by police officials or causing a nuisance, meaning that it is not certain they 
actually committed a misdemeanor. Vandalizing objects, spraying graffiti 
and the consumption of alcohol and drugs in public space are other acts for 
which persons were frequently registered (21 per cent). Sixteen percent of 
all records concerns violent acts like quarrels and disputes and 13 per cent 
is related to property crime (e.g. bicycle theft). Unfortunately, reference 
material (national averages) for BVH is not available, neither for the Hoek van 
Holland riot (Muller et al. 2010) nor nationally.
In as far as could be deduced from police documentation, the majority 
(74) of the arrestees did not seem to experience personal problems (e.g. 
substance abuse, psychopathology) or to display problem behaviour 
at school or at home. For a total of 34 arrested suspects (31 per cent), 
background information on problem behaviour during education and 
at home, personality and alcohol and drug habits were found. Thirteen 
arrested suspects had shown aggressive and problematic behaviour at 
school, five of them having been expelled due to their misbehavior. Of the 
arrested suspects showing problematic behaviour at school, three behaved 
unruly at home as well. Additionally, the behaviour of eight other arrestees 
was considered troublesome by their parents. This unruly behaviour 
ranged from walking away from home one or more times, not being 
susceptible to parental authority or trying to withdraw themselves from it, 
to threatening and assaulting their parents and siblings. For ten arrestees, 
there is information indicative of psychopathology. Especially indications of 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (seven cases, or 6 per cent 
of all 108 arrestees) are referred to, sometimes combined with an inability to 
control aggressive impulses. The most recent estimated national average for 
ADHD is 2.9 per cent for children and 2.1 per cent for young adults, with the 
prevalence in males two to three times as high as that in females (Tuithof et 
al. 2010). For the Hoek van Holland beach riot, no comparable information on 
the background of arrestees is available.
Arrestees’ backgrounds
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Analysis of the interrogation transcripts learns that most of the 
arrested suspects told they had come to Haren because of the party they 
expected (61 per cent) or out of curiosity (24 per cent). Only one arrestee 
acknowledges to having been present because disorder could result. For 
ten arrestees, their motives for being present are unknown, four arrested 
suspects were in Haren for other reasons and one arrestee denies having 
been present.
Arrestees have been arrested predominantly for throwing objects 
(e.g. cans, bottles, stones) towards police officers (78 per cent). To a lesser 
extent they have (as well) been arrested for vandalism and destruction of 
property (including arson; 18 per cent) or the looting of a nearby super 
market (19 per cent). Seven arrestees are accused of inciting other people 
to join in the disorder and five have been detained for disregarding police 
instructions. Sixteen individuals deny their involvement in the disorder, 76 
give one or more explanations for their actions and for 16 arrested suspects 
the self-stated motives for their actions remain unknown. Of those that give 
an explanation for their behaviour, 47 per cent state they felt influenced by 
the behaviors of others and ‘got carried away’. Of the 95 arrested suspects 
being asked, almost all (92 per cent) confirm having consumed alcohol. 
Twenty arrestees say they feel their substance use – especially alcohol – 
influenced their behaviour during the disorder. Nineteen arrested suspects 
felt actions of the police were unnecessary and disproportional, and used this 
to explain their actions. Sensation- and thrill-seeking, being tough, feeling 
worked up or behaving impulsively due to personality deficits (e.g. ADHD) 
are referred to a much lesser extent. For the Hoek van Holland beach riot, 
no comparable information on the arrestees actions and motives is available 
from interrogation transcripts. However, prior to the riot, police repeatedly 
received information (which proved to be correct) from covert sources that 
a large group of hooligans intended to riot at the event.
To summarize, the Hoek van Holland riot was characterized by 
participation of a number of repeat offender individuals, many of whom 
were known as hooligans by police, who knew each other and actively 
looked for a confrontation. By contrast, those arrested in relation to the 
disorder in Haren generally did not know one another and were not known 
hooligans. Some (those who video images show were most active) can at 
most be characterized as marginally involved in felonies and to some extent 
displaying antisocial behaviour or having done so in their adolescent years. 
This indicates that contextual factors might be more important to explain 
why disorder occurred in Haren and why police were attacked.
Contrary to the 2011 England riots, nothing in media accounts or in the 
interviews that were held alludes to specific grievances or state repression as 
factors in the project X riot. On the contrary, hedonistic behaviour by spoiled 
adolescents under the influence of alcohol was blamed mostly, in conjunction 
with the mobilizing influence of (social) media and inadequate anticipation 
by authorities. The film Project X obviously provided a contextual factor, and 
to this day, events are known as the Haren Project X riots. Van den Brink et al. 
(2013) argue that the Project X film fits in a tradition of adolescent movies 
and as such resonated with youngsters, but that the film itself played only
Arrestees’ actions and motives
Contextual factors
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a minor role in events on the day itself. In the case of Haren, social media 
(especially Facebook and YouTube) did play a significant role in mobilizing 
youngsters. van Dijk et al. (2013) make clear that some traditional media 
(especially radio stations) played an active role in mobilizing for the event 
and that the media attention and social media activity fed into each other. 
However, national media attention did not lead to mobilization on a national 
level: the event in Haren was, as far as visitors were concerned, mainly a 
regional event. Whereas both traditional and social media played a role in 
mobilizing for the event, there are no indications that they played a significant 
role in the violence that erupted.
Van den Brink et al. (2013) argue how events in Haren fit with an 
existing youth culture characterized by drinking, dancing, partying and a 
craving for intense physical experiences where events function as a kind of 
‘moral holiday’. The likelihood of violence increases in a context that creates 
such a ‘time out’ feeling (van der Linden et al. 2004). This type of argument is 
similar to an explanation of the 2011 England riots as an expression of violent 
consumerism (e.g. Treadwell et al. (2012) suggest that ‘consumer culture 
supplied rioters with a compelling motivation to join the rioting’). It is clear 
that the youngsters gathered in Haren for a party and that a lot of alcohol 
was consumed. Having said that, there are many occasions where youths 
consume a lot of alcohol without violence erupting and while all of this set 
the scene for the events that unfolded in Haren, they are still not sufficient 
to explain the violence that occurred. After all, less than 10 per cent of those 
that had converged in Haren partook in the violence, meaning that the vast 
majority did not. These figures are in line with Adang (2011) who found that 
even in highly escalated situations, a maximum of 10 per cent (and usually 
much less) of those present are actually violent. At the crossroads, several 
elements contributed to the opportunity that arose for disturbances to start. 
Many youngsters gathered at the crossroads because it was close to house of 
the girl who sent out the original invitation, the place of the so-called party 
that was widely published on social media. Also, the largest number of media 
representatives were gathered there. The media served as an attraction 
point: every time a camera was turned on, a group of youngsters started 
jumping and singing in front of the camera. By default, this crossroads 
became the place to be. Where people had arrived individually or in small 
groups of friends, gradually spontaneously groups of young males formed 
that synchronized their behaviour by jointly jumping and singing together, 
at first especially when cameras were turned on, but later independent of 
camera presence or activity. However, there was nothing to do, there was 
in fact no party, and everybody seemed to be waiting for things to come. 
Gradually, the festive atmosphere turned more rowdy: ‘People started to get 
bored and that’s one things went wrong. There was nothing to do’ (van den 
Brink et al. 2013: 106).
This was recognized by many of those present, for some of them this 
was reason to leave, which could be seen as a form of self-selection: those 
who remained group were looking for excitement. It was also recognized by 
the police officers who felt increasingly uncomfortable. Van Hasselt (2013) 
argues that Haren offered an accumulation of risk factors for recreational 
violence: there were a lot of people under influence with no entertainment 
and no facilities offered. This does not mean that escalation was inevitable.
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Other areas in Haren where hundreds of young people had converged under 
the influence of alcohol (the designated area, the railway station) were not 
affected by violence at all, or only after the riots had been displaced as a result 
of police action. Once the violence escalated, clear (perceived) opportunities 
presented themselves to be violent with limited risk of retaliation: the 
number of police present was clearly not capable of controlling the situation. 
It is impossible to know whether or not a riot would have occurred that day 
in Haren had the seven riot police officers not arrived on the scene at the 
crossroads when they did.
Looking at the social context at the crossroads, we would suggest 
that more and more of the youngsters present started to identify as a 
common group, even though most of them were unknown to each other. 
This was mediated via increased synchronicity in joint jumping, singing and 
chanting. Through the reactions of those present, a kind of spontaneous 
norm developed about what was acceptable or desired behaviour. The 
bangs of firework every few minutes were greeted with cheers, as was 
the climbing of a traffic pole. The occasional throwing of objects, at first 
random, but later in the general direction of police officers did not meet with 
disapproval. Whereas at first, the crowd was spread out over the crossroads 
and neighboring streets, with police moving in between them, later police 
took up position behind the barrier, separated from the crowd. The police 
officers did not let themselves be provoked by crowd members, but the 
separation contributed to an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ group perspective. Although 
an occasional object was thrown in the direction of the officers behind the 
barrier, there was no pressure at all against the physical barrier or the police 
line. Occasionally, an officer approached the barrier and talked to one of 
the individuals present, and on a few occasions, an officer enters the crowd 
without problem. One could say violence at these unprotected officers was 
not normative in this situation. Only when the riot police arrived (without 
doing anything other than taking up position), did this change: violence 
directed at these officers in full riot gear did seem acceptable and things 
escalated rapidly. In terms of opportunity, our interviews show that it was 
clear to everyone present that these seven riot police officers were unable 
to take effective action against the crowd and that arrests had to await the 
arrival of backup. By that time, violent perpetrators will probably not have 
had the feeling that arrest was likely in the existing chaos. For some, it was 
a unique opportunity to be in charge: ‘Now the roles are reversed. A kind of 
spontaneous anarchy. All of the sudden the police is no longer in charge. It was 
anarchy, the street was in charge and that had to be celebrated’ (van den Brink 
et al. 2013: 110). Most of the 16 youngsters interviewed by van den Brink et 
al. (2013) who were present in Haren were not involved in the violence: in 
the interviews, they distanced themselves from the violent perpetrators, 
seeing them as outsiders: ‘they look different’, ‘they are not from here’, ‘it was 
nasty people’ and ‘people from elsewhere with hoods and scarves’ (p. 104). 
However, other respondents described them as ‘normal youths’, young males 
‘who thought they were tough’, ‘not dangerous people’ and ‘It is just impulsive 
behaviour, a kind of mischief ’ (p. 105). Many of the respondents stressed the 
opportunity that existed: ‘Now it is just possible, you can just act out’, people 
were ‘throwing stuff at police because they could’, ‘the number of police 
officers was minimal. There was just no authority’. Those youngsters who did 
76
not participate in the riot were not hostile to police (they were critical of 
police lack of control of the situation) and often felt sorry for the police who 
were clearly overwhelmed (van den Brink et al. 2013: 109–11).
Although the appearance of the seven riot police officers certainly was 
directly followed by the escalation, the start of the riot cannot be blamed on 
disproportionate or undifferentiated police action (crowd conflict is often 
blamed on police action, e.g. Stott and Reicher 1998), and there is nothing 
in the interviews or media reports that would indicate the escalation to be a 
reaction to some kind of frustration or action that was seen as inappropriate 
by (members of) the crowd. In fact, police was passive before the escalation 
and remarkably restrained after it. This is confirmed by the interviews with 
youngsters present (van den Brink et al. 2013: 111). It is true that, after police 
were present in larger numbers following the escalation, some eyewitnesses 
observed instances of disproportionate use of force by individual police 
officers and some of the arrested suspects pointed to police use of force as 
a reason for their own violence. At the same time, however, police officers 
assisted people who wanted to leave the situation. 
This paper sought to address the question how events in Haren 
escalated, what individual, situational and contextual factors played a role. 
That a riot erupted in the affluent place of Haren was shocking, Haren is far 
from a deprived municipality, there was no politically contentious context, 
nor was there previous antagonism between police and youths. The big 
question was how and why events unfolded as they did, in a context that 
was seen as devoid of the usual potential causes for collective violence. Our 
analysis does not provide a clear-cut answer as to why police were attacked 
in this ‘issueless’, seemingly recreational riot. There were no indications that 
the riot erupted because members of the crowd had grievances against the 
riot police, or saw them as symbols of state repression. None of the numerous 
factors mentioned in the media or by authorities (e.g. the film project X, 
‘Facebook’, social media in general, use of alcohol, youth culture, ‘hooligans’) 
are in themselves sufficient to explain the causation of the violence. Instead, 
a mixture of contextual, situational and individual factors played a role.
Our analysis of events and the comparison with the Hoek van Holland riot 
shows that there is a need to move forward the debate on the role contextual 
and individual factors play in the initiation and escalation of collective violence. 
The analysis of events shows that the initiation/escalation model, developed 
in relation to collective violence in the context of football and protest events, 
can also be used to explain other types of collective violence, such as the 
recreational project X riot in Haren. The importance to distinguish between 
initiation and escalation of violence is confirmed. In this case, escalation was 
quite sudden and triggered by the arrival of seven riot police officers, but this 
was preceded by an on-scene initiation process lasting more than two hours, 
where no real starting point could be discerned (the first evidence of an 
object being thrown occurred 1 hour and 37 minutes before the escalation). 
The situation at the crossroads presented an opportunity for those wishing 
to be violent with the following ingredients: youth culture, darkness, alcohol, 
the number of people present and inadequate measures by authorities. 
Some took advantage of the opportunity that presented itself, or helped
Conclusion
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create that opportunity. Research into the 2011 England riots also pointed 
to the importance of opportunity (e.g. Guardian/LSE 2011; Morell et al. 
2011). However, the opportunity present in Haren was not enough in itself to 
trigger escalation (even in combination with the preceding group formation). 
Something had to happen first before isolated acts of object throwing could 
turn into collective violence. It was the spontaneous ‘charging’ or build-
up process that took place within the gathered crowd before the arrival of 
the seven riot police officers who made escalation ever more likely. In the 
course of this process, those taking initiatives received support and felt 
supported, and spontaneous norms about acceptable or expected behaviour 
seemed to develop. A process of self-selection occurred as those that felt 
uncomfortable with the changing atmosphere left. Other stayed, curious 
to see what would happen. As evidenced by synchronous jumping, singing 
and chanting, a social identity developed within the crowd, distinct from 
the police. The withdrawal of the police from the crowd and their taking up 
position behind barriers (well before the escalation) contributed to a setting 
where police and the crowd were not only physically but also psychologically 
separated from one another, contributing to an us versus them situation.
The contextual factors contributing to the escalation fit very well with 
the ESIM (e.g. Reicher 1984; 1996). At the same time, only a minority of those 
present actively involved themselves, showing the variability in the readiness 
to be involved in violence. The build-up involved spontaneous group formation 
of young males not necessarily knowing each other beforehand, but fitting 
with the young male syndrome. For those who were actively involved in the 
violence, our analysis shows that many of the violent perpetrators were first 
offenders without previously being prosecuted and with minimal previous 
police contacts. They seemed to be influenced especially by the contextual 
factors that were conducive to participation. Arrested suspects (or their 
lawyers) overwhelmingly indicated they were ‘dragged along’ and acting 
under the influence of alcohol. Of course, this could be seen as self-serving 
attempts to minimize their own involvement and even those that played a 
more prominent role or were more actively involved in creating a situation 
that could lead to escalation often used this excuse. The analysis of suspects 
however also suggests that a small minority (those most actively involved in 
the violence according to video evidence), were not simply representative of 
Dutch young males in general. Fifteen arrestees who had been in the frontline 
of the violence had been prosecuted before for violent felonies, and seven 
had been brought to justice at least four times. Some also displayed problem 
behaviour at school and/or at home. For these arrestees, aggressive and 
violent behaviour is not limited to event settings alone but is both continuous 
(from childhood into young adulthood) and consistent (in various settings). 
Information indicative of psychopathology (mainly ADHD) is present more 
often for arrestees compared to the estimated Dutch national average.
These findings mirror results of Farrington (2006), who studied 
individuals repeatedly being involved in public disorder, and Russell 
(Russell 1995; Russell and Arms 1995; 1998) who concluded that those 
likely to escalate a crowd disturbance may be characterized as impulsive 
or sensation seeking compared to those who are not. More generally 
within criminology, evidence is emerging that predispositions are related 
to the etiology of antisocial and aggressive acts (e.g. Raine 1993; Rowe 
78
2001; Portnoy et al. 2013). Psychopathology in general, childhood ADHD 
psychopathology, current ADHD and increased impulsivity measures 
are specifically related to an increased risk of committing reactive 
violence (Helfritz and Stanford 2006; Retz and Rösler 2010). This 
suggests predispositions are of influence on (individual) riot behaviour. 
This is not to say that we favor simplistic (and often ideologically driven) 
riff-raff theories of collective violence (cf. Reicher 2001). Our analysis of the 
project X riot clearly indicates the important role social context (including 
actions by authorities) played and it was not the case, as authorities initially 
assumed, that the escalation was the result of premeditated and organized 
action by hooligans. On the contrary, a relatively low number of arrestees 
had previous convictions. The contrast with the Hoek van Holland beach riot, 
where hard core hooligans were involved in premeditated violence, clearly 
illustrates the difference. Comparing the Project X public disorder to the 
Hoek van Holland beach riot suggests the existence of two different types 
of perpetrators at different ends of a continuum: incidental public order 
offenders and notorious troublemakers. Both types of perpetrators seem 
to differ not only in their frequency of offending but also qualitatively, i.e. 
in the extent to which contextual influences and predispositions influence 
public disorder behaviour. Each riot situation presents a unique intergroup 
context and, looking at the initiation/escalation model, has its own unique 
and dynamic mix of different (sub)groups with different social identities and 
with the presence or absence of young males of varying propensities and 
social backgrounds in situations with (potential) frictions and opportunities. 
The contribution of this paper, and of the initiation/escalation model, is 
that it helps to integrate different theories and to pay attention to the 
interactional and individual aspects of riots that usually receive less emphasis 
(Newburn 2015: 49). Further study into the characteristics of individuals 
who are repeatedly involved in public disorder is needed to further develop 
theory. This is a challenging enterprise, given that it is difficult to gather 
the necessary data.
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Abstract
Introduction
Several European countries have recently been confronted with 
mutually arranged confrontations between hooligan groups in a 
predesignated setting. This article explores the significance of this form 
of collective violence for those involved and how this relates to existing 
collective violence theory. In addition to international and national 
questionnaires and subsequent in-depth interviews with police officials, two 
case studies were conducted and compared with a ‘regular’ (not mutually 
arranged) hooligan confrontation. We also assessed the criminal history and 
psychological traits of individuals participating in mutually arranged fights 
(n = 38) and individuals taking part in a regular confrontation (n = 76). Our 
results indicate that the meaning of mutually arranged confrontations differs 
importantly from that of spontaneous collective violence. Furthermore, data 
indicate that criminal career measures differ between individuals who are 
involved in mutually arranged confrontations and spontaneous collective 
violence. Theoretical implications are discussed.
Key words: hooliganism, mutually arranged confrontations, collective violence, 
psychological traits
Since the 1980s, violent confrontations between supporter groups 
in and around football stadiums, endangering both those directly involved 
as well as other spectators, have been a source of concern (Dunning et 
al., 1986). In broad terms, three explanations have been put forward to 
explain this phenomenon. Taylor (1971) focused on the crumbling traditional 
relationship between football clubs and the working-class community from 
the 1960s onwards, which led to resistance from this particular fan base, 
who subsequently engaged in confrontations with rival fans and the police. 
Marsh (1978) focused upon the intragroup dynamics and the rituals and 
performance of violence within hooligan groups, whereas the Leicester 
School emphasized the emergence of a working-class subculture in which 
behaviour was underpinned by uncivilized moral standards (Dunning et al., 
1988).
Explanations for violent confrontations around football that take a class 
approach are widely rejected nowadays (Dunning, 2000; Taylor, 1987). This 
also goes for so-called convergence explanations of collective violence in 
general, which focus on the criminal and deviant character of those involved 
(Ball and Drury, 2012; Reicher, 2001). Instead, explanations of collective 
violence have taken a group-dynamic discourse, to which the concept of 
social identity is central (Reicher, 2001). From this perspective, precipitating 
incidents (trigger events) may result in the emergence of an individual’s self-
understanding as a member of a group. Subsequently, an accentuation of 
perceived similarities (with the in-group) and differences (from the out-
group) may serve as a catalyst for violent collective action, with situation-
specific norms guiding group and individual behaviour (Postmes and 
Spears, 1998; Reicher, 2001). The social identity perspective, then, provides 
meaning to collective violence by pointing to specific circumstances in which 
a social identity may become salient, making escalation against another 
group whose behaviour is seen as illegitimate more likely. A role of individual 
characteristics of those involved in collective violence is explicitly dismissed 
(Reicher, 2001).
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In line with this group-dynamic discourse, the long-term declining 
trend of football-related disorder has been explained by improvements in the 
policing of crowds (Cleland and Cashmore, 2016). At the same time, various 
authors have pointed out an apparent increase in mutually arranged violent 
confrontations between hooligan groups away from the stadium and outside 
of match days (Cleland and Cashmore, 2016; Jewell et al., 2014). These fights 
are characterized by mutual consultation between the two parties involved, 
at a minimum about time and place. Furthermore, arrangements may be 
made with regard to the wearing of distinctive clothing and informal codes 
of legitimate action, such as group size and the fighting rules participants 
are required or expected to adhere to (Adang, 1999; Spaaij, 2007). Also, the 
fight may be recorded by individuals who are part of the participating groups 
but who are not involved in the fight itself. 32
Prior studies indicate that hooligan groups consist of individuals who 
are regularly involved in violence, both in groups and alone (Piquero et al., 
2015; Lösel and Bliesener, 2003). Furthermore, individuals belonging to such 
groups have been observed to seek out opportunities to behave violently 
around football matches (for example, Adang, 2011). This may lead to the 
assumption that it is particularly individuals inclined to behave violently who 
participate in mutually arranged confrontations. Thus far, prior empirical 
work has an exclusive focus on ‘regular’ confrontations. Consequently, 
the question remains whether mutually arranged confrontations merely 
reflect a difference on a continuum from completely spontaneous to fully 
planned collective violence, or whether the contributing factors to mutually 
arranged confrontations differ from the antagonistic relationships around 
which ‘regular’ confrontations revolve. Therefore, the current article aims 
to provide insight into whether and to what extent (individuals participating 
in) mutually arranged confrontations differ from (those participating in) 
‘regular’ confrontations and how this fits with existing theories on football 
violence, specifically the social identity perspective.
From the 1960s onwards, scholars aimed to explain collective violence 
by providing a link between individuals, their actions in crowds and the 
context in which these actions arise (Reicher, 2001). The social identity 
perspective on collective violence emerged as a counterpart to then popular 
convergence explanations stressing the role of individual characteristics. 
Within the social identity perspective, trigger events and their resulting 
intergroup dynamics are assumed to facilitate group forming and the 
emerging of antagonistic relationships between groups. More specifically, 
it is argued that, in an associated context, an individual thinks, feels and 
behaves in accordance with the group he/she identifies with (Reicher, 2001).
Prior empirical work supports this line of thought. For instance, 
individual behaviour in violent crowds usually is aimed at and limited to 
the party held responsible for a certain course of events, and violent 
behaviour tends to remain within the boundaries defined as appropriate 
by the groups with which individuals identify (Drury and Reicher, 1999, 
2000; Reicher, 1984, 1987, 1996). The specific strengths of social identity 
theory are its ability to explain the rapidity with which consensus within
Theoretical considerations
32 Footage of arranged confrontations can be found online, for instance,  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UjU2S01wya0 and  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OqB6_BFEFIQ (accessed 2 June 2020). 
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crowds can arise and why any person may come to act violently in crowds 
(Reicher, 2001; Terry et al., 1999). However, even in the face of trigger events 
and intergroup dynamics gravitating towards collective violence, only a 
minority of the individuals present actually involve themselves in violent 
behaviour (Adang, 2011). Such variations in the willingness to participate 
in collective violence, as well as actively seeking opportunities for violence 
in collective settings, remain unaccounted for by social identity theory.
Prior empirical work shows that differences in offensive action tendencies 
in crowds can be traced back to the social categories with which individuals 
identify, the content of these categories, and the persons prototypical thereof 
(Herrera and Reicher, 1998; Reicher and Hopkins, 1996a, b; Reicher and Sani, 
1998; Sani and Reicher, 1998, 1999), as well as the extent to which individuals 
experience anger (Levy et al., 2017; Mackie et al., 2000; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). 
This indicates that cognitive processes, especially those that deal with the 
processing of social cues, and their resultant emotions may play a key role in 
collective violence involvement (also see Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 
2017). Consequently, a common ground between the social identity 
perspective and the convergence explanations it dismisses may be found in 
the way group identification dynamics and personal characteristics interact.
Previously, the so-called ‘young male’ syndrome has been linked to 
collective violence involvement (Adang, 2011). This syndrome refers to 
a high prevalence of risk-taking and criminal behaviours among males 
between 15 and 35 years of age, particularly in the presence of like-minded 
peers (Tamás et al., 2019). At the same time, pointing towards demographic 
characteristics (sex: male, age: young) is too unspecific, particularly because 
by far the larger part of young males do not engage in this type of risk-taking 
and antisocial behaviour. Given the relatively high prevalence among hard-
core hooligans of, in particular, traits associated with violent behaviour – 
such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), emotion-regulation 
deficits, heightened impulsivity, sensation-seeking behaviour and antisocial 
tendencies – such traits have been implicated in repeated and continuous 
participation in collective violence (Lösel and Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 
2015; Russell, 2004). In addition, the presence of antisocial tendencies has 
been found to contribute to positive attitudes towards violent behaviour, 
such as the belief that violence is acceptable or that violence contributes 
to self-esteem and social image (Huesmann and Guerra, 1997; Slaby and 
Guerra, 1988). The inclusion of individual psychological characteristics in 
explanations of involvement in collective violence therefore may provide a 
more detailed picture of who participates in collective violence and why.
Spectator violence around football matches manifests itself in the 
form of competitive violence between socially organized fan groups (Spaaij, 
2007). Among such groups, a degree of shared identity exists both within 
countries and across societies, which revolves around ‘their explicit interest 
in violent confrontation with rival fan groups’ (Spaaij, 2008: 373). However, 
improvements in stadium management and the increased risks of arrest, 
mean there are limited opportunities to behave violently around football 
matches and at stadium grounds. Arguably, this has led hooligan groups 
to seek alternatives in confronting one another (Cleland and Cashmore, 
2016; Jewell et al., 2014). Given the specific context in which mutually 
arranged confrontations occur and the actions required from individuals to
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organize these fights, a process of self-selection may occur. This suggests 
that individual characteristics may have value in explaining this type of 
collective violence. At the same time, prior studies demonstrate that 
mutually arranged confrontations are more than just an outlet for the violent 
tendencies of those taking part. In 1997, a pre-arranged and well-organized 
confrontation between rival hard-core sides (Ajax and Feyenoord) took 
place in the Netherlands; this confrontation resulted in the death of one 
Ajax-supporting participant and in several participants on both sides getting 
seriously wounded. A case study of this confrontation by Kerr and De Kock 
(2002) indicated that specific events further increased an already existing 
antagonistic relationship between the hard-core sides involved, which 
subsequently served as a motive for a mutually arranged confrontation 
between these groups. Although not mentioned as such by Kerr and De Kock 
(2002), their account of these events fits social identity theory by referring 
to trigger events and intergroup dynamics to explain why these groups 
confronted one another. Groups that participate in mutually arranged 
confrontations seem to adhere to a priori set rules (Adang, 1999), and the 
death of an Ajax-supporting participant in the case studied by Kerr and 
De Kock (2002) was recognized by participants as a clear and unwelcome 
transgression of these rules. Because violent behaviour during mutually 
arranged confrontations tends to remain within predefined boundaries, 
this indicates another link between individuals’ behaviour and the group 
the individual identifies with, which is also in line with social identity theory.
It has been argued that the predefined boundaries around mutually 
arranged confrontations provide a relatively safe domain for displaying 
aggression while at the same time maintaining an image of the hooligan 
culture as exciting (Adang, 1999; Kerr and De Kock, 2002; Spaaij, 2006). This 
suggests that specific values of the hooligan culture may add significance for 
those who participate in mutually arranged confrontations. Spaaij (2008) has 
identified six fundamental features of the hooligan subculture. First, violence 
in the football context is associated with individual peak experiences, such 
as excitement and pleasurable emotional arousal. This may equally apply to 
mutually arranged confrontations (see Kerr and De Kock, 2002). Second, 
individual and collective reputations may be managed by putting oneself in 
dangerous situations regardless of potential physical injuries. In this regard, it 
is of particular relevance that mutually arranged confrontations may be more 
often concerned with establishing or maintaining a collective reputation 
than with resolving ongoing conflicts (Newson, 2017). Third, territorial 
identifications are considered a fundamental feature of the hooligan culture. 
This refers to defending territory such as the stadium or surrounding 
grounds and invading rivals’ territory. However, since mutually arranged 
confrontations usually take place outside of football grounds (Giulianotti and 
Armstrong, 2002), this feature of the hooligan culture appears to be of less 
relevance. Fourth, the hooligan culture has been described as providing a 
sense of solidarity and belonging owing to the shared collective experiences. 
Indeed, peer groups may accommodate an individual’s need for prestige, 
status or sense of security (Crosnoe and McNeely, 2008; Megens and 
Weerman, 2010). At the same time, this results in interdependence between 
individual interest and group membership, which may manifest itself in peer 
pressure to take part in violent confrontations (King, 2001). Fifth, hard 
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masculinity – a social construct that is primarily based on physical prowess, 
fighting ability and physical health – is considered a fundamental feature 
of the hooligan culture (Spaaij, 2008). Sixth and finally, representations of 
sovereignty and autonomy are reflected in attempts to manipulate, disrupt 
or circumvent security regimes (Spaaij, 2008). From this perspective, 
mutually arranged confrontations may be seen as an unintended 
consequence of police measures aimed at reducing football-related violence.
Taken together, the current literature seems to indicate that – in 
addition to satisfying individual needs for excitement and sensation – 
mutually arranged confrontations are a way of establishing, maintaining 
and increasing status within the hooligan subculture. A shared social 
identity on the one hand appears to provide a platform for violence while 
on the other hand restricting it. Violence, within certain limits, may be 
experienced as something good and desirable. First, this suggests that 
self-selection into mutually arranged confrontations may be stronger 
compared with that into spontaneous acts of collective violence and that, 
consequently, the individual characteristics of those participating may 
diverge depending on the context in which collective violence comes to be. 
Second, the current literature suggests that, unlike in spontaneous acts 
of collective violence, although a trigger event and antagonistic relations 
between groups may provoke mutually arranged confrontations they are 
no prerequisite. This implies that contributing factors at the individual 
(psychological characteristics) and contextual level (trigger events, 
intergroup relationships) around mutually arranged confrontations diverge 
from those around spontaneous collective violence. Contrary to social 
identity theory (Reicher, 2001), this implies that offender characteristics 
may not be completely irrelevant when explaining collective violence.
Despite regular references to mutually arranged confrontations (Adang, 
1999; Giulianotti and Armstrong, 2002; Newson, 2017; Spaaij, 2007), to our 
knowledge only one empirical study into this matter has been conducted 
(Kerr and De Kock, 2002). This study, however, has several limitations. First, 
the data available for analysis were limited to newspaper reports and a few 
minutes of grainy publicly available camera footage that recorded part of the 
events from a distance of more than 100 metres. Second, their case study 
dates back to an event that occurred in 1997, leaving open the option that 
there have been changes in the hooligan subculture. Third, no attempt was 
made to systematically compare the confrontation under scrutiny with 
‘regular’ collective violence between hooligan groups. In the current study, 
the context in which mutually arranged confrontations occur is addressed 
on the basis of more recent data and compared with a ‘regular’ not mutually 
arranged confrontation around a football match.
There was no realistic possibility of conducting participative observation 
or to interview individuals involved in mutually arranged confrontations. 
Although potential respondents were approached for interviews, the 
media attention on this topic at the time of the study resulted in restraint 
Current study
Methodology
Data
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among potential respondents. Consequently, information provided by the 
police and related parties was the only reasonable alternative. An implication 
is that data are based on information from secondary sources and not on 
information from participants themselves. This means that no first-hand 
information was available about participants’ experience of mutually 
arranged confrontations and their motives for taking part (for example, 
excitement, peer pressure). As a result, in this study we were dependent 
on the impressions and experiences of expert respondents, which possibly 
may have led to bias with regard to participant experiences and motives. 
Figure 1 displays the various data sources used for the study. In the following 
paragraphs, these data sources are further explained.
In 2016, an international questionnaire was sent out by the Dutch 
National Football Information Point (NFIP) of the Dutch National Police to 
officials from other European NFIPs to assess whether other European 
countries also face mutually arranged confrontations. Of the 15 officials 
from 13 countries who responded, 7 reported experiences with mutually 
arranged confrontations. Also in 2016, a questionnaire was sent out to 
Dutch police officers who had security and public order around professional 
football within their remit and to police professionals involved in gathering 
covert information on these topics. A total of 35 national questionnaires – of 
which 11 were from police officers involved in gathering covert information 
– were returned. The number of football clubs about which information was 
obtained was assessed as a measure of representativeness. This showed that 
(at least one) questionnaire was returned for 31 out of the then 35 football 
clubs (89 percent) playing professional football in the Netherlands. The 
national questionnaires provided information on involvement in mutually 
arranged confrontation of supporter groups linked to 25 of those football 
clubs. In both the international and national questionnaires, respondents 
were asked about observed trends, developments and implications for 
public order policing. Following the international and national surveys, 
semi-structured interviews were held with six foreign and nine Dutch 
police officials (of whom six worked covertly). Topics that were discussed 
in the interviews aligned with the topics addressed in the questionnaires. 
Interviews therefore mainly served to provide additional information on the 
answers respondents had already provided in writing.
Figure 1. Overview of the data sources used in the current study
International and national questionnaire 
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At the time the study was conducted, the Dutch NFIP had gained 
knowledge of 47 mutually arranged confrontations in the Netherlands 
concerning the years 2009–13. Of these confrontations, 31 had actually 
materialized and 16 were either prevented by the police or cancelled by the 
groups involved themselves. However, to our knowledge, only one of the 
fights that materialized – between supporters of PSV and Roda JC Kerkrade 
(2012) – resulted in arrests and a police investigation. Therefore, this case was 
included in the current study. Information on more recent mutually arranged 
confrontations was provided in May 2016 by the Dutch police. Information 
covered 5 out of 35 (14 percent) Dutch clubs playing professional football 
and led to information on 17 additional mutually arranged confrontations, 
of which 8 were prevented or did not occur. To our knowledge only 1 of the 
other 9 cases, a mutually arranged confrontation between supporters of 
SC Heerenveen and FC Groningen (2015), resulted in arrests and a police 
investigation. Consequently, this case was also included for case analysis.
Several criteria led to these cases being labelled as mutually arranged 
confrontations. In both cases, police investigations revealed contacts 
between the leaders of the groups involved prior to the confrontation. 
Furthermore, information was found in these case files on rules that were 
set prior to the confrontations, including group size, clothing to distinguish 
groups from one another and ‘rules of engagement’. However, with only 
two police investigations conducted into a total of 40 confrontations that 
actually occurred, available recent empirical data are limited. Various 
suspects in the case files that were studied refused to make a statement 
and invoked their right to remain silent, further illustrating the challenge 
of gathering empirical data on this topic. To add to the material from the 
criminal investigations that were conducted (which contained transcripts of 
police interviews with suspects and witnesses, wiretap reports of suspects’ 
phone conversations, digital data from seized mobile phones – such as 
WhatsApp and text messages – and/or camera footage), we also conducted 
semi-structured interviews with police personnel involved in these criminal 
investigations (n = 5).33 
During the match between FC Utrecht and FC Twente on 4 December 
2011, fireworks were thrown from the visitors’ section towards the FC 
Utrecht family section. A number of FC Utrecht supporters reacted furiously 
to this event and tried to reach the stand holding the visiting FC Twente 
supporters. Owing to the stewards in the stadium, they did not succeed. In a 
second attempt, about 80–100 FC Utrecht supporters then tried to reach the 
visitors’ stand from outside the stadium, resulting in a violent confrontation 
with police officers. No specific information that supporter groups would 
seek the confrontation with each other had been present prior to the 
match and generally the fireworks thrown towards the family section were 
considered to be the trigger event. For the comparison case, police were 
confident the individuals arrested represented those responsible and/or 
involved in the violence. Furthermore, the comparison case was extensively 
investigated by an external commission that conducted a document analysis 
in relation to this match, held 26 interviews with the parties involved in
Case studies
Comparison case
33 No interviews with those involved in the confrontations were conducted. Quotes from 
those involved thus come from (transcripts of) police interviews that were held as part 
of a criminal investigation. 
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football safety around this specific match and reviewed police documentation 
of arrested suspects (Auditteam Voetbal en Veiligheid, 2012).
In both the 2012 and 2015 mutually arranged confrontations, about 40–
50 individuals were involved. However, not all individuals were arrested for 
their involvement. Based on the information available in the police files, we, 
as researchers, established the involvement of 38 people (mutually arranged 
confrontation sample). Our data are limited to these individuals. Involvement 
was determined based on their being caught redhanded, reading digital 
communications and telecommunication history, viewing camera footage, 
obtaining covert information and recording suspects’ communication 
by secretly placed equipment. In addition, information on 76 individuals 
involved in the comparison case was collected (comparison sample). 
To assess an individual’s criminal career history, the police registration 
system HKS (Dutch: Herkenningsdienstsysteem) was consulted. The HKS 
contains information on every suspect detained by the Dutch police and 
the indictable offences involved, and it has been suitable for scientific 
research since 1996 (Bijleveld, 2007).34 Given that the minimum age for 
legal responsibility is 12 in the Netherlands, criminal career information 
may be incomplete for the nine subjects who were born before 1984. In 
order to assess psychological characteristics, we turned to available police, 
Probation Service and forensic psychological data. These data largely rely 
on information provided by the individuals themselves, by their family or 
by professionals aware of the individual’s personal situation, and they do 
not entail validated clinical assessments of psychological characteristics. 
Consequently, the current study uses behavioural indicators as proxies 
for psychological characteristics. However, because not all behavioural 
indicators may be recorded as such, this strategy implies a risk of false 
negatives. Table 1 presents the behavioural indicators focused upon and 
references indicative of their presence. We explored whether significant 
differences emerged in relation to criminal career and psychological trait 
measures between the mutually arranged confrontation and comparison 
samples by utilizing Chi-square and t-tests.
Offender analysis
34 Information that was registered in the HKS since 1 January 2010 has been migrated to the 
BVI/BOSZ system. Therefore, these systems were also consulted. 
Table 1. Behavioral indicators and information indicative of their presence
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Of the covertly working police officials, only two respondents mention 
the need to settle a score or extreme rivalry between hooligan groups 
supporting different teams from the same region as a significant contributing 
factor in arranged confrontations. The majority indicate that they do not 
consider trigger events or antagonistic relationships between the groups 
involved to be the main reason for the occurrence of these fights. Subsequent 
interviews with six respondents working covertly further illustrate this 
point of view. They report that mutually arranged confrontations also occur 
between hooligan groups whose clubs have never played against one another 
and between whom no troubles are known of. 35 Respondents mention social 
media in this respect, which allows hooligan groups to easily contact each 
other without having to have ever physically met during football matches.
Survey data of the Dutch police professionals responsible for 
security and public order around professional football and European NFIP 
representatives further emphasize the role of the group’s reputation. 
One respondent notes that taking on a bigger club especially adds to the 
reputation of the group: ‘one does not want to lose to the little one, while the 
other gains status by taking on that specific big one.’ Respondents further 
elaborate on this matter by referring to the existence of an informal ranking 
revolving around the collective reputation of hooligan groups. Collective 
reputation in this regard is dependent on whether groups are able to mobilize 
enough people, to show up and fight, adhere to the rules and come out the 
winner. In addition, some point to the posting of footage of the confrontation 
in (private) social media communities as a way to enhance a group’s status. 
Their answers furthermore indicate that confrontations may be arranged by 
leading members of the older hard cores to provide the young cores with an 
opportunity to gain status, or that these confrontations may be organized 
by young hard-core groups themselves with the same objective in mind.
The foregoing indicates that mutually arranged confrontations 
predominantly are not the result of antagonistic relationships or trigger 
events. Most often, survey data indicate that a need for excitement (n = 6) or 
to defend the collective reputation of the hooligan group involved or the town 
from which they originate (n = 4) are perceived to underlie the occurrence 
of a mutually arranged confrontation. Rather than being spontaneous and 
prompted by feelings of hostility and anger, the motivations of arranged 
confrontations appear to be more distant, not only fulfilling participants’ 
current need for excitement but also securing or increasing the long-term 
subcultural standing of the group as a whole. At times these motivations 
coincide. This is illustrated by hooligan groups recruiting outsiders to 
participate in arranged confrontations in order to be able to mobilize a fighting 
group of respectable size and with sufficient fighting ability to increase the 
likelihood of winning confrontations, with the purpose of safeguarding or 
increasing the group’s collective reputation. According to the respondents 
interviewed, these outside recruits usually are individuals who have shown that 
they are willing and capable to fight, for instance those skilled in martial arts. 
Our case study information also illustrates the importance of 
excitement and collective reputation. Audio recordings made secretly by 
Contributing factors
Results
35 In June 2018, for instance, footage surfaced online of a confrontation between supporter 
groups linked to a Dutch club and a German club that had never played one another. The 
footage referred to can be found at https://www.dumpert.nl/item/7444327_02de1fb9 
(accessed 1 June 2020). 
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the police in the aftermath of the arranged confrontation in the 2015 case 
file indicate that participants derive pleasurable feelings from participating 
in the arranged confrontation, revealing that suspects regarded the 
confrontation as ‘a top fight’ and labelled it as ‘cool’. During subsequent 
police interrogations, one suspect explicitly acknowledged that he likes to 
fight: ‘I think it’s a kick. It may not be the right word, but it feels good. I love 
it.’ Furthermore, in both the 2012 and 2015 cases, no current or historical 
troubles between the supporter groups involved were known of. For the 
2015 case, WhatsApp conversations obtained in the criminal investigation 
indicated that an individual with a leading role in an older generation firm 
feels that ‘the youngsters should earn a reputation’. To this end, he arranged 
fights with other groups, including the 2015 confrontation. The relevance 
attributed to collective reputation is also underscored by the reaction of FC 
Groningen hard-core members to the fact that, contrary to agreements, 
at least one individual in their group had used a weapon. A police-recorded 
conversation shows that some of those involved – including the group leader, 
who had been making arrangements – felt the use of a weapon might result 
in damage to the collective reputation of their group and in a decrease in the 
willingness of other groups to confront them. Therefore, they are determined 
to identify and punish those who had transgressed the collective norm.
Finally, our comparison case shows that – despite some prior incidents 
(that is, violence against FC Utrecht players by FC Twente supporters) – there 
seemed to be no current tensions between the supporter groups involved. 
Disturbances appeared to be triggered by FC Twente supporters repeatedly 
throwing fireworks towards FC Utrecht supporters in the family stand. A 
spontaneously formed group of enraged FC Utrecht supporters then tried 
to reach the area where the FC Twente supporters were located and from 
where the fireworks had been thrown. The view that the hostilities were 
generated by the circumstances is further substantiated by the outcome 
of the police investigation, which indicated that the violence could not be 
related to specific, already existing groups of problematic supporters or 
the presence of identifiable ‘leaders’ or so-called ‘key hooligans’ who played 
an important connecting or leading role in orchestrating the violence.
In the survey and subsequent interviews, respondents specifically 
mentioned the involvement of hooligan groups or groups of fanatical 
supporters in mutually arranged confrontations. Some, in addition, explicitly 
stated that only a very small proportion of the hooligans known to the 
police participated in these fights. From the respondents’ answers it can be 
deduced that individuals participating in mutually arranged confrontations 
often frequent pubs known to be patronized by hard-core supporter groups, 
have identifying tattoos linking them to the hard core or are designated 
by the police as hard-core members. Furthermore, several respondents 
stated that international bonds of friendship between hooligan groups may 
result in several hooligan groups confronting others together. For instance, 
friendship ties between supporters of Dutch and Belgian football clubs were 
mentioned. One of the respondents explicitly stated that they considered 
mutually arranged fights and the individuals participating in them to belong 
to a specific hooligan subculture to which many unwritten rules apply.
Rituals surrounding collective violence
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According to survey and interview data, mutually arranged 
confrontations mainly take place at remote ‘neutral’ places (for example, 
forests, industrial sites and large parking lots). Thus, mutually arranged 
confrontations mostly cannot be traced back to territorial identifications. 
Survey and interview data, however, also indicate that – in addition to 
agreement about time and location – clear terms are set in advance about the 
number of people (per group) that will participate and the use of weapons. 
Our data suggest that the use of weapons is generally not accepted and that 
other ‘rules of engagement’ are used (for example, when someone is lying 
on the ground they are to be left alone). The 2012 case file contains footage 
indicating that, prior to the actual fighting, group sizes were checked, which 
was followed by shouting  “it’s fair, it’s fair, we’ll take you on, we’ll take you on” 
and by the two groups physically confronting one another. In addition, the 
police investigation revealed that, when planning the confrontation, both 
parties agreed that the fight would stop if “things go too far”. Furthermore, 
although suspects in the 2015 case investigation invoked their right to remain 
silent with regard to their involvement, they did make statements about 
the illicit use of a weapon by one of their own, illustrating their disapproval: 
“I think it is outrageous that someone has been stabbed. I am strongly against 
this”, “stabbing is a cowardly deed that does not fit” and “I heard that 
someone has been stabbed with a knife, I am quite shocked”. Although these 
answers may have been socially desirable in an interrogation setting, also 
from the secret recording in a suspect’s car it becomes clear that, by using 
a weapon, a collective norm had been transgressed: “Using a knife goes way 
too far. Together we should talk about that.” Rather than being impulsive and 
uncontrolled, mutually arranged confrontations are thus characterized by 
strict norms in the run-up to the confrontation, in the actual confrontation 
and in its aftermath. The provision of a relatively safe domain in which to 
display aggression represents sovereignty and autonomy. These aspects 
of the hooligan subculture are also reflected in the fact that the police, 
according to respondents, generally are not aware of when and where these 
confrontations will take place.
Survey and interview data also relate to the behaviour that is expected 
from individuals who associate with hooligan groups:  “Individuals have to 
be there, and they can’t say that they don’t want to fight”. Although survey 
and interview data with regard to expected behaviour may be subject to 
bias owing to their second-hand nature, they are substantiated by case file 
information that shows intergroup solidarity and the mutual agreement of 
groups and the individuals who are a part of it to fight. For instance, camera 
footage of the 2012 confrontation showed that, once the fighting had 
stopped, individuals belonging to both groups gave one another high-fives 
and briefly embraced before walking back in the direction they had come 
from. Furthermore, one suspect in the 2015 case stated to the police officers 
first to arrive on the scene – thus outside of an interrogation setting – that 
mutually arranged confrontations are something “that happen between 
people wanting the same: just taking each other on, and then it’s over.” In 
addition, the police investigation reveals that, after the 2015 confrontation, 
leaders of both cores expressed their satisfaction. A microphone secretly 
placed in a suspect’s car recorded a participant in the confrontation saying 
“I shook hands with one of the leaders and a few more boys shook hands. And
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then it was just nicely finished”. Survey and interview data additionally 
suggest that taking part in arranged confrontations may result in individuals 
being ‘rewarded’ – for example, by allowing them to visibly identify with 
the hooligan group from then on by wearing a particular tattoo – and as 
such contribute to the individual’s standing and reputation in the group.
Collective and individual reputation management, as well as 
excitement, seem to underlie mutually arranged confrontations, but case 
file information also allows for the hypothesis that individuals may feel 
pressured to participate. Although suspects in interrogations may try to 
reduce their responsibility vis-à-vis the police, their statements suggest 
that resorting to violence may sometimes be perceived as necessary: “I 
drove them there, while I knew they wanted to fight. When I was in the car, 
turning back was not an option.” In addition, anecdotal stories from police 
officers imply that individuals whose performance during the confrontation 
is considered insufficient may be punished (for example, being beaten 
up, being outcast or not being allowed to watch matches from the same 
stand in the stadium). Given the anecdotal nature of the data gathered in 
the current study, the data do not permit statements about the frequency 
of such punishments, or whether punishments may result from other 
behaviour (such as the leaking of information about confrontations).
Taken together, the survey data, interviews and case studies illustrate 
that individuals may be intrinsically motivated to participate in mutually 
arranged confrontations. At the same time, these data give room to the 
hypothesis that perceived pressure to meet norms of hooligan culture may 
play a role in an individual’s decision to participate. The lack of first-hand 
information about participants’ experiences and motives for participating, 
however, necessitates caution with regard to this matter. At the same time, 
the findings in our comparison case are starkly different, because, in their 
attempt to reach the visiting supporters, provoked FC Utrecht supporters 
used violence against the authorities – notably stewards (in the stadium) 
and the police (outside the stadium). Suspects in the comparison case also 
reacted less rationally when confronted with footage of their behaviour 
and some appeared genuinely shocked. Asked about their motives and 
thoughts at the time by the police judge, they stated they had “just been 
angry with the FC Twente supporters” and they had “ not thought things 
through”. This strongly contrasts with the premeditated and regulated 
nature of the violence displayed during mutually arranged confrontations.
Mutually arranged confrontations appear to stem from a specific 
subculture of which violence is a core aspect. Furthermore, to strengthen 
collective reputation, individuals with a known status of being capable of 
violence are recruited to participate in mutually arranged confrontations. 
Therefore, we expect that individuals participating in such fights more 
often have a violent criminal history (both solo and in groups) compared 
with individuals involved in ‘regular’ hooligan confrontations. By extension, 
we also expect higher levels of behavioural indicators associated with 
violent offending for the mutually arranged confrontation sample.
Table 2 provides a comparative analysis with regard to criminal career 
measures of the mutually arranged confrontation and comparison samples.
Offender characteristics
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From Table 1 it can be seen that the mean age of the mutually arranged 
confrontation sample is significantly higher (p < .03) than that of the 
comparison sample. Chi-square analyses indicated that the prevalence of 
general as well as violent offending was significantly higher (p < .01) in the 
mutually arranged confrontation sample than in the comparison sample. At 
the same time, however, prior violent offending in the comparison sample 
(39 percent) proved not to be an exception. The higher level of prior violent 
offending in the mutually arranged confrontation sample appeared to be 
related to their significantly (p < .01) higher level of collective violence 
offending rather than to individual violent offending.36 Finally, contrary to 
our expectations, the prevalence of individual traits associated with violent 
behaviour did not differ between the two samples.
Results from the conducted analyses fit with the image that emerges 
from the surveys and interviews, indicating that it is particularly individuals 
who are used to committing violence – whether alone or in a group – who 
participate in mutually arranged confrontations. The absence of differences 
between the mutually arranged confrontation sample and the comparison 
sample with regard to the presence of psychological traits may be explained 
by the fact that, in the comparison case, arrested individuals were located 
in the same stand as hard-core supporters. This may be linked to an interest
in hooligan culture to say the least, a line of thinking that is underscored by 
the comparison case report. This report notes that some of those arrested 
may be described as the new generation of hooligans. This may also explain 
why a large proportion of those arrested (39 percent) had been involved in 
violence prior to taking part in this specific incident.
Table 2. Criminal career characteristics of mutually arranged confrontation and  
comparison sample.
*p<.05 **p<.01
36 Due to probable violations of normality, we conducted a robustness check by running 
the Welch t-test. Findings from these checks indicated that results remained significant. 
Therefore, we assume that our results are robust to violations of the assumption of 
normality. Furthermore, also when accounting for age, by calculating the mean number 
of offenses per life year, differences in frequency of offending remained significant. 
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The current article has examined to what extent the meanings attributed 
to the participants’ violence overlap when spontaneous and mutually 
organized acts of collective violence are compared, who participates in these 
different types of collective violence, and how this relates to the currently 
dominant theoretical views on this topic. 
In line with the social identity perspective, our data show that the groups 
involved in mutually arranged confrontations have common norms that are 
actively enforced when these are transgressed by individuals participating in 
these fights. At the same time, in contrast to our comparison case and a wide 
body of literature on spontaneous collective violence (see Reicher, 2001), 
our data indicate that trigger events and antagonistic relationships between 
the groups involved do not seem to be primary drivers of mutually arranged 
confrontations. Instead, the meaning of mutually arranged confrontations 
– compared with spontaneous collective violence – may be traced back to 
rituals of violence, which are characteristic of the hooligan culture (Spaaij, 
2008).
The taking place of mutually arranged confrontations particularly 
relates to the need to maintain or establish a collective reputation, although 
the excitement, fun and pleasure derived from participating in these fights 
may also play an important role. In addition, based on the data gathered, it 
may be hypothesized that individuals feel pressured to conform to hooligan 
group norms. Although individuals who do not belong to hooligan groups also 
get involved in mutually arranged confrontations, survey and interview data 
indicate that they are purposefully approached by leading hooligan group 
members because of their skills in martial arts, which may serve to benefit 
the hooligan group’s standing. Furthermore, our data indicate that those 
involved in mutually arranged confrontations are characterized by a more 
elaborate history of registered violent offences and are older at the time 
of involvement compared with the individuals involved in regular hooligan 
violence. In addition, our data suggest the presence of behavioural problems 
among a significant portion of both the mutually arranged sample and the 
comparison sample. Taking into consideration that some of the arrestees in 
the comparison case were described as ‘the new generation’ of hard-core 
hooligans, our data are in line with prior findings that violent hooligan groups 
are made up of both young adolescent males and generally violent individuals 
who have outgrown adolescence and suffer from problems on a range of 
psychological traits associated with violent behaviour (Lösel and Bliesener, 
2003; Russell, 2004). At the same time, because psychological traits 
were not assessed with validated psychological measurements, caution in 
interpreting this finding is required.
Taken together, our results indicate that the main motivations for 
mutually arranged confrontations relate to social dominance and excitement 
-seeking. Our findings therefore largely differ from the perceived injustice
and efficacy around which spontaneous acts of collective violence revolve 
(Reicher, 2001) but fit the recently proposed quadripartite violence 
typology, which differentiates between excitement-seeking, greed for social 
dominance or goods, revenge and self-defence as the main motivations for 
violence (Howard, 2015).
In the case of mutually arranged confrontations, the unwritten norms 
and rules of the hooligan culture appear to ensure that the violence can
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take place in a controlled and relatively safe environment that prevents 
predetermined boundaries being crossed in the heat of the moment. This 
raises the question of who might be attracted to such opportunities for 
controlled violence. Our data suggest a self-selection process with regard 
to the individuals who do and do not participate, particularly concerning 
the interest in and level of prior violent offending. Given the prevalence of 
personal characteristics associated with violence – such as heightened 
impulsivity and emotion-regulation deficits – for a significant proportion 
of those taking part in mutually arranged confrontations, these traits may 
be of importance in this regard, facilitating or contributing to the observed 
self-selection process. The sample sizes, however, may have been too small 
to detect statistically significant differences between the mutually arranged 
confrontation sample and the comparison sample. This study, then, suggests 
that individual characteristics are not to be disregarded – as maintained by 
the social identity perspective – at least not in the case of mutually arranged 
confrontations. Our findings thereby support the inclusion of an individual-
oriented approach to the study of mutually arranged confrontations – a 
stance further underscored by a typical lack of the type of antagonistic 
group dynamics in mutually arranged confrontations that are held to be 
characteristic of spontaneous collective violence. However, processes of 
self-selection also appear to exist in cases of spontaneous acts of collective 
violence, with the majority of individuals present not involving themselves in 
actual violence (Adang, 2011). The findings of the current study, then, may 
serve as a starting point for future studies assessing the relative contribution 
of individual characteristics to participation in collective violence in general.
When considering the current findings, it is important to keep in 
mind the limitations of our data. First, given the secrecy of mutually 
arranged confrontations, this study relies almost exclusively on second-
hand sources on participants’ experiences and motives. The information 
from our police respondents is limited to the fights that have become 
known to them. In addition to this, police respondents may be biased in 
their understanding with regard to participants’ experiences and motives 
for participating in mutually arranged confrontations. Second, the aim of 
police investigations as laid down in the case files is to inform and convince 
a judge, which also creates a certain bias. However, given the fact that 
we had access to the original transcripts of interrogations and subjects’ 
communications (telephone, WhatsApp), we were able to triangulate the 
findings extensively. Despite their obvious downsides and not having been 
able to gain direct access to individuals (formerly) involved in mutually 
arranged confrontations, the police investigations offered a unique 
perspective on the backgrounds of mutually arranged confrontations. Third, 
most individuals involved in the selected cases were not arrested. The 2012 
and 2015 confrontations resulted in fewer arrests than might have been
expected given the reported number of individuals involved (about 40–50 
in each case) and we have no way of knowing to what extent those arrested 
were representative of the section of the hooligan population involved in 
arranged confrontations. Fourth, with regard to criminal career measures, 
in general when committing a crime the chances of arrest (and thus being 
registered in the HKS) are low. Reliance on official data is therefore likely to 
underestimate an individual’s actual criminal behaviour; at the same time,
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this might give more significance to our finding of enhanced involvement in 
violence among participants in mutually arranged confrontations. Fifth and 
finally, information on individual traits was assessed on the basis of Dutch 
National Police and Probation Service data. Because specific diagnostics 
were not available in these data, the current findings should primarily be 
seen as indicators of behavioural traits. Future research may seek to address 
the personal characteristics of those involved in different types of collective 
violence using validated clinical instruments. Summarizing, in this study 
we relied on key informants such as police professionals with many years of 
experience in football and security. Interviewing and surveying this group 
of respondents enabled us to place findings from the police investigation 
files and offender data into a broader context. By combining a criminological 
perspective, incorporating a reference group and triangulating data sources, 
we have sought to fill a lacuna in the current collective violence literature.
In this study, qualitative and quantitative data were used to explore 
the contributing factors of mutually arranged confrontations and the 
significance of these fights for those involved. For comparison purposes, 
the data were matched to data on a ‘regular’ spontaneous football-related 
confrontation. An important limitation of our data was their restriction 
to secondary instead of first-hand sources. Consequently, bias may have 
occurred with regard to participants’ experience of mutually arranged 
confrontations and their motives for participating in these fights.
The results of our study indicate that antagonistic relationships 
between the hooligan groups involved are not a prerequisite for mutually 
arranged confrontations to occur. Instead, there needs to be a basis of 
mutual understanding, respect and trust. In addition, mutually arranged 
confrontations appear to predominantly revolve around establishing or 
maintaining a ‘tough’ collective reputation, with motivations for taking 
part being linked to excitement-seeking, positive attitudes towards violent 
behaviour and establishing or maintaining social goods or dominance. 
This largely contrasts with spontaneous acts of collective violence, which 
are the result of feelings of anger in response to specific events. Analyses 
furthermore show that individuals in the mutually arranged confrontation 
sample are older and have a more extensive history of violent offending 
than the comparison sample. With regard to individual traits associated 
with violent offending, no statistically significant differences between 
the mutually arranged confrontation sample and the comparison sample 
were found. This fits an interpretation of hooligan culture as a whole 
being attractive to individuals with personal characteristics that fit the 
hard masculinity and frequent violence displayed by these groups. Taken 
together, the results of our study suggest that the various, and seemingly
conflicting, explanations that thus far have been offered for football-related 
disorder and collective violence all have relevance in understanding this 
phenomenon. More specifically, convergence explanations for collective 
violence stressing individual characteristics appear applicable to instances of 
collective violence that occur in an organized manner and in a predesignated 
setting. Inclusion of an individual-oriented approach alongside the current 
context-oriented approach, may therefore prove useful in future studies on 
mutually arranged confrontations as well as on collective violence in general.
Conclusion
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Rationale and aim of the research project 
This thesis aimed to assess whether differences between social 
identity and convergence explanations of collective violence can be bridged 
by focusing on psychological characteristics that play a key role in the 
processing of social information and that have been linked to the display 
of violent behavior. In this thesis, a typological approach (Moffitt, 1993, 
1997) that distinguishes between different types of offenders served as a 
vantage point. This concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the 
conducted studies, discusses the thesis’ scope and limitations and reflects 
on its scientific progress, implications for practice and directions for future 
study
The first study assessed the developmental pathways as measured 
by timing and frequency of offending leading up to becoming involved 
in collective violence for a sample of 438 individuals. Their involvement 
was established due to being arrested for partaking in collective violence 
incidents that occurred in 2011 or 2012 or due to being recorded in a 
database of ‘known’ hooligans maintained by the Dutch National Football 
Intelligence Point (Dutch: Centraal Informatiepunt Voetbalvandalisme, CIV ) 
during that same period.
Individuals’ criminal history up to their known involvement in collective 
violence was assessed by utilizing data from the Dutch police registration 
system HKS (Dutch: Herkenningsdienstsysteem). The distribution of 
registered offenses across individuals was heavily skewed: a small number 
of individuals were responsible for the majority of criminal records. 
Group-based modelling of the criminal career data (see Nagin, 2005) 
showed a minority of collective violence offenders (n=57, 13%) which 
started offending at an early age and had a high frequency of offending 
compared to other collective violence offenders in the sample. To further 
assess the patterns that emerged, the Dutch police registration system 
BVH (Dutch: Basisvoorziening Handhaving) was consulted to assess, over 
the past five years, incidents that did not result in arrest. The distribution 
of BVH-registered incidents was also heavily skewed. Particularly the 
minority identified by group-based modelling of HKS-data as early-starter 
high frequency offenders was more often involved in violent incidents in 
general and involved in more serious violent offenses in particular, both 
alone and collectively, than collective violence offenders following other 
developmental trajectories. 
Taken together, this study indicates that there are important 
differences between collective violence offenders with regard to criminal 
career measures that are central to typological approaches. Findings 
therefore suggest that offender typologies may be useful in interpreting 
these pronounced differences and may help explain the contrasting results 
of prior empirical research on collective violence offenders’ characteristics.
The second study explored whether behavioral and psychological 
characteristics were linked to an increased risk of recurrent collective 
violence involvement. To this end, criminal career and individual trait data 
Summary of the main results
Variation within a group of collective violence offenders
Individual determinants of persistence in collective violence
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of the sample utilized in the first study were gathered. Criminal career data 
additional to those used in the first empirical study concerned offenses 
registered in the HKS over a 4- to 5-year period after collective violence 
involvement. Persistence was defined as collective violence recidivism within 
this follow-up period. 
Prior empirical work (e.g. Lösel & Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 2015) 
was utilized to identify potentially relevant behavioral and psychological 
characteristics. Individual characteristics data with regard to ADHD, ASPD, 
impulsivity, emotion-regulation deficits and sensation-seeking behavior 
were derived from three sources: the Dutch National Police (BVH records, 
n=438), the Dutch Probation Service (reports of a (shortened) recidivism 
risk assessment instrument, n=113) and the Netherlands Institute of 
Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology (forensic psychological/psychiatric 
reports, n=15). In addition, problematic childhood behaviors at home and 
at school were assessed from these sources. Study results indicated that 
behavioral and psychological characteristics were linked to continued 
collective violence involvement. Individuals that persist in collective violence 
display significantly more problematic criminal career and individual trait 
measures. By applying Cox proportional hazard models (Cox, 1972) we 
found that particularly age at onset of offending, number of prior collective 
violence offenses and ADHD were associated with persistence in collective 
violence offending, with the latter more than doubling its risk. 
Taken together, findings contradict a core assumption of the social 
identity perspective that offender characteristics are not linked to collective 
violence involvement. The skewness in the distribution of individual traits 
linked to persistence across trajectory groups and the finding that individual 
traits are predictors of persistence in collective violence however suggest 
that convergence theories do have some explanatory power, especially 
when it comes to early-starter high frequency collective violence offenders. 
Herewith the study results offer further support for a collective violence 
offender typology, which suggests that the relative contribution of individual 
and contextual determinants and their interaction differs between various 
types of collective violence offenders. 
The third study assessed the relative contribution of individual 
determinants, social processes and their interaction for reactive acts of 
collective violence. To this end, a case study of a 2012 Project X party that got 
out of hand was conducted. Data utilized to reconstruct the course of events 
consisted of 105 interviews, written documentation and open-source and 
police audio-visual material. Data of the 108 arrestees concerned criminal 
history and psychological traits and were gathered in the police registration 
systems HKS and BVH. Where possible, findings were compared to data 
concerning another riot in a party atmosphere, the Hoek van Holland beach 
riot that occurred in 2009 (see Muller et al., 2010).
The Project X riot originated from a public Facebook event opened by a 
then 15-year old girl inviting friends to celebrate her birthday. This event got 
hijacked and on the day of the event between some 3.000 to 5.000 individuals 
showed up in the vicinity of the girl’s parental home. As a prevention 
measure, the police were already present. A gradual build-up occurred from
Mechanisms of reactive collective violence
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 the moment of sundown, when about 700 youngsters advanced to the barriers 
behind which the police had taken position. When police reinforcements by 
means of riot police arrived, escalation occurred. At that moment, the police 
did not engage with the crowd and in our data no evidence surfaced for 
disproportionate or undifferentiated police action. Social identity seemed 
to have emerged spontaneously due to the party atmosphere among those 
involved: predominantly adolescent males without discernible criminal 
history or links to hooligan groups. Contextual factors (opportunity, risk) 
and alcohol consumption may have contributed to escalation. Nevertheless, 
the selection processes that occurred around the build-up (with changing 
dynamics for some being the reason to leave) and escalation (with less than 
10 percent of those present partaking in actual violence) also indicated that 
individual determinants – particularly ADHD – may have contributed to 
participating in the collective violence that followed. These findings were 
in sharp contrast with collective violence at the Hoek van Holland beach 
riot in 2009. Around this event, deliberate mobilization of repeat offenders 
already affiliated with an upcoming violent hooligan group occurred with the 
specific goal of rioting in mind (Muller et al., 2010). 
Taken together, the study shows that various types of collective violence 
offenders can be identified, between whom the relative contribution of 
contextual and individual factors may vary. Particularly for a small group of 
collective violence offenders characterized by persistent violent behavior 
problematic individual characteristics may have a significant contribution.
The fourth study assessed the relative contribution of individual 
determinants, social processes and their interaction to proactive collective 
violence. To this end, mutually arranged confrontations between hooligan 
groups in the Netherlands – in which arrangements concern at least time 
and location of the confrontation and informal codes of legitimate action – 
were studied. 
The study was based on qualitative data (police case files, questionnaire 
and semi-structured interviews with police officials) and quantitative 
data concerning the criminal history and behavioral and psychological 
characteristics of those partaking in mutually arranged confrontations. 
Quantitative data were compared to similar data of collective violence 
offenders who participated in a spontaneous confrontation between 
supporters around a football match. The data indicate that mutually 
arranged confrontations are organized in a secretive manner and are less 
likely to take place when the perceived risk of apprehension or severe injuries 
is deemed high. Instead of temporary norms as assumed in social identity 
theory, structural values characteristic of the hooligan culture – such as 
the importance of collective reputation and individual status – appeared 
contributing factors to the occurrence of and becoming involved in mutually 
arranged confrontations. Offender data indicated that the individuals 
involved in arranged confrontations were older than reactive collective 
violence offenders, were more likely to have a history of violent offending 
and had committed more violent offenses.
In sum, the findings of the study suggested that mutually arranged 
confrontations are not explicitly guided by trigger events and antagonistic
Mechanisms of proactive collective violence
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relationships between groups. Instead, these fights more often are driven 
by a subculture, which assigns value to behaving violently. Individual 
determinants (early onset, prior violent offenses) appeared to increase 
the likelihood of being part of this subculture. This again suggests that 
characteristics of those involved in collective violence are important for 
explaining why collective violence occurs and who becomes involved.
This section discusses the data selection and methodological 
considerations of this thesis. It then elaborates on the challenges brought 
along by taking a typological vantage point. Finally, the thesis’ findings and 
its theoretical contribution are addressed. 
The first study of this thesis aimed to assess developmental pathways of 
collective violence offenders up to becoming involved in collective violence. 
The second study aimed to explore whether behavioral and psychological 
characteristics were linked to an increased risk of recurrent collective 
violence involvement. An important methodological challenge was to only 
include individuals who have actually participated in large-scale riots, which 
are the focus of the current thesis. Within the Dutch Penal Code, as long 
as the number of participants meets the legally required minimum of two, 
the actual number of people involved in a particular incident is not legally 
relevant for an incident to be regarded as collective violence. Incidents 
of collective violence as registered by the police hence cover a broad 
spectrum of barroom brawls in which as little as two individuals participate, 
up to large scale incidents of public disorder in which significant crowds of 
people participate.
To identify collective violence offenders, a hooligan database maintained 
by the Dutch police served as an important data source. This database was 
created to store data on the most prominent hooligans of each club playing 
professional soccer in the Netherlands. Being registered in this database is 
dependent on input of local police officers who have football and security in 
their remit and who are required to provide input for ‘their’ football team 
or teams (Ferwerda & Adang, 2007; Van Ham et al., 2012). To minimize a 
potential bias towards known offenders, we also included suspects who were 
apprehended due to their involvement in recent collective violence incidents. 
Important with regard to the selected incidents was the comprehensive 
nature of the subsequent police investigations. This comprehensiveness 
was reflected by for example providing suspect photos to the media with 
the aim of identifying as many suspects as possible. Based on the number 
of individuals that had been involved in the selected incidents, police were 
confident that most perpetrators – including up to then unknown individuals – 
were arrested. As such, a potentially broad range of individuals, from already 
known individuals (e.g. hooligans) to one-time collective violence offenders, 
were identified. Furthermore, compared to previous empirical studies on 
the topic (e.g. Farrington, 2006; Lösel & Bliesener, 2003; Piquero et al., 
2015), the sample employed in the first and second study of this thesis is 
relatively large and less biased towards individuals (at risk of) persisting 
into (violent) offending. Nevertheless, the collective violence offenders
Data selection and restrictions
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that were identified are by no means a statistically random reflection of all 
collective violence offenders in the Netherlands.
Furthermore, the current thesis considered both reactive and 
proactive types of collective violence. Around the time of the study, however, 
investigating mutually arranged confrontations between hooligan groups 
was no police priority. Consequently, there was no other option than to 
rely on the – to our knowledge – only two investigations into this matter 
that were conducted relatively recently. Though we do not have reasons to 
suppose they are not, we could not ascertain the extent to which findings are 
representative for all mutually arranged confrontations and the individuals 
involved in these fights. Compared to the only other empirical study into 
this matter (Kerr & De Kock, 2002), the current study was based on much 
more detailed information on the situation in which the mutually arranged 
confrontation came to be and more extensive data with regard to the 
individual characteristics of the individuals involved.
In sum, though the current thesis comprises a heterogeneous sample 
of both collective violence incidents and collective violence offenders, 
constructing a truly random sample of collective violence incidents and 
offenders was not possible. Findings, therefore, primarily relate to the 
samples included in this thesis. Consequently, caution is required when 
generalizing the current findings to other contexts in which collective 
violence occurs. Future studies employing other samples are necessary to 
substantiate the present results. 
The current study is the first to link individual level criminal history 
data and psychological traits data to participation in collective violence. 
Criminal career histories were based on the individual’s registered history. 
Being recorded in the police registration system, however, not only reflects 
individual behavior, but is also highly influenced by police priorities that make 
some criminal activities more prone to police interference and registration 
than others. Prior research for instance indicates that the strong decrease in 
registered juvenile offending may be linked to police practices (Van Ham et 
al., 2015). Reliance on police data therefore, is likely to underestimate actual 
criminal behavior. Subsequently, this may have affected the prevalence 
of the trajectories identified with group-based modelling, as well as the 
assignment of individuals to these trajectories. Registered crime bias may 
also affect the level of persistence among collective violence offenders (as 
measured by recidivism in collective violence) found. Furthermore, obtaining 
validated data on the sampled individual’s psychological characteristics 
relevant for the current study proved to be unfeasible since psychological 
testing of offenders involved in collective violence is uncommon. Therefore, 
the current study had to rely largely on derivative measures of psychological 
characteristics instead of diagnostics with clinical instruments. Although it 
was not tested here whether these derivative measures are indeed associated 
with social information processing, this may be deduced post-hoc from the 
study’s findings. The current findings, for instance, are in line with that of 
prior empirical work with regard to a) the distribution of psychological 
characteristics among criminal trajectories and b) their association with 
persistence in violent behavior. That being said, future studies should strive 
Methodological considerations 
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to use standardized psychological measures. In addition, the current thesis 
was limited to psychological characteristics which are, as ascertained by 
prior empirical work, associated with solo violence. Taking prior empirical 
work on solo violence as a vantage point, however, disregards the intergroup 
and intragroup dynamics that characterize collective violence. Individual 
characteristics, such as the sensitivity to peer pressure, for instance, may 
influence the felt need to conform to group norms and, therewith, also 
affect collective violence involvement. This suggests that psychological 
characteristics not taken into account in this thesis may be relevant in 
explaining collective violence as well. 
The semi-parametric group-based trajectory modelling used to identify 
collective violence offenders with similar criminal patterns over time also 
has its limitations. Although group-based modelling is objective in that the 
groups found do not reflect random variation (Piquero, 2008), a limitation is 
that trajectory modelling always will identify a small number of latent classes 
and, as such, a priori assumes offender types in the data (Skardhamar, 2010). 
Furthermore, identified trajectories are an approximation. Criminal careers 
of individuals may fit best with the aggregated pattern of a particular group 
but may not follow the trajectory curve perfectly (see Nagin and Tremblay, 
2005a, 2005b; Sampson & Laub, 2005). In order to avoid reification of 
trajectory groups, group membership should be linked to relevant risk- and 
protective factors to ascertain their theoretical relevance.
The relative contribution of individual and contextual determinants 
to collective violence was addressed by conducting qualitative studies 
into reactive and proactive acts of collective violence. To this end, various 
methodological approaches and data sources were utilized, including a 
detailed analysis of underlying case files (including interrogations and other 
evidence such as footage and confiscated chat conversations). Using police 
case files for scientific purposes, however, requires a certain level of restraint, 
since this information is primarily gathered for investigative purposes such 
as searching for the truth and creating a body of evidence to be used in court. 
In addition, unlike collective violence offenders involved in reactive acts of 
collective violence, those involved in mutually arranged confrontations were 
not forthcoming in answering police questions about their motivations and 
almost exclusively exercised their right to remain silent. Likely, this was not 
only because any statement made would contribute to the evidence against 
them, but also reflected the informal code within hooligan subculture that 
states that the police are not to be talked with. Consequently, second-hand 
sources of information such as survey data and semi-structured interviews 
with police professionals working in football and security had to be relied on 
specifically with regard to the cases of proactive collective violence studied. 
Part of the police professionals consulted had acquired the trust of individuals 
who partake in these mutually arranged confrontations. Furthermore, police 
officers working covertly were consulted. These police officers are able to 
obtain information from informants who are part of the hooligan groups 
involved in such fights. Although bias with regard to motivational aspects 
in play for the individuals participating in mutually arranged confrontations 
cannot be completely ruled out, the information obtained from these police 
officers clearly contributes to identifying the relevant mechanisms giving 
cause to this type of collective violence. 
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Despite the limitations set out above, by employing a wide variety of 
sources and several methodological approaches, the data gathered for the 
current study allowed for a comprehensive exploration of whether social 
identity and convergence perspectives on collective violence could be 
fruitfully reconciled.
Collective violence research encompasses opposing theoretical views, 
with one view stressing the relevance of context and the other underscoring 
the importance of individual traits. Over the past decades the context in 
which collective violence occurred has become the all but sole research 
focus. Core assumptions of social identity explanations of collective violence 
are that collective violence is preceded by trigger events, that antagonistic 
relations are present among the groups involved and that offender 
characteristics do not, in any way, guide an individual’s decision to partake 
(Reicher & Stott, 2011; Reicher, 2001; Waddington, 2012). Furthermore, by 
arguing that no individual attributes are known of that reliably predict riot 
participation (Reicher, 2001), social identity explanations do not take into 
account individual characteristics of collective violence offenders. In the 
theoretical debate on collective violence, the intersection of contextual 
and convergence explanations for collective violence has remained mainly 
untouched. This thesis aimed to provide directions for uniting opposing 
theoretical views on collective violence and furthering the debate on its 
determinants by combining quantitative and qualitative data and methods. 
The social identity perspective acknowledges individual differences 
between collective violence offenders to the extent that they may identify 
different social categories in a given situation, in the contents of these 
categories and in the persons prototypical thereof (Herrera & Reicher, 
1998; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a, b; Reicher & Sani, 1998; Sani & Reicher, 
1998, 1999). Differences in individual characteristics of collective violence 
offenders are, however, rejected as a matter of principle. The first question 
this thesis sought to address was whether developmental pathways in 
delinquency and crime differ across individuals up to the moment they 
become involved in collective violence. Indeed the age of onset at and 
frequency of offending was found to differ substantially between collective 
violence offenders. These pronounced differences within the sample with 
regard to criminal career measures fit existing ideas on criminal careers and 
extant typological theories on crime causation. This thesis therewith, as a 
first, offers an indication that different types of collective violence offenders 
may be identified based on their criminal career characteristics. 
The second question central to this thesis was whether there are 
individual characteristics that are linked to persistence in collective violence 
and, if so, which ones. The results presented in this thesis indicate that 
there are indeed individual characteristics that contribute to persistence 
in collective violence, as measured by recidivism. Not only criminal 
career measures but also ADHD was found to significantly contribute to a 
heightened chance of having been registered for repeated involvement in 
collective violence. Furthermore, confirming the results of the first study, 
individual characteristics associated with the processing of and reacting 
to social cues (ADHD, ASPD heightened impulsivity, emotion-regulation
Theoretical notions and scientific progress
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deficits, sensation-seeking behavior) were found significantly more often 
in early-starter high frequency collective violence offenders compared 
to collective violence offenders who followed different developmental 
trajectories. These findings substantiate prior empirical work, which has 
implicated these individual characteristics in contributing to intergroup 
conflict and offensive action tendencies in crowds (Levy et al., 2017; Mackie 
et al., 2000; Russell, 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). In addition, the distribution 
of these individual characteristics among the different developmental 
trajectories distinguished in the sample of collective violence offenders 
offers further support for a typological vantage point to bridge differences 
between contextual and convergence explanations for collective violence. 
Collective violence not only occurs reactively in response to trigger 
events, but may also be preplanned without necessarily being preceded by 
trigger events or requiring antagonistic relations between the sides involved 
(also see Adang, 2011). The third question this thesis aimed to address, was 
whether the contribution of contextual and individual determinants differs 
between these different types of collective violence and, if so, how. The data 
presented in this thesis indicate that the distinction between reactive and 
proactive violence is not straightforward. Particularly the Hoek van Holland 
beach riot (Muller et al., 2010) – which was used as a comparison case in the 
Project-X case study – showed that a small group of individuals belonging to 
an upcoming but already notorious hooligan group were already in advance 
intent on instigating public disorder; the majority of those participating 
responded to how events subsequently unfolded. This indicates that 
contributing factors may differ between individuals who participate in 
collective violence, and that various types of collective violence offenders 
may be involved in a single incident. Consequently, the relative contribution 
of contextual and individual determinants then appears to vary between 
incidents and between the individuals who involve themselves.
The data gathered in this thesis, furthermore, suggest that particularly 
persistent offenders involve themselves in both reactive and proactive acts 
of collective violence. The most prominent contributing factors seem to 
be a violent criminal history, individual characteristics associated with the 
processing of social information and the subculture of which this group of 
perpetrators are part. As a result, the individuals who may be characterized 
as persistent collective violence offenders appear to have a low threshold 
for using violence, both alone and in a group, confirming prior empirical 
work (Piquero et al., 2015; Lösel & Bliesener, 2003). In addition to negative 
emotions such as revenge, current results are in line with prior studies, 
which suggest that there are individuals who may experience positive 
affect (such as joy or the gaining of status among their peers) when acting 
violently (Adang, 2011; Spaaij, 2008). Taken together, this argues for an 
approach incorporating both reactive and proactive collective violence 
and the inclusion of both negative and positive affect when considering the 
relative contribution of contextual and individual determinants of collective 
violence. Theoretically, this fits the recently introduced quadripartite 
violence typology (QVT) used to explain why individuals may behave violently 
(see Howard, 2015). This typology may complement currently dominant 
contextual approaches on collective violence stressing trigger events and 
the emergence of social identity.
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The initiation-escalation model (Adang, 2011) describes that collective 
violence may initiate in response to trigger events or with individuals and 
groups actively seeking out opportunities for confrontation. Furthermore, 
Adang (2011) identifies two mechanisms for the escalation of violence 
(in the sense that more individuals decide to involve themselves). Next to 
opportunity and (perceived) risk of retaliation, Adang (2011) identifies an 
‘us versus them’ relationship as an important escalation mechanism, with a 
higher frequency of violence observed when relationships between groups 
are more antagonistic. The initiation-escalation model thus differentiates 
between collective violence type (spontaneous and premeditated) and its 
significance for those involved (negative affect/positive affect). Herewith, 
this model largely parallels the recently introduced quadripartite violence 
typology (QVT). 
To explain violent behavior, the QVT distinguishes between the type of 
violence (impulsive or controlled) and the feelings the individual(s) involved 
associate with behaving violently (appetitively or aversively) (Howard, 
2015). The QVT has identified four incentives for violent behavior: a desire 
for excitement and exhilaration is central to appetitive/impulsive violence, 
whereas in the case of appetitive/controlled violence self-gratification – either 
in material goods or social dominance – is the key incentive. Self-protection 
against an interpersonal threat (whether physical or psychological) is 
considered to underlie aversive/impulsive violence, whereas vengeance or 
retribution is the incentive for aversive/controlled violence.
At least three arguments can be brought forward for the relevance of the 
QVT to explain collective violence. First, the point of view that main reasons 
for partaking in a collective violence event may vary between individuals is 
acknowledged by our Project-X case study. This study, for instance, indicated 
that many arrestees had – according to their own statement – acted violently 
in response to unnecessary and disproportionate police actions. Be it to a 
much lesser extent, others, however, referred primarily to sensation- and 
thrill-seeking to explain their own behavior. Second, aversive violence and its 
core underlying incentives of self-protection and vengeance are reflected in 
the thesis’ finding that a significant part of collective violence offenders only 
engage in violence under specific conditions. This, for instance, may be in 
case of trigger events and the resultant emerging relationships between the 
groups present. Third, appetitive violence and its core underlying incentives 
of excitement and self-gratification are reflected in the significance of 
spontaneous and premeditated acts of collective violence, such as planned 
fights, particularly for individuals who belong to a hooligan subculture that 
glorifies behaving violently. 
This thesis’ findings have provided evidence that psychological 
characteristics may underlie the incentive(s) of engaging in violence as 
identified by the QVT. For instance, psychological characteristics contribute 
to persistence in collective violence, indicating that these characteristics 
may affect trigger event and intergroup relationships perception. 
Furthermore, these characteristics were particularly present in early-onset 
high frequency offenders, who appear to derive intrinsic (excitement) and/
or extrinsic value (social dominance) from behaving violently. Taking into 
account the results of prior empirical work, this indicates that explaining 
why collective violence occurs and who becomes involved, requires analysis
Theoretical implications
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on various levels. In order of aggregation level, the first level of analysis is 
that of context such as trigger events and intergroup relations, on which 
the SIM focuses. The second level of analysis is that of intragroup relations, 
which focuses on intragroup dynamics, norms and expectations (e.g. 
role models, synchronizing behaviors). The third level of analysis is that 
individual characteristics that are associated with behaving violently, such 
as heightened impulsivity, sensation-seeking behavior and a hostility bias. 
As individual characteristics influence perception of intra- and intergroup 
relations, individual characteristics interrelate with the other two levels 
of analysis. Future studies may make clear how these levels of analysis 
interrelate and both its theoretical and practical implications. 
Results presented in this thesis indicate that particularly early-onset high 
frequency collective violence offenders show psychological characteristics 
associated with violent behavior. In addition, data presented in this thesis 
indicate that criminal history and psychological characteristics are linked 
to persistence in collective violence offending. Furthermore, the results 
of this thesis indicate that those involved in proactive collective violence 
incidents have a more criminal and violent history than most individuals who 
partake in reactive collective violence. These findings combined suggest 
that distinguishing between various types of collective violence offenders 
for whom the root causes of partaking in collective violence are likely to vary 
– as well as taking into account the varying nature of collective violence – 
may help extend our understanding of why collective violence occurs.
The Netherlands has had a common national football policy since 
1997. While initially, this policy focused upon formulating a joint approach 
by professional football clubs, the police, municipalities and the Public 
Prosecution Service, later on, emphasis shifted to normalization. 
Normalization adheres to confronting supporters who visit a football 
match with as few restrictions as possible. To further develop accessibility, 
hospitality and safety around football, various spearheads have recently 
been drawn up. Next to increasing supporter involvement in football safety 
policy and providing municipalities – as the authority for maintaining public 
order – leverage points to deal with football safety, a person-oriented 
approach is considered a priority. This originates from the point of view that, 
as long as so-called ‘notorious troublemakers’ are present around football 
matches, accessibility and hospitality for other supporters remain limited. 
Criteria that are considered to be at the core of taking on a successful 
person-oriented approach are: a) the presence of a comprehensive 
approach to problem supporters consisting of appropriate punishment as 
well as preventing recidivism, b) communication of intended measures and 
penalties by all partners involved (club, municipality, police and the Public 
Prosecution Service), c) sufficient intelligence gathering about hard core 
hooligans and d) operational follow-up on this intelligence. Taken these 
criteria in mind, it may be concluded that the person-oriented approach 
aims for a nationally consistent approach to notorious troublemakers while 
at the same time warranting customization for each individual (Auditteam 
Football & Safety, 2019). 
Implications for practice
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The thesis’ findings that psychological characteristics affect 
persistence in collective violence have various implications for practice. With 
regard to the sufficient intelligence gathering about hard core hooligans, 
this thesis has made clear that, for the time being, it is a major challenge to 
collect data on the individual characteristics of collective violence offenders. 
This is partly due to the fact that the police and partners – such as the Public 
Prosecution Service and the Probation Service – pay limited attention to 
individual characteristics when individuals are arrested due to becoming 
involved in collective violence. Besides psychological assessment being costly 
and time consuming, this seems based on the prejudice that group dynamics 
are the main determinant of becoming involved in collective violence. The 
thesis findings, however, imply that more often than currently is the case 
psychological reports and risk assessments of individuals arrested for their 
involvement in collective violence will need to be written and conducted, for 
instance by the Probation Service or the Netherlands Institute of Forensic 
Psychiatry and Psychology (Dutch: Nederlands Instituut voor Forensische 
Psychiatrie en Psychologie, NIFP). This way, a better picture may be obtained 
of underlying explanations of an individual’s involvement in collective 
violence, recidivism risk and the required measures to prevent recidivism i.e. 
appropriate punishment and operational follow-up.
Also, with regard to the sufficient intelligence gathering about hard core 
hooligans, identifying individuals for whom a person-oriented approach may 
contribute to football safety may be considered a key challenge. Currently, 
a database of those frequently involved in hooliganism is maintained by 
the Dutch National Football Intelligence Unit (CIV in Dutch). This national 
database is filled with individuals whose names – usually limited to a maximum 
of 10 – are provided bottom-up by local police officers who are required 
to utilize the ‘Focus on Hooligans’ (Dutch: Hooligans in Beeld) method. In 
short, this method aims to monitor and control individuals whose behaviour 
on match days is considered problematic by local police officers and who 
commit offences at other times and locations as well (Spaaij, 2013). The 
findings of this thesis suggest that in this way – by requiring and maximizing 
local input – individuals are regarded as a notorious troublemaker while 
differing markedly from one another on key characteristics. For instance, 
there were 228 persons in this study who belonged to the CIV database, but 
only 57 persons appeared to have the highest risk of persisting into collective 
violence. This thesis findings, therefore, argue for a top-down approach to 
identifying notorious troublemakers as well. This top-down approach may 
utilize inclusion and exclusion criteria by means of the current thesis findings 
and, therewith, contribute to an intelligence-based police strategy that also 
considers characteristics of collective violence offenders. 
A subsequent intelligence-based police strategy may be aimed at 
preventing notorious troublemakers’ presence in crowds. This working 
method goes beyond the main dilemma of public order policing, namely 
controlling crowd members with violent intent without alienating crowd 
members whose aims are legitimate (Reicher et al., 2004). Instead of 
taking action specifically towards individuals who have frequently behaved 
violently in crowds, the current results argue as well for preventive action 
taken towards persons who, based on their criminal history and individual 
characteristics, are at high risk of repeatedly displaying violent behavior
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in crowds. The data presented in this thesis indicate that particular for 
individuals who suffer from psychological and psychiatric problems 
associated with social information processing measures such as stadium 
bans or obligations to report at a police station at a given time or place should 
be considered, despite the current absence of a comprehensive track record 
with regard to collective violence offending. Without paying attention to 
these individual’s underlying problems and needs, there will be no incentive 
for them to change their behavior. Although limiting their freedom around 
football matches may be suitable to reduce the risk of collective violence 
from occurring, behavioral interventions would need to be imposed to 
further reduce recidivism. 
The results of the thesis suggest that different types of collective 
violence offenders can be identified for whom the root causes of becoming 
involved in collective violence differ. Paralleling the relative small number 
of early-starter high frequency collective violence offenders found in the 
conducted studies, prior research indicates that often only a small minority 
of the individuals present may be intent on instigating violence (Adang, 
2011; Reicher et al., 2004). The thesis’ results indicate that for a minority 
of collective violence offenders behavior is driven by individual rather than 
contextual factors. Their behavior, however, may in turn be a contextual 
factor contributing to the involvement of other groups in the crowd. Taking 
preventive actions towards this minority of persistent collective violence 
offenders, then, may prevent violent behavior in crowds both directly 
and indirectly. However, the reality of collective violence is complicated 
by the notion that groups intent on instigating collective violence are not 
automatically a role model for other groups in the crowd. The chances that 
individuals with violent intent become role models for other groups in the 
crowd without such an intent particularly has been linked to the response 
of the police (Reicher, 1984; Stott et al., 2001). Therefore, a major emphasis 
is to be placed on supporting and facilitating crowd members pursuing 
legal goals and activities, even under conditions where one is aware of the 
presence of groups with illegal goals and even at points where these groups 
start to act in illegal or violent ways (Reicher et al., 2004). A better insight in 
which people and groups – i.e. social identities – are present in a crowd may 
help the police to develop strategies to act in an appropriate and targeted 
manner, therewith preventing that behaviors of the violent-intent minority 
contribute to escalation of collective violence in crowds. 
In addition to finding support for taking a typological vantage point 
when explaining collective violence, this thesis differentiated between 
various types of collective violence: trigger-related and preplanned. 
Preplanned acts of collective violence particularly concern mutually arranged 
confrontations between hooligan groups. Such fights are, in the Netherlands 
and in other European countries, prosecutable under criminal law. Mutually 
arranged confrontations have been taking place now for several years, 
indicating the structural character of such fights in the Netherlands. The 
increasing number of mutually arranged confrontations may be traced back 
to improvement in stadia management and increased risks of apprehension, 
which limit opportunities to behave violently around football matches and at 
stadium grounds (Cleland & Cashmore, 2016; Jewell, Simmons & Szymanski, 
2014). This suggests that the police should focus on increasing the perceived 
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risk of apprehension among potential participants as to ensure that mutually 
arranged confrontations do not materialize. In addition, the findings 
presented in this thesis indicate that such fights are participated in by only 
a small part of ‘known’ hooligans who have an extensive history of violence, 
both solo and alone. This suggests that priority should be given to identifying 
people involved in these fights. Bringing together various information flows 
(e.g. police registration data, police professionals working covertly) and 
implementing new technology – such as artificial intelligence to analyze 
footage of fights – may provide insight into the persons which are involved 
in mutually arranged confrontations. Writing and conducting psychological 
reports and risk assessments of individuals arrested for their involvement 
in such fights, may help in identifying risk factors – both individual and 
contextual – that increase the risk of partaking in these fights. Information 
from such reports and assessments subsequently can be used to draw up 
a person-oriented approach (Dutch: Persoonsgerichte Aanpak, PGA), which 
may focus on raising barriers for these individuals’ future participation in 
these fights. In addition, decreasing the number of individuals willing or able 
to participate in mutually arranged confrontations, may increase the efforts 
necessary to organize these fights and as such contribute to their preclusion. 
The findings of this thesis are an inducement for several future 
research directions. This thesis suggests that the relative contribution 
of individual and contextual determinants to collective violence differs 
between individuals. This thesis’ findings have substantiated that to explain 
collective violence, three levels of analysis (intergroup relations, intragroup 
dynamics and individual characteristics) can be distinguished. Although this 
thesis is limited to collective violence in settings generally considered as 
issue-irrelevant (Wann et al., 2001), this suggests that to explain collective 
violence around protests and demonstrations – issue-relevant collective 
violence – these levels of analysis also need to be accounted for. The motives 
underlying issue-relevant collective violence, however, may deviate from 
issue-irrelevant collective violence (less hedonistic and more ideologically 
driven). Consequently, future studies may assess individual characteristics of 
collective violence offenders involved particularly in issue-relevant collective 
violence, their association with persistence in this type of collective violence 
and the interaction of individual characteristics at the intra- and intergroup 
level. Conducting such studies may not only provide data that are currently 
lacking, but may also offer further substantiation for the theoretical 
implications that may be derived from the findings of this thesis. 
The findings in this thesis are supportive of a hybrid perspective on 
collective violence in which intergroup relationships, intergroup dynamics, 
opportunity and individual determinants all contribute. Particularly, results 
indicate that individuals who come to participate in collective violence are 
not a homogeneous group. Up to now, it has not been adequately assessed 
whether and, if so, to what extent and through which mechanisms small 
groups of individuals known for their frequent and repeated involvement 
in collective violence may be able to affect intergroup relationships and 
intergroup dynamics in collective settings. 
Future research directions
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Also, the results of the conducted studies suggest that psychological 
characteristics linked to the processing of social information increase 
the risk of more frequent involvement in collective violence. Up to now, 
collective violence researchers seem to prefer a reconstruction of events 
based on observations, in-depth interviews and case file studies. These 
studies result in detailed reports of the context in which collective violence 
occurs, although to some extent trigger events and motives identified in 
these studies may resemble theoretical assumptions more than that they 
reflect objective data (Waddington, 2012). The emphasis in this thesis 
has been mainly on providing evidence that psychological characteristics 
associated with solo violence may serve as a predictor of collective violence 
involvement for, at least, a subgroup of collective violence offenders. As 
a result, the social component of collective violence and the interaction 
between the individual and social component has not been explicitly studied 
in this thesis. Incorporating behavioral and psychological determinants 
linked to social information processing identified in this thesis – which up 
to now have been disregarded – may provide additional knowledge on who 
becomes involved in collective violence and why. Noteworthy in this regard 
is that the processing of social information may also be affected temporarily. 
For instance, the findings derived from the Project-X case study indicate 
that a considerable part of the arrestees blamed their involvement on being 
under the influence of alcohol. The use of alcohol has been found to heighten 
impulsive behavior, to alter perceptions of opportunity and to decrease 
sensitivity to social cues (Van Hasselt, 2013). Furthermore, future research 
may also assess whether, and if so, which psychological characteristics 
affect intragroup dynamics and make individuals – regardless of context – 
more susceptible to joining a violent crowd or to conform to group norms.
Furthermore, internet in general and social media in particular have 
become indispensable in social life. Social media played a prominent role 
in one of the case studies; a crowd was mobilized via Facebook. At the 
same time, it is important to realize that an extensive reconstruction of 
this incident showed that the simple fact that many young people were on 
their feet cannot be identified as the leading contextual cause. Since then, 
in the Netherlands no more incidents have occurred in which social media 
were primarily the means by which crowds were mobilized and events 
subsequently resulted in collective violence. In relation to mutually arranged 
confrontations, however, social media do seem to play an important role. The 
contact between hooligan groups by social media is easy and quick to realize 
and (relatively) safe with regard to chances of apprehension; moreover, social 
media offer an outlet to hooligan groups to be able to distribute footage 
of mutually arranged confrontations that materialize quickly and with a 
large reach. The dynamics of social media on proactive collective violence 
therefore appear of interest for future research. Not only for identifying 
individuals who participate in these fights, but potentially also to predict 
when and where these fights will occur. However, to be able to arrive at 
reliable predictions about future fights, accuracy and completeness of social 
media and other open source data (e.g. hooligan sides involved, location, 
date, time) would need to be assessed. 
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The current thesis has brought together opposing views on the causes of 
collective violence. To this end, various data sources and scientific disciplines 
were considered. The thesis finds that different types of collective violence 
offenders can be identified, who differ qualitatively with regard to criminal 
history, individual traits, and their likelihood of persistence in collective 
violence. Furthermore, it finds reasons for differentiating spontaneous from 
pre-planned instances of collective violence. Whereas contextual factors 
appear most salient for individuals engaging in spontaneous collective 
violence, individual traits seem to govern a subsample of persistent collective 
violence offenders engaging in both spontaneous and pre-planned collective 
violence incidents. Whereas persistent collective violence offenders 
constitute only a small part of all individuals engaging in spontaneous 
collective violence, their presence is more outspoken among those engaging 
in pre-planned collective violence.
Conclusion
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Titel: Groepsgeweldplegers en groepsgeweld. De rol van individuele 
kenmerken 
Sinds de jaren ’60 van de vorige eeuw ontstond in toenemende 
mate weerstand tegen verklaringen voor groepsgeweld die stelden dat 
dit geweld irrationeel, ongericht en ongecontroleerd van aard is. Dit 
gold eveneens voor de ‘klassieke’ veronderstelling dat een gewelddadige 
menigte de criminele, gewelddadige inslag weergeeft van de mensen die 
daarvan deel uitmaken. Daarmee verschoof de focus naar de context waarin 
groepsgeweld plaatsvindt, en meer in het bijzonder naar het concept ‘sociale 
identiteit’. Dit begrip verwijst naar iemands bewustzijn dat hij of zij tot 
een bepaalde groep behoort en door anderen zo behandeld wordt. Vanuit 
dit perspectief beredeneerd zijn niet de eigen doelen en verlangens maar 
groepsnormen bepalend voor het gedrag van mensen in een menigte, en 
spelen persoonskenmerken hierin geen rol van betekenis. Tegelijkertijd werd 
duidelijk dat slechts een klein deel van een menigte overgaat tot geweld. 
Verschillen in welke groepen mensen binnen een menigte onderscheiden en 
welke emoties zij in een situatie ervaren, zijn individuele factoren die hierin 
een rol kunnen spelen. Dit suggereert dat niet alleen de context maar ook 
individuele factoren groepsgeweld kunnen verklaren. De in dit proefschrift 
beschreven studies onderzochten in hoeverre uiteenlopende verklaringen 
voor groepsgeweld kunnen worden samengebracht. De nadruk lag hierbij op 
psychologische kenmerken die een sleutelrol spelen bij de verwerking van 
sociale informatie en waarvan eerder is aangetoond dat zij verband houden 
met het vertonen van individueel gewelddadig gedrag.
Dit proefschrift beslaat vier deelonderzoeken. Deze deelonderzoeken 
richtten zich op de volgende vragen:
In de eerste kwantitatieve studie van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 2) 
werd voor een groep van 438 groepsgeweldplegers de criminele carrière 
tot aan hun betrokkenheid bij groepsgeweld in beeld gebracht. Deze 
steekproef bestond uit personen die de politie had aangehouden vanwege 
hun deelname aan groepsgeweld, dan wel personen die in een landelijke 
hooligandatabase geregistreerd stonden. Het onderzoek liet zien dat de 
bij de politie geregistreerde delicten voor deze steekproef scheef verdeeld 
waren: een klein deel van de groepsgeweldplegers was verantwoordelijk 
voor een aanzienlijk deel van alle bij de politie geregistreerde delicten. Een
Aanleiding 
Deelonderzoeken en bevindingen
1 verschillen criminele ontwikkelingspaden van groepsgeweldplegers tot aan 
hun betrokkenheid bij groepsgeweld (hoofdstuk 2)?
2 bestaat er een verband tussen bepaalde individuele kenmerken en 
persisterend groepsgeweld en, zo ja, om welke individuele kenmerken gaat 
het (hoofdstuk 3)? 
3 verschilt de bijdrage van contextuele en individuele factoren voor reactieve 
(hoofdstuk 4)
4 en voor proactieve vormen van groepsgeweld (hoofdstuk 5) en, zo ja, op 
welke wijze?
(   )
(   )
(   )
(   )
119
07. Samenvatting
klein deel van de groepsgeweldplegers (n = 57, 13%) kon bovendien worden 
getypeerd als ‘vroeg-startende hoogfrequente dader’. Personen binnen 
deze groep waren veelvuldig betrokken bij gewelddadige incidenten in 
het algemeen en ernstige geweldsdelicten in het bijzonder, zowel alleen 
als in groepsverband. De hoofdconclusie van dit onderzoek luidde dat er 
belangrijke verschillen zijn tussen groepsgeweldplegers in de leeftijd ten 
tijde van het eerste delict en het aantal gepleegde delicten. Deze verschillen 
sluiten aan bij criminele carrièrekenmerken die centraal staan in typologische 
benaderingen. Een implicatie van deze bevinding is dat er verschillende 
typen groepsgeweldplegers kunnen worden onderscheiden, waarvoor de 
oorzaken die ten grondslag liggen aan hun betrokkenheid bij groepsgeweld 
kunnen verschillen.
In het tweede kwantitatieve onderzoek van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 
3) werd onderzocht of gedrags- en psychologische kenmerken verband 
hielden met een verhoogd risico op herhaald daderschap van groepsgeweld in 
een periode van vier tot vijf jaar. Voor het identificeren van mogelijk relevante 
kenmerken werd geput uit eerder empirisch werk (zie Lösel & Bliesener, 
2003; Piquero et al., 2015). Dit leidde tot een focus op de rol van Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), antisociale persoonlijkheidsstoornis, 
impulsiviteit, sensatiezoekend gedrag en deficiënties in de emotieregulatie. 
De mate waarin deze kenmerken aanwezig waren binnen de onderzoeksgroep 
uit studie 1 werd geïnventariseerd aan de hand van politiedata, data van de 
drie Reclasseringsorganisaties (3RO) en Pro Justitia-rapportages die waren 
opgesteld door het Nederlands Instituut voor Forensische Psychiatrie en 
Psychologie (NIFP). Uit het onderzoek kwam naar voren dat recidivisten – in 
vergelijking met personen die dat niet doen – jonger zijn ten tijde van het 
eerste geregistreerde delict, een uitgebreidere criminele historie hebben en 
vaker lijden aan ADHD. Dit suggereert dat daderkenmerken een verklarende 
waarde hebben voor betrokkenheid bij groepsgeweld. Aanvullende 
analyses suggereerden dat dit in het bijzonder geldt voor ‘vroeg-startende 
hoogfrequente daders’.
 Het derde onderzoek voor dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 4) betrof een 
casestudy van een spontane grootschalige ordeverstoring. Deze casestudy 
baseerde zich op interviews (n=105) met professionals en bij het evenement 
aanwezige burgers, een analyse van schriftelijke documentatie, open-source 
en politie-audiovisueel materiaal en data van de 108 aangehouden verdachten. 
Het onderzoek liet zien dat de menigte tot geweld tegen de politie overging 
toen de Mobiele Eenheid (ME) arriveerde; van disproportioneel en/of 
ongericht politieoptreden was op dat moment geen sprake. De daders waren 
met name mannelijke adolescenten zonder banden met hooligangroepen 
of een aanmerkelijke criminele voorgeschiedenis. Contextuele factoren 
(gelegenheid, pakkans) en alcoholconsumptie hebben mogelijk bijgedragen 
aan de escalatie. Tegelijkertijd maakte het onderzoek duidelijk dat de opbouw 
richting de rel – in de vorm van een grimmiger wordende sfeer – voor een 
groot deel van de aanwezigen een reden was om te vertrekken. Bovendien 
nam minder dan tien procent van de aanwezigen daadwerkelijk deel aan het 
geweld. Deze bevindingen impliceren dat selectieprocessen bijgedragen 
kunnen hebben aan het collectieve geweld dat volgde. In het bijzonder kwam 
ADHD daarbij als een mogelijk relevant individueel kenmerk naar voren, in 
ieder geval voor een klein deel van de betrokkenen.
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Het vierde onderzoek van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 5) ging nader in 
op de betekenis van wederzijds afgestemde vechtpartijen (‘vechtafspraken’) 
voor personen die betrokken zijn bij deze vorm van groepsgeweld. Deze 
studie baseerde zich op kwalitatieve data (waaronder een survey en twee 
opsporingsonderzoeken) en kwantitatieve data (criminele geschiedenis 
en de gedrags- en psychologische kenmerken van deelnemers aan 
vechtafspraken). De uitkomsten van dit onderzoek suggereerden dat 
onderliggende normen en waarden van de hooligancultuur bijdragen aan 
het deelnemen aan vechtafspraken: de waarde die gehecht wordt aan de 
reputatie van de eigen hooligangroep en de individuele status c.q. hiërarchie 
binnen deze groepen. In dit licht past de bevinding dat het plaatsvinden 
van vechtafspraken meestal níet te herleiden is tot triggers of spanningen 
tussen de betrokken groepen. Ook de bevinding dat deelnemers aan 
vechtafspraken een uitgebreidere geweldshistorie hebben ten opzichte 
van personen die betrokken zijn geweest bij een spontane ordeverstoring, 
lijkt te passen binnen een subcultuur die waarde toekent aan gewelddadig 
gedrag. Daarmee suggereren ook de bevindingen van deze studie een zekere 
mate van ‘selectie’. Dit impliceert wederom dat daderkenmerken zinvol 
kunnen zijn om groepsgeweld en de betrokkenheid van personen daarbij te 
verklaren.
De juridische formulering van ‘geweld in vereniging’ (art. 141 SR) – wat 
de facto verwijst naar groepsgeweld – bestrijkt een breed spectrum; van 
kleine vechtpartijen tot grootschalige verstoringen van de openbare orde. 
Daar de focus van deze dissertatie op het laatste lag, zijn in de steekproef 
van de eerste twee studies uiteindelijk die personen meegenomen die bij 
de Nederlandse politie als ‘hooligan’ geregistreerd waren, of  die – om een 
mogelijke vertekening naar bekende daders te minimaliseren – bij recente 
ordeverstoringen zijn aangehouden als verdachte. Belangrijk voor de laatste 
groep was het alomvattende karakter van de opsporingsonderzoeken, 
waardoor de meeste relschoppers, inclusief tot dan toe onbekende personen, 
konden worden aangehouden. In dit proefschrift is verder een onderscheid 
gemaakt tussen reactief en proactief groepsgeweld. Vechtafspraken waren 
ten tijde van het onderzoek echter (nog) geen prioriteit voor de politie. Het 
aantal opsporingsonderzoeken dat binnen de vierde studie kon worden 
geanalyseerd bleef derhalve beperkt tot twee. Hoewel er geen redenen 
zijn om aan te nemen dat deze twee vechtafspraken dat niet zijn, kon niet 
worden vastgesteld in welke mate de huidige bevindingen representatief 
zijn voor alle vechtafspraken en de daarbij betrokken personen. Kortom, 
hoewel het proefschrift een beredeneerde steekproef van zowel 
groepsgeweldincidenten als groepsgeweldplegers omvat, bleek een geheel 
willekeurige steekproef van collectieve geweldsincidenten en daders niet 
mogelijk. Derhalve is voorzichtigheid geboden bij het veralgemeniseren 
van de huidige bevindingen naar andere contexten waarin groepsgeweld 
voorkomt (zoals demonstraties).
Voor het inventariseren van de criminele voorgeschiedenis en recidive 
van groepsgeweldplegers is gebruikgemaakt van politieregistratiegegevens. 
Deze data kunnen sterk beïnvloed zijn door beleidsprioriteiten van de politie 
en het Openbaar Ministerie (OM). Om die reden kan het daadwerkelijke 
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criminele gedrag van personen zijn onderschat (onderrapportage). Deze 
beperking kan de in de eerste studie onderscheiden criminele carrière-
trajecten van groepsgeweldplegers en het toewijzen van personen aan 
deze trajecten hebben beïnvloed. Dit geldt eveneens voor de waargenomen 
mate van persistentie onder groepsgeweldplegers. Aanvullend bleken 
objectieve data aangaande psychologische kenmerken c.q. diagnoses vrijwel 
geheel afwezig. Dit betekent dat binnen het huidige proefschrift vrijwel 
uitsluitend gebruikgemaakt is van afgeleide variabelen in plaats van met 
klinische instrumenten verkregen data. In de derde en vierde studie van dit 
proefschrift is daarnaast gebruikgemaakt van kwalitatief materiaal. In het 
bijzonder de vierde studie naar vechtafspraken vraagt om een zekere mate 
van terughoudendheid bij het interpreteren van de onderzoekbevindingen. 
Het aantal casestudies was, in de vorm van twee strafrechtelijke onderzoeken, 
beperkt. Bovendien werd deze informatie uitsluitend verzameld ten behoeve 
van de bewijsvoering in de context van een strafrechtelijk onderzoek, en 
beriepen bij vechtafspraken betrokken personen zich vrijwel altijd op hun 
zwijgrecht. Hierdoor was vanuit de eerste hand vrijwel geen informatie 
over motieven om deel te nemen aan vechtafspraken beschikbaar. In plaats 
daarvan moest worden vertrouwd op informatie uit de tweede hand (i.c. 
politieprofessionals werkzaam op het gebied van voetbal en veiligheid), 
waarbij vertekening in de mogelijke motieven voor deelname aan een 
vechtafspraak niet volledig kon worden uitgesloten. 
Ondanks voornoemde beperkingen maakten de verzamelde data, 
dankzij een breed scala aan bronnen, grote steekproeven en verschillende 
methodologische benaderingen, een uitgebreid onderzoek mogelijk naar de 
vraag of verschillen tussen tegenstrijdige verklaringen voor groepsgeweld 
konden worden overbrugd. 
Het proefschrift levert een belangrijke bijdrage aan de theorievorming 
op het vlak van groepsgeweld. De bevindingen uit de eerste twee 
onderzoeken laten uitgesproken verschillen binnen de steekproef van 
groepsgeweldplegers zien waar het gaat om criminele carrièrekenmerken 
en de aanwezigheid van psychologische kenmerken. Deze uitkomsten passen 
bij bestaande typologische theorieën over de achterliggende verklaringen 
voor criminaliteit. Dit proefschrift geeft daarmee als eerste een empirisch 
onderbouwd argument om meerdere typen groepsgeweldplegers te 
onderscheiden (in ieder geval: ‘vroeg-startende hoogfrequente daders’ 
en ‘incidentele groepsgeweldplegers’). De achterliggende verklaringen 
voor betrokkenheid bij groepsgeweld verschillen per type dader. Dit 
biedt handvatten om ogenschijnlijk tegenstrijdige verklaringen voor 
groepsgeweld met elkaar te verbinden. Dit proefschrift laat tevens zien dat 
groepsgeweld niet alleen kan voortkomen uit triggers en spanningen tussen 
de betrokken groepen; vanuit de hooligancultuur wordt gewelddadig gedrag 
positief gewaardeerd, wat onder andere tot uiting komt in vechtafspraken 
tussen hooligangroepen. Tegelijkertijd is het maken van een onderscheid 
tussen reactieve en proactieve vormen van groepsgeweld geen sinecure. De 
strandrel in Hoek van Holland (Muller et al., 2010) – die werd gebruikt als 
vergelijkingscase in de Project-X casestudy – liet zien dat een kleine groep 
personen die behoorden tot een opkomende maar beruchte hooligangroep
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het voornemen hadden een rel te veroorzaken. De meerderheid van 
de bij het geweld betrokken personen reageerde vervolgens op hoe 
gebeurtenissen zich ontvouwden. Dit geeft aan dat verklarende factoren 
voor een rel kunnen verschillen tussen de personen die daarbij betrokken 
zijn. Dit pleit voor een theoretische benadering waarin aandacht is voor 
zowel reactieve als proactieve vormen van groepsgeweld en waarin zowel 
negatieve (gevoel van onrecht) als positieve (status, behoefte aan spanning) 
aspecten van gewelddadig gedrag worden meegewogen. Theoretisch past 
dit bij de recent geïntroduceerde quadripartiete geweldstypologie (QVT) 
(zie Howard, 2015).
De uitkomsten van het proefschrift hebben verschillende implicaties 
voor de praktijk. Zo is het binnen de uitgevoerde onderzoeken moeizaam 
gebleken om gegevens te verzamelen over de persoonskenmerken 
van groepsgeweldplegers. De bevindingen van de uitgevoerde studies 
impliceren echter dat vaker dan nu het geval is psychologische rapporten 
en risicotaxaties uitgevoerd moeten worden bij groepsgeweldplegers. 
Zo kan een beter beeld worden verkregen van de onderliggende oorzaken 
van iemands betrokkenheid bij groepsgeweld, het recidiverisico en de 
vereiste maatregelen om recidive te voorkomen. Het nemen van preventieve 
maatregelen tegen personen die als persistent groepsgeweldpleger kunnen 
worden aangemerkt, kan bijdragen aan het beperken van situaties waarin 
het tot groepsgeweld kan komen. Een kanttekening daarbij is wel dat alleen 
passende gedragsinterventies recidive daadwerkelijk kunnen verminderen. 
De uitkomsten van deze thesis bieden aanvullend zicht op criminele carrière- 
en persoonskenmerken die behulpzaam kunnen zijn bij het identificeren van 
personen met een hoog risico op recidive. Hiermee kunnen de bevindingen 
van het proefschrift bijdragen aan het verder vormgeven en ontwikkelen van 
een in 2007 door de politie opgezette database van notoire ordeverstoorders. 
Tot slot blijkt uit het onderzoek dat een klein deel van ‘bekende’ hooligans 
deelneemt aan vechtafspraken. Het feit dat deze vechtafspraken in kleine 
kring worden georganiseerd, pleit voor een focus op het identificeren van bij 
deze gevechten betrokken personen. Het samenbrengen van verschillende 
informatiestromen (bijv. Politieregistratiegegevens en politieprofessionals 
die heimelijk werken) kan hierbij behulpzaam zijn en richting geven aan een 
persoonsgerichte aanpak (PGA). Vanuit de bevinding dat gelegenheid en 
pakkans een belangrijke contextuele factor zijn voor het al dan niet doorgaan 
van vechtafspraken, kan ook worden geïnvesteerd op het vergroten van de 
(waargenomen) pakkans onder potentiële deelnemers. 
In dit proefschrift is voor het eerst een poging gedaan om tegengestelde 
opvattingen over de achterliggende oorzaken van groepsgeweld samen 
te brengen. Vanuit de in dit proefschrift opgenomen studies kan worden 
geconcludeerd dat er meerdere typen groepsgeweldplegers zijn, 
die verschillen qua criminele geschiedenis, individuele kenmerken en 
recidiverisico. Waar contextuele factoren het meest in het oog springen 
voor bij spontaan groepsgeweld betrokken personen, lijken individuele 
kenmerken een belangrijke verklarende factor onder groepsgeweldplegers 
die betrokken zijn bij zowel spontane als vooropgezette vormen van 
groepsgeweld. Laatstgenoemde groep vormt een klein deel van alle
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personen die spontaan betrokken raken bij groepsgeweld; andersom is hun 
betrokkenheid bij vooropgezette vormen van groepsgeweld aanmerkelijk 
groter. Dit proefschrift suggereert dat het theoretisch relevant is om 
te differentiëren tussen verschillende vormen van groepsgeweld en 
groepsgeweldplegers.
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